1967

1076

VOL VII

(1 JULY - 31 JULY)

~~FO 371~~

FO 174/402

File No. 1076

Name of File—

INTER - ARAB AFFAIRS

AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

RECORD OF WEEDING		
	INITIALS	DATE
2 YEARS		11/11
5 YEARS (CONSULAR POSTS ONLY)		
10 YEARS		

CLOSED UNTIL 2001

LAST Year's File No. 1076/66.

NEXT Year's File No.

1076

(1882) D. 156230 177m 10/65 P.E. Gp. 610

1967

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

Kuwait and the Arab-Israel War

Kuwait has returned to normal. (Paragraph 1)

Kuwait's enthusiastic espousal of the Arab cause in Palestine was combined with a careful consideration of her own interests. (Paragraphs 2-4)

The Government was successful in maintaining security. The decision to cut off oil to Britain and the United States was taken reluctantly in deference to Arab pressure and the Government have sought to minimise the effect on Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. (Paragraphs 5-8)

A strike in the Kuwait Oil Company was brought to an end by the Government, though not without difficulty. Production is now limited only by a shortage of tankers. (Paragraph 9)

The Arab Foreign Ministers Conference was cut short for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. (Paragraph 10)

A banking crisis caused by a shortage of currency was narrowly averted. (Paragraph 11)

British interests have come through with surprisingly little damage, but Kuwait may still be exposed to pressure to act against them. (Paragraph 12)

Some similarities with our experience.

O.S. AJS 13.VII
J.O. 14/7
N.G.K. Fus 17/7

12/VII

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

(1013/67)

No. 17

1 July, 1967.

Sir,

Life in Kuwait has returned to normal, on the surface at least, after the convulsions of the first two weeks of what the radio calls "black June". The fighting is over, the oil workers are back at their jobs, and the political forces of the Arab world are deployed for the time being at the United Nations. Kuwait is coming up for air.

2. During the last two weeks of May Kuwait worked itself into a state of exaltation. Every Egyptian move against Israel was applauded almost before it was made: the United Nations force must leave Sinai and Gaza, the Gulf of Aqaba was an Arab sea, the Arabs were united at last, and Israel's days were numbered. For the first time since they achieved complete independence the Kuwaitis could find an opportunity to show their true Arab mettle. The Foreign Minister visited Cairo; and on his return he summoned me and other Western representatives and warned us not to intervene in the crisis, otherwise our interests "would be stopped". Between the 28th and 31st of May a Battalion Group of the Kuwait Army was moved by air to the Canal Zone. On the 4th of June, at a meeting in Baghdad, the Kuwait Government agreed with the governments of other Arab oil-producing states that oil supplies should be withheld from those who committed

/aggression

The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

aggression against the Arabs. Kuwait had moved into the front line: Syria herself could not have done better.

3. At this stage the Kuwaitis seemed as confident of victory as they were in the justice of their cause, though I do not think they knew quite what they meant by victory. They were irritated by our insistence on freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, but they could afford to remain friendly to us whilst ignoring our representations, for they were going to win. However, even at this stage the Government were operating on two levels of thought; for underneath the excitement of Arabism they were moved by more sober calculations. It was possible to interpret their actions either as the products of enthusiasm or as efforts to anticipate and contain the pressures that they knew would be exerted on them both within Kuwait itself and by the other Arab governments. Even the Foreign Minister, more of an enthusiast than most, made it clear to me from the start that whatever might be said or done about oil supplies, the Kuwait Government were determined to protect the oil installations against sabotage; the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces - and he was not alone in this - looked over his shoulder towards Iraq as he reluctantly prepared to send a sizeable part of his Army to Egypt; and one of the merchants confided miserably to me, just before the war began, that Kuwait was finished whichever side won, for she would either fall to the irresistible prestige of a victorious Nasser or be engulfed in the frustration that would follow defeat.

4. This kind of political dualism can doubtless be found in every Arab country, but it is particularly pronounced in Kuwait, where the wealthy minority of natives must maintain themselves against the foreign Arabs who keep the economy and the state going, as well as against their powerful and

covetous Arab brethren outside. It is thus difficult to disentangle the motives of the Kuwait Government. It would not be legitimate to call one set artificial and the other real, for though they do not forget their own interests, the Kuwaitis certainly feel strongly and sincerely about Palestine. They generally resolve the conflict by combining extravagance of gesture with a minimum of action; but gesture and action sometimes get mixed up, to our discomfort and to theirs. In their Arab policy they seem to reverse the political wisdom of the West, for their motto could well be "fortiter in modo, suaviter in re".

5. It is only in the light of this duality of thought and feeling that the subsequent actions of the Kuwait Government can be interpreted to make any sense - Western sense, that is, for the Arabs understand it well enough. They were going to win, but they were surprised when the war came: the "Zionist gangs" were universally condemned as aggressive, but somehow they were not supposed to attack first. When the attack came on the 5th of June the Kuwait Government declared "defensive war" on Israel - a piece of humbug required by the Constitution; but their next act was to cancel the planned despatch of reinforcements to the Kuwaiti forces in Sinai. In the matter of security they showed surprising resolution: having declared martial law, they immediately despatched guards, including a brigade of the Army, to protect the oil installations, and they deployed armed police patrols in Kuwait town, including substantial detachments to protect this and the American Embassy. They permitted demonstrations to form but kept them fragmented; and this policy was entirely successful, but for a small group of Palestinian demonstrators who on the 6th of June reached the gates of the Embassy with a supply of oversized (and consequently short-range) brickbats and managed to break some outhouse windows and damage two or three cars. As far as I know, this was the only damage

caused by disturbances in Kuwait throughout the crisis. The authorities are justly, if irritatingly, proud of this record in a country which harbours tens of thousands of Palestinians, Syrians, Iraqis and Egyptians.

6. The oil story is somewhat less edifying. Having committed themselves on the 4th of June at Baghdad to deny oil supplies to aggressors, the Kuwait Government woke up on the 6th of June to find that Cairo and other Arab capitals were accusing the United States and Britain of giving massive air support to Israel. Some members of the Government immediately believed these stories of our involvement, as I discovered that morning when I denied them to the Acting Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kuwaiti Ministers were meeting at that time to consider what action they should take, and so I arranged for a further denial to be passed to the Amir himself. This drew a personal message from the Foreign Minister to assure me that the Kuwait Government would not repeat the allegations on Kuwait Radio and would not take any decision on the basis of unsubstantiated reports. The message came at about 10 a.m. on the 6th of June. Neither promise was kept: on the one o'clock news that day Kuwait Radio carried an announcement that the export of oil to the United Kingdom and the United States was to be banned because of their aggression against the Arabs.

7. The Kuwait Government could, and did, justify their action to us as the least they could do if they were to control the situation here and prevent sabotage to the oil installations. In this I think they were right; but judging that they needed a sharp reminder that our patience was not inexhaustible, I sought instructions to inform the Amir that the action which the Kuwait Government had taken, without a word of consultation with us, called into question the

validity of the Exchange of Letters of 1961. Before I could receive your answer the Foreign Minister summoned me, late in the evening of the 6th of June, to explain his Government's action. He hoped that you would understand Kuwait's difficulties and that the stoppage of the oil would be temporary. Kuwait relied on Her Majesty's Government for protection and wanted to retain her friendship with Great Britain. The Kuwait Government would take all measures necessary to maintain law and order and to protect British lives and property.

8. It must have cost the Foreign Minister a lot to speak in that way at that time: to us in Kuwait the interview marked the turning point in the crisis of Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. By then it must have been clear to the Kuwait Government that the Arabs were beaten and that Kuwait's survival in an uncertain future might well come to depend once again on the support of her oldest friend. When I saw the Amir on the 8th of June and the Foreign Minister again on the 9th of June, the atmosphere was more relaxed; and both repeated assurances on the safety of British lives and property and on the importance they attached to their links with Britain. Indeed the Amir, though he appeared stupified by events in the Levant, seemed rather pleased with his achievements in Kuwait - the maintenance of order in the town and the oilfields and the avoidance (as he saw it) of any real damage to the common economic interests of Britain and Kuwait. The Amir, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister all promised to moderate the tone of Kuwait Radio, to which I had taken the strongest objection; and this they have done. I wish I could say the same of the press, which seems determined to out-Cairo Cairo.

9. The security authorities had their severest test on the night of the 9th of June and the next day, when a number of demonstrations mourned the withdrawal and celebrated the return

of President Nasser. The crowds looked nasty, but there was no violence; and on the 11th of June public meetings were banned, to be replaced by a general strike. There is strong evidence, though no proof, that the Government themselves planned the strike as their own demonstration of Arabism: a strike which should be painless (the airport and the petrol stations continued to operate) and which should not last more than twenty-four hours. However, things did not go according to the presumed plan; for although Kuwait town came to life on the 12th of June, the oil workers stayed away, and the unions began to feel their oats and looked like getting out of hand. For two more days the expatriate staff of the Kuwait Oil Company (mostly British) managed to keep essential production going in order to provide sufficient natural gas to operate Kuwait's generating stations and distillation plants. But it was clear that this situation could not last, and on the evening of the 13th of June the Government, deciding that enough was enough, issued a decree under their martial law powers ordering all persons resident in Kuwait to go back to work. This was completely effective, and work has since proceeded normally in the oilfields. Production is limited by a shortage of tankers, due partly to the closure of the Suez Canal and partly to the wish of the Kuwait Government that British and American flag ships should not be loaded for the first few days after the strike. This restriction was finally lifted on the 22nd of June, and the first American flag ship is expected to arrive at Mina al Ahmadi on the 7th of July.

10. With the strike of the oil workers broken, one further demonstration of Arab solidarity was yet to come: on the 17th of June Kuwait played the host to a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers. It looked as though we were in for more trouble as the angry delegations assembled. Fortunately, however, the

meeting coincided with the opening of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations; and after a seven hour meeting lasting into the early hours of the 18th of June, the Foreign Ministers betook themselves to the cooler latitude of New York. Thus the meeting, which had begun with a bang at the airport, ended with a whimper in the Salam Palace, and little has been heard of it since. Its resolutions did no more than confirm what the Baghdad meeting of the 4th of June had decided about oil supplies; and for the rest, it seems that there was a general reluctance to play, at any rate so soon, the aces dealt by the extemist Algerians.

11. The first week after the outbreak of the fighting was further enlivened by a monetary problem. There was a run on the banks. and particularly on the British Bank of the Middle East, which had attracted large deposits from Jordanians and Palestinians as well as from Kuwaitis. The Kuwait Currency Board was quite unprepared for this situation, and it began to look as though the note issue would run out and endanger the whole credit structure. The Amir, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance all gave me assurances of their interest in the British Bank of the Middle East; but apart from closing the banks for three days they had no plan for dealing with the shortage of currency. By the 18th of June the crisis had passed and money began to flow back to the banks, except for the British Bank of the Middle East, which has inevitably continued to suffer a steady loss of deposits.

12. So the first phase of the crisis has ended in Kuwait. To all outward appearances we have emerged comparatively unscathed here. Kuwait's ancient monuments, including Her Majesty's Embassy, still stand. The British community remains undisturbed. The oil still flows, albeit not to Britain and the United States, from undamaged installations. The bulk of

Kuwait's sterling holdings, as far as I can gather, remain in London despite strident press demands for their withdrawal. The British Bank of the Middle East has retained its concession, though it has lost some of its deposits. The troublesome foreign Arabs have been kept in their place, and Al Sabah remain confident and apparently unshaken.

13. But we have not finished yet: the effects of this crisis will take time to work themselves out. Kuwait will continue to be subjected to severe external pressures and internal strains. The ruling family may be confident, but the people have lost their confidence in the West, in the Soviet Union, in the leadership of the United Arab Republic, and above all in themselves. Their ease of association with us, which I found so impressive during the short time I was here before the trouble started, has gone: we do not see them socially now. This situation will doubtless improve as time effaces the shock and our common interests reassert themselves; but I doubt whether things will ever be quite the same again. In a subsequent despatch I hope to assess the longer term effects on Anglo-Kuwaiti relations and examine the lessons that we might draw from the events of "black June".

14. I should like to end this despatch by paying tribute to the British community, who showed such patience and fortitude that I found them a help rather than a responsibility; to the management of the Kuwait Oil Company, whose hard work and skill, both professional and diplomatic, resolved many daily problems; to my American colleague, whose complete co-operation was invaluable to a newcomer; to the Kuwait police, who protected the Embassy and the community with remarkable success and courtesy; and finally to my staff, particularly those concerned with our communications, who cheerfully worked very long hours in conditions that were not always easy.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Beirut, Jedda, Amman, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Khartum, Tripoli, Benghazi, Bahrain and Washington, and to the Political Agents at Bahrain, Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(G.G. Arthur)

Reference 1076

Mr Adams seems to share
my doubts about London
& King Hussein!

H of C P.T.O. L

L (VIII

Mrs Cinnadeth

Confidential

I think that we all have our doubts about King Hussein + Jordan but few diplomats who have served in the middle East proper would believe the Israelis myopic view that Jordan need not have taken part in the Arab Israeli war. This may be a nice explanation to explain away things to the Americans and British - but we can be certain that the Israeli attack on the West Bank and Jerusalem was no holding operation and the Israelis could have stopped and switched earlier to the Syrians had they wanted. Did they?

The Jordanian performance was no better and no worse than the Egyptian, and if one is to believe Jenna Hyane it is a good deal better than that of the Syrian regime + officers (though not the soldiers).

What we have to question once and above the performance + future of Jordan is the position of Nasser + nasserism. At present the Arab extremists do not include Nasser (who may be still fairly stable at home) but others Boumedienne, Atassi, Arafat who are not so stable at home + are playing foreign policy for their own internal reasons.

VIII

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

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PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDONRGR TKY◇
PRODROME RABAT
FOR 4 FOLDN GRPS 450A 011535Z
FROM FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO FLASH PRODROME RABAT
TELNO 358 1 JULY 1967
FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK

B

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1582 OF 30 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
AMMAN AND COPENHAGEN.
MY TELNO 1578: MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A RESOLUTION NOW TABLED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, COSTA RICA, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, GUATEMALA, BOLIVIA, HONDURAS, MEXICO, GUYANA, EL SALVADOR, JAMAICA, NICARAGUA, ECUADOR, COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA:-
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

CONSIDERING THAT THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IS AN UNAVOIDABLE OBLIGATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THEY SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE:
CONSIDERING ALSO THAT THE CEASE-FIRE ORDER ISSUED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCEPTED BY THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND BY THE STATES OF JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS A FIRST STEP TO REACH A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY OTHER MEANS THAT THE ORGANISATION MIGHT ADOPT AND THE PARTIES ENFORCE:
1. CALLS URGENTLY UPON
(A) ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OF JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WHICH IT HAS OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT:
(B) THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT TO PUT AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, TO ENDEAVOUR TO ESTABLISH A CO-EXISTENCE BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND TO RESORT IN EVERY CASE TO THE PROCEDURES FOR PACIFIC SETTLEMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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SERVICE TELEX

2. REITERATES THE CONVICTION THAT NO STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE BASED ON THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE, AND DECLARES THAT THE VALIDITY OF OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY SUCH MEANS SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNISED.

3. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST COOPERATING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND RELYING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

(A) IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1(A) ABOVE:

(B) TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS OF THE REGION:

(C) TO OBTAIN AN ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES: AND

(D) TO GUARANTEE THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE TERRITORY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES OF THE REGION, INCLUDING TO THIS EFFECT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DE-MILITARIZED ZONES.

4. REAFFIRMS, AS IN PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS, THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM, WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS 22ND SESSION.

F O PASS MOSCOW 240, PARIS 241, TEL AVIV 263, AMMAN 129 AND COPENHAGEN 114.

SOSFA
TPD 011542 EHH

Sent tel. recording conversation with the Belgian.

PRODROME RABAT

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

MXDF

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME RABAT
FOR3 FOLDN GRPS 250A 011502Z
FROM FOLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO FLASH PRODROME RABAT
TELNO 359 01 JULY 1967
FOLLOWING RCVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1578 OF 30 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TELAVIV
AMMAN AND COPENHAGEN.
MY TELEGRAM NO 1550: MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING IS REVISED QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION
INCORPORATING AMENDMENTS TABLED BY YUGOSLAVIA AT THE END OF THE
GENERAL DEBATE THIS MORNING. MALAYSIA HAS NOW JOINED THE LIST OF
CO-SPONSORS.
BEGINS
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
HAVING DISCUSSED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
NOTING THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL OCCUPY AREAS INCLUDING
TERRITORIES BELONGING TO JORDAN SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC
1. CALLS UPON ISRAEL IMMEDIATELY TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES TO
THE POSITIONS THEY HELD PRIOR TO 5 JUNE 1967:
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PRESENT RESOLUTION AND TO SECURE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATIOM ESTABLISHED BY THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB
COUNTRIES:

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non-aligned

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

3. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESIGNATE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED ~~IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA~~:

4. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RENDER EVERY ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION=:

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT URGENTLY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ISRAEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION:

6.REQUESTS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAEL ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN COMPLETED, CONSIDER URGENTLY ALL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SEEK PEACEFUL WAYS AND MEANS FOR THE SOLUTION OF ALL PROBLEMS-- LEGAL, POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN, THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS, GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN PARTICULAR THOSE CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 33.

ENDS

FO PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 237 PARIS 238 TELAVIV 261 AMMAN 127, AND ROUTINE COPENHAGEN 133.

SOSFA
TPD 011508 EHH

PRODROME RABAT

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cy CAT. 'A'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 360 D M

[Date] 1/7/67 R M

Repeated to

[Priority] FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL. ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TEL NO. 1401

DF 1 JULY AND TO BEIRUT. JEDDA. KUWAIT. BAHRAIN

. KHARTOUM. H.Y. ADEN. BENGHAZI. DOHA. ABU DHABI.

DUBAI. TRIPOLI. TUNIS. ALGIERS AND RABAT.

REPEATED ANKARA. TEHRAN. WASHINGTON. PARIS.

MOSCOW. TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIDDLE EAST.

A B

DISTRIBUTION

U.K. MIS. NEW YORK TELEGRAMS NOS. 1578 AND 1582

(BEING REPEATED TO ALL ADDRESSEES) GIVES THE

TEXTS OF A ~~QUOTE~~ "NON-ALIGNED" ~~UNQUOTE~~ AND ~~QUOTE~~

"LATIN AMERICAN" ~~UNQUOTE~~ RESOLUTION WHICH ARE

EXPECTED TO BE VOTED ON IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ON MONDAY 3 JULY.

2. MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD VOTE

AGAINST THE ~~QUOTE~~ "NON-ALIGNED" ~~UNQUOTE~~ RESOLUTION

AND FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

3. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THERE WILL BE ADVERSE

See top-the.night. Reaction/

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

ARAB REACTIONS. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY UNLESS YOU SEE OVERRIDING OBJECTION, TRY TO ANTICIPATE [redacted]ESE BY INITIATING ACTION AT ANY LEVEL AT WHICH IT IS LIKELY TO BE USEFUL TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED TO EXPLAIN THE REASONING BEHIND THIS DECISION.

4. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE DECLARED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THE ARAB TERRITORY THEY HAVE OCCUPIED. WE WISH TO SEE THIS BROUGHT ABOUT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. BOTH RESOLUTIONS UNEQUIVOCALLY PROVIDE FOR SUCH WITHDRAWAL. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM IS THAT, BY ISOLATING THIS ELEMENT AND IGNORING THE OTHER ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION, PASSAGE OF THE ~~QUOTE~~ "NON-ALIGNED" ~~UNQUOTE~~ RESOLUTION WILL CONTRIBUTE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF WITHDRAWAL. THE MOTIVES OF THE SPONSORS OF THIS RESOLUTION ARE OPPORTUNIST AND CYNICAL.

5. IN MY CONTACTS WITH ARAB REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK, AS WELL AS IN MY SPEECH ON 21 JUNE, I MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT IN MY VIEW THERE WAS NO HOPE OF SECURING WITHDRAWAL UNLESS, ON THE ARAB SIDE, THERE WAS A WILLINGNESS TO GRASP THE NETTLE OF ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED TO END THE STATE OF WAR. THE ~~QUOTE~~ "NON-ALIGNED" ~~UNQUOTE~~ RESOLUTION IGNORES THIS. NOTHING IN THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION

WOULD. COMMIT S THE ARABS TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. BUT IT PROVIDES A CONSTRUCTIVE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS CAN WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH IN TERMS OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. HAS SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

5. SITUATION AT UNITED NATIONS MAY CHANGE FURTHER BEFORE VOTES ARE TAKEN. AND WE SHALL ADVISE YOU AS NECESSARY. BUT FOR REASON EXPLAINED IN PARA. 3 ABOVE WE WANT YOU TO TAKE ACTION WITHOUT DELAY. SOSFA.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Signature]

[No. and prefix]

[Date]

[Priority]

CY/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FCO

TO RABAT

SOS FM

No. 361 D M

1/7/67 R M

Repeated to

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 1402~OF

1 JULY AND TO BEIRUT KUWAIT JEDDA BAHRAIN

KHARTOUM BENGHAZI TRIPOLI TUNIS ALGIERS RABAT

ADEN CAIRO ABU DHABI DOHA AND DUBAI REPEATED

DISTRIBUTION

FOR INFORMATION TO U K MISSION NEW YORK

TEL AVIV WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1401 PARAGRAPH 3.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION.

PLEASE REPORT BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM YOUR

ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY LOCAL REACTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

See gp. tel. reply.

2/VI

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
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Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]

FROM TO

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. D M

[Date] R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

IN TERMS OF FRESH ACTION AGAINST OIL EXPORTS

AND BRITISH TRADE AND PUBLIC DISTURBANCES:

AND ALSO ANY RECOMMENDATIONS AND

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF

BRITISH LIVES AND PROPERTY.

DISTRIBUTION

SOFIA.

Despatch of opinion of El Alamein.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

MAP-31

- ARRIVE CE MATIN A LONDRES DU ROI HUSSEIN DE JORDANIE.-

LONDRES, 1ER JUIL.(MAP).- ARRIVE CE MATIN A LONDRES, SM. LE ROI HUSSEIN DE JORDANIE A DECLARE NOTAMMENT EN REPONSE AUX QUESTIONS DE JOURNALISTES QU'IL VOULAIT BIEN ADMETTRE MAINTENANT QUE LES ETATS UNIS ET LA GRANDE BRETAGNE N'ETAIENT PAS INTERVENUS MATERIELLEMENT, MAIS QU'ILS AVAIENT ACCORDE A ISRAEL LEUR SYMPATHIE ET LEURS ENCOURAGEMENTS''.

''SUR LE MOMENT , CERTAINS FACTEURS NOUS ONT DONNE L'IMPRESSION QU'IL SE PASSAIT QUELQUE CHOSE D'ANORMAL. DEPUIS NOUS AVONS EXAMINE TOUS LES ELEMENTS D'ENQUETE ET NOUS NOUS SOMMES CONVAINCUS QU'IL N'YA AVAIT PAS EU D'INTERVENTION MATERIELLE'' A AJOUTE LE SOUVERAIN JORDANIEN.(MAP).-

...(SUIVRA)...

MO/DD/+++++++

MAP-32

- ARRIVE CE MATIN...(DEUX)...

IL A ENCORE PRECISE QUE '''SI LES CHOSES REVENAIENT A CE QU'3)-LES ETAIENT AVANT LE 5 JUIN CE SERAIT ALORS UNE PREMIERE ETAPE VERS LA RECHERCHE D'UNE SOLUTION AUX PROBLEMES DU MOYEN ORIENT''.

IL CONVIENT DE RAPPELER QUE LE ROI HUSSEIN A DECLARE A SON DEPART DE NEW YORK QU'IL ETAIT ''ENTEIREMENT SATISAFAIT DE CE QU'AUCUN AVION AMERICAIN OU BRITANNIQUE N'AVAIT AIDE LES FORCES AERIENNES ISRAELIENNES''.(MAP).-

MO/DD/++++++++12H55+++++

1076 Rabat

FO. 371 No. 71 ARRIVED TU

En Clair

KUWAIT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 377 1 July, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.377 of 1 July, Repeated for information to Amman, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beirut, Jedda, Bahrain, and Saving to Tripoli, Benghazi, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Khartoum, UKMIS New York, Washington, Moscow and Holy See.

1076 G/67.

My telegram No.362 [Jerusalem].

The Kuwait National Assembly today resolved to urge the Parliaments of all Islamic and other States to oppose both the measures taken by Israel to annex old Jerusalem, and any attempts to bring about the internationalisation of the City.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Tripoli 2, Benghazi 2, Rabat 2, Algiers 2, Tunis 2, Khartoum 2, UKMIS New York 5, Washington 28, Moscow 2 and Holy See 2.

Mr. Arthur

Sent 1300Z/1 July
Recd 1550Z/1 July

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
Eastern Dept.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
-6 JUL 1967

AJS 13.VII

88888

Rabat No. 22 Saving to Rabat

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat.A.

IMMEDIATE AIGIERS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 226 2 July, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

1/7

(361 Kuw)

1076/

Your telegram No. 1402 to Amman.

Only major steps that remain for the Algerians to take are sequestration of property, take over of surviving business interests (this boils down to Barclays and one or two small enterprises) and expulsion of British. I do not think that our support for this resolution would provoke them to do any of these things though danger of their taking some action would be increased if we were isolated, with the United States, in support of the resolution, and if the other Arabs reacted violently.

2. I base this assessment mainly on two points:

(a) The Algerians have alwasy taken the line that we are backing Israel to the hilt; our vote will therefore not change anything.

(b) Such British interests as survive here do so because it suits the Algerians to let them do so.

3. No new precautions seem called for. With Aden filling the local headlines, British subjects are on the look out for trouble; if there is a sudden deterioration I shall recommend a B.B.C. announcement. 5 July (Independence Day) could be a critical time. We shall continue to take full precautions at this post.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to UKMis New York 5, Tripoli 16, Tunis 18 and Rabat 23.

Telno not Saving no

Mr. Dawbarn Sent 0930Z 2 July.
Recd.1043Z 2 July.

AJS 13.VII

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

44444

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 11 JUL 1967

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21/7/67.

Résolution présentée par la Yougoslavie et d'autres pays

L'Assemblée Générale,

après avoir étudié la situation grave prévalant au Proche-Orient et notant que les forces armées d'Israel occupent des zones comprenant des territoires appartenant à la Jordanie, à la Syrie et à la République Arabe Unie

1. Fait appel à Israel pour retirer immédiatement toutes ses troupes aux positions occupées avant le 5 juin 1967;

2. Demande au Secrétaire-Général d'assurer la conformité avec cette résolution et d'assurer, avec l'aide de l'Organisation du contrôle de la trève de l'ONU établie par le Conseil de Sécurité, l'observance stricte par toutes les parties des dispositions des accords de l'Armistice général entre Israel et les pays Arabes;

3. Demande en outre au Secrétaire-Général de désigner en temps utile un représentant personnel qui l'aidera à assurer la conformité avec cette résolution et sera en contact avec les parties intéressées;

4. Fait appel à tous les Etats pour donner toute l'aide voulue au Secrétaire-Général pour la mise en application de cette résolution;

5. Demande au Secrétaire-Général de faire un rapport urgent à l'Assemblée Générale et au Conseil de Sécurité sur l'application par Israel des termes de cette résolution;

6. Demande au Conseil de Sécurité qui a déjà été saisi de cette question, dès que les forces armées d'Israel se seront retirées, d'étudier d'urgence tous les aspects de la situation au Moyen-Orient et de rechercher des moyens légaux et pacifiques pour tous les problèmes légaux, politiques et humanitaires, par les moyens appropriés, selon les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et en particulier ceux exposés dans les articles 2 et 33.

2/7/67.

Texte d'une résolution présentée par Trinidad et Tobago, Panama, le Paraguay, Costa Rica, l'Argentine, le Brésil, le Chili, le Guatemala, la Bolivie, le Honduras, le Mexique, la Guyane, le Salvador, la Jamaique, le Nicaragua, l'Ecuador, la Colombie, le Vénézuéla:-

L'Assemblée Générale,

considérant que la préservation de la paix est une obligation inévitable pour tous les Etats membres et, dès lors, qu'ils devraient s'abstenir de faire usage de la force dans la sphère internationale;
considérant aussi que l'ordre du cessez-le-feu donné par le Conseil de Sécurité et accepté par l'Etat d'Israel et par les Etats de la Jordanie, de la Syrie et de la République Arabe Unie est une première étape vers une paix juste au Moyen Orient qui devrait être confirmée par d'autres moyens que l'Organisation pourrait adopter et les parties mettre en vigueur:

1. Lance un appel urgent
   (a) à Israel pour le retrait de toutes ses forces de tous les territoires de Jordanie, de Syrie et de la République Arabe Unie occupés à la suite du récent conflit;
   (b) aux parties en conflit pour mettre fin à l'état de belligérence pour tenter d'établir une coéxistence basée sur un bon voisinage et de recourir dans tous les cas aux procédures pour un règlement pacifique prescrites dans la Charte des Nations Unies.

2. Réitère la conviction qu'aucun ordre international ne peut être basé sur la menace ou l'usage de la force, et déclare que la validité de l'occupation ou de l'acquisition territoriale par de tels moyens ne devrait pas être reconnue.

3. Demande au Conseil de Sécurité de continuer, avec un sens d'urgence, d'étudier la situation au Moyen-Orient en coopérant directement avec les parties et en s'appuyant sur la présence des Nations Unies,

   (a) afin de mener à bien les dispositions du paragraphe 1 (a) ci-dessus;

(b)

(b) de garantir la liberté de transit par les voies d'eau internationales de la région;

(c) d'obtenir une solution adéquate et complète du problème des réfugiés; et

(d) de garantir l'inviolabilité du territoire et l'indépendance politique des Etats de la région, y compris, à cet effet, l'établissement de zones démilitarisées.

4. Réaffirme, ainsi que dans des reccomandations précédentes, le caractère désirable de l'établissement d'un régime international pour la ville de Jérusalem, qui devrait être étudié par l'Assemblée Générale à sa 22ème session.

Texte d'une résolution présentée par Trinidad et Tobago, Panama, le Paraguay, Costa Rica, l'Argentine, le Brésil, le Chili, le Guatemala, la Bolivie, le Honduras, le Mexique, la Guyane, le Salvador, la Jamaique, le Nicaragua, l'Equador, la Colombie, le Vénézuéla:-

L'Assemblée Générale,

considérant que la préservation de la paix est une obligation inévitable pour tous les Etats membres et, dès lors, qu'ils devraient s'abstenir de faire usage de la force dans la sphère internationale;
considérant aussi que l'ordre du cessez-le-feu donné par le Conseil de Sécurité et accepté par l'Etat d'Israel et par les Etats de la Jordanie, de la Syrie et de la République Arabe Unie est une première étape vers une paix juste au Moyen Orient qui devrait être confirmée par d'autres moyens que l'Organisation pourrait adopter et les parties mettre en vigueur:

1. Lance un appel urgent
   (a) à Israel pour le retrait de toutes ses forces de tous les territoires de Jordanie, de Syrie et de la République Arabe Unie occupés à la suite du récent conflit;
   (b) aux parties en conflit pour mettre fin à l'état de belligérence pour tenter d'établir une coexistence basée sur un bon voisinage et de recourir dans tous les cas aux procédures pour un règlement pacifique prescrites dans la Charte des Nations Unies.

2. Réitère la conviction qu'aucun ordre international ne peut être basé sur la menace ou l'usage de la force, et déclare que la validité de l'occupation ou de l'acquisition territoriale par de tels moyens ne devrait pas être reconnue.

3. Demande au Conseil de Sécurité de continuer, avec un sens d'urgence, d'étudier la situation au Moyen-Orient en coopérant directement avec les parties et en s'appuyant sur la présence des Nations Unies,

   (a) afin de mener à bien les dispositions du paragraphe 1 (a) ci-dessus;

(b)

(b) de garantir la liberté de transit par les voies d'eau internationales de la région;

(c) d'obtenir une solution adéquate et complète du problème des réfugiés; et

(d) de garantir l'inviolabilité du territoire et l'indépendance politique des Etats de la région, y compris, à cet effet, l'établissement de zones démilitarisées.

4. Réaffirme, ainsi que dans des reccomandations précédentes, le caractère désirable de l'établissement d'un régime international pour la ville de Jérusalem, qui devrait être étudié par l'Assemblée Générale à sa 22ème session.

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PRODROME RABAT
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PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON

1076

FOR 1 GRS 160A 020856Z

RP R I O R I T Y FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT

TELNO 362 2ND JULY, 1967.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1598 OF 1 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN,
KHARTOUM, H.C.ADEN, BENGHAZI, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, TRIPOLI,
TUNIS, ALGIERS, RABAT, CAIRO, ANKARA, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON.
PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.
MY TELEGRAM NO. 1578 : EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION, MIDDLE EAST.
THE ''NON-ALIGNED'' RESOLUTION HAS BEEN FURTHER REVISED
AS FOLLOWS:

(A) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3:
DELETE ALL AFTER ''WHO WILL'' AND INSERT ''ASSIST HIM
IN SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AND BE IN CONTACT
WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED''

(B) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6:
AFTER ''SECURITY COUNCIL'' INSERT ''WHICH IS ALREADY
SEIZED OF THE QUESTION''.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY TO BEIRUT 73, JEDDA 54, KUWAIT 8, BAHRAIN 8,
KHARTOUM 8, H.C. ADEN 30, BENGHAZI 3, DOHA 3, ABU DHABI 2,
DUBAI 2, TRIPOLI 4, TUNIS 23, ALGIERS 6, RABAT 8, CAIRO 67,
ANKARA 54, TEHRAN 22, PARIS 251, MOSCOW 249, TEL AVIV 272
AND AMMAN 132.

Done.

SOSFA++++ SENT AT 0859Z MOE

PRODROME RABAT

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/Fl A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 363 D M

[Date] 2 JULY R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM JEDDA ADDRESSED TO F O

TELNO 481 OF 2 JULY RFI TO BEIRUT KUWAIT

BAHRAIN KHARTOUM BENGHAZI TRIPOLI TUNIS ALGIERS

RABAT ADEN PERSONAL CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK

TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO ABU DHABI

DOHA DUBAI

DISTRIBUTION

YOUR TELNO 1402 TO AMMAN:

LIKELY SAUDI REACTION TO U.K. SUPPORT OF LATIN

AMERICAN RESOLUTION.

I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY FRESH SAUDI ACTION AS

REGARDS OIL EXPORTS. A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE

MINISTER OF PETROLEUM (SEE MY LETTER 15393 OF 8

JULY TO MR WEIR) MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE SAUDI

GOVERNMENT IS NOT AT ALL HAPPY ABOUT THE

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

(existing

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

EXISTING RESTRICTIONS THEY HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO IMPOSE. IN VIEW OF THE DAMAGE TO THE SAUDI ECONOMY WHICH THESE ENTAIL.

2. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAVE SO FAR TAKEN NO ACTION AGAINST OUR TRADE AND ARE ONLY LIKELY TO DO SO IF ALL ARAB STATES DECIDE ON AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT.

3. THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO HAVE THE SECURITY SITUATION WELL UNDER CONTROL AND NO PUBLIC DISTURBANCES WILL BE TOLERATED. KING FAISAL WAS QUITE DEFINITE ON THIS POINT TO ME (PARA 9 OF MY TELNO 462 OF 25 JUNE). ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD ALREADY PROTECTING THIS EMBASSY AND KEY PLACES IN JEDDA. AND THE CROWN PRINCE AND COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BOTH ASSURED ME ON 29 JUNE THAT ALL MEASURES WERE IN HAND TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF BRITISH LIVES AND PROPERTY IN THE COUNTRY.

4. WE MUST, HOWEVER, EXPECT BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE CRITICISM OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION AND THIS MAY WELL BE REFLECTED IN THE PRESS AND OTHER PUBLICITY MEDIA.

F O PASS RABAT 8

SOSFA.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading] CY Cat A

FROM FO TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 364 D M

[Date] 2 July R M

Repeated to

[Priority] ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TUNIS. ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 2 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORT TRIPOLI ALGIERS RABAT WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

YOUR TEL ~~(GP UNDEC 1401)~~. TO AMMAN.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS. FOLLOWING FROM BRANT. IN AMBASSADOR'S TEMPORARY ABSENCE FROM TUNIS. I SAW POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING. TO EXPLAIN OUR VIEWS.

2. HE CLAIMED TO BE WELL AWARE OF OUR POSITION FROM OTHER SOURCES ALSO. HE DEPRECIATED OUR READINESS TO URGE NEGOTIATION WITH ISRAEL WHILE THEY WERE STILL IN POSSESSION OF THE FRUITS OF HER AGGRESSION. TO DO SO WAS TANTAMOUNT TO SANCTIONING ISRAELI GAINS. AND ENCOURAGING A "MIGHT IS RIGHT" MORALITY. TUNISIAN VIEW. AS EXPRESSED

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

EXPRESSED TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 30 JUNE. WAS THAT ISRAEL MUST FIRST WITHDRAW - THEN DISCUSSION COULD BEGIN. TO ACT OTHER WISE WOULD CONSTITUTE A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR THE U.N.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERVIEW. HOWEVER, HE DID SUGGEST THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MIGHT TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH REGULATION OF OTHER QUESTIONS. BUT TUNISIA WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO PROPOUND SUCH A SOLUTION. ~~IGP UNDEC WLEST~~ IT HARDEN ATTITUDE OF THE THREE ARAB STATES MAINLY AFFECTED. AND WEAKEN HER ABILITY TO COUNSEL MODERATION BEHIND THE SCENES.

4. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE TUNISIANS WILL MAKE AN ISSUE OF THE MATTER. THE AMBASSADOR. WHO SAW ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY. BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. RECEIVED THE SAME IMPRESSION.

PLEASE SEE ALSO MIFT FO PASS TRIPOLI 18 ALGIERS 11 RABAT 17 AND TEL AVIV 5.

SOSFA

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/ICAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0. TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 365

[Date] 2 July.

D M

R M

Repeated to

[Priority] IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

~~8.%853.58~~ ADDSD TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 3504

OF 2/7 RPTD FOR INFMN TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS

TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN BEIRUT AMMAN KUWAIT BAHRAIN

RABAT TUNIS TRIPOLI JEDDA H C ADEN KHARTOUM

ALGIERS AND CAIRO.

YRTELS NOS. 1603 TO 1607 (NOT TO ALL)

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION MIDDLE EAST.

DISTRIBUTION

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS. IN THE LIGHT

OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOW

AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) YOU SHOULD GIVE A FIRM EXPLANATION OF VOTE

BEFORE VOTING TAKES PLACE ON EITHER

RESOLUTION. MY I.F.T. CONTAINS SOME AMEND-

MENTS TO THE DRAFT CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO

. 1607 .

(B) YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE NON-ALIGNED

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

DRAFT. BUT YOU SHOULD ALSO CALL FOR A PARAGRAPH

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

/ BY PARA.

BY PARAGRAPH VOTE IF THIS HAS NOT BEEN REQUESTED BY ANY OTHER COUNTRY. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN YOUR VOTE ON INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS AS IN MY SECOND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

(C) YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO ALL YOU CAN TO ENSURE THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION COMES TO THE VOTE AND YOU SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF IT.

2. THE EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE ON THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE AND ON THE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS ARE, OF COURSE, OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND WE SHALL BE BRIEFING THE PRESS HERE AT THE SAME TIME AS YOU ARE SPEAKING IN NEW YORK. WE SHALL NEED TO KNOW BY TELEPHONE THE PRECISE TIMES WHEN YOU WILL BE SPEAKING.

3. INSTRUCTIONS ON A PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH VOTE ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT (IF THAT OCCURS) AND ON THE OTHER RESOLUTIONS ARE CONTAINED IN MY THIRD FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

SOSFA

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CMFA

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70 TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 366 D M

[Date] 2 JULY R M

Repeated to

[Priority] IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 3505

OF 2 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON

PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN BEIRUT AMMAN

KUWAIT BAHRAIN RABAT TUNIS TRIPOLI JEDDA HC ADEN

KHARTOUM ALGIERS AND CAIRO.

1076 MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM AND YOUR

TEL NO 1607.

DISTRIBUTION

SPEECH IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON THE NON-ALIGNED

RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE.

FOLLOWING ARE MY AMENDMENTS:

PARAGRAPH 2 SHOULD NOW READ AS FOLLOWS:

~~DUTY~~ "WE SHALL VOTE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI

FORCES FROM THE ARAB TERRITORY THEY HAVE

OCCUPIED. WE WISH TO TAKE ACTION HERE AT THE

UNITED NATIONS THAT WILL END THE PRESENT STATE OF

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

I Belligerency

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

BELLIGERENCY AND SO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF

COEXISTENCE BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND

WE WANT TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT DELAY" ~~UNQUOTE~~.

PARAGRAPH 8 TO BE AMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

~~QUOTE~~"WE RECOGNISE HOWEVER THAT AN EFFORT HAS BEEN

MADE TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR THE 17

COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SPONSORED THE RESOLUTION HAVE

DECLARED THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF THE APPOINTMENT

OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE

HAVE STRONGLY ADVOCATED SUCH A PROPOSAL. WITHOUT

SUCH A PRESENCE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PRACTICAL

PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. IT IS A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS

OUR WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT" ~~UNQUOTE~~.

PARAGRAPH 9 - ADD A SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS:

~~QUOTE~~"BUT THE RESOLUTION HAS CERTAIN IMPORTANT

DEFECTS TO WHICH I WILL RETURN IN A MOMENT" ~~UNQUOTE~~.

PARAGRAPH 10 - ADD A SENTENCE AFTER ~~QUOTE~~" . . .

THE END OF BELLIGERENCY" ~~UNQUOTE~~ AS FOLLOWS: ~~QUOTE~~

"IT PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH

INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS" ~~UNQUOTE~~.

PARAGRAPH 12 - AMEND AS FOLLOWS:

~~QUOTE~~" WE BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST RESOLUTION

/proposed

PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA /AND OTHERS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THOSE PURPOSES BECAUSE OF SOME OF THE PROVISIONS WHICH IT CONTAINS AND BECAUSE SOME OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS ARE OMITTED. ON THE OTHER HAND/WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND OTHERS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT. MY DELEGATION WILL THEREFORE VOTE AGAINST THE FIRST RESOLUTION AND IN FAVOUR OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION" ~~UNQUOTE~~/.

SOSFA.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/OTP A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 367 D M

[Date] 2 July R M

Repeated to

[Priority] IMMEDIATE

3/7/67
DS/A25 3.VII
DA 3/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEWYORK TELNN 3506 OF 2/7

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW

PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN BEIRUT AMMAN KUWAIT

BAHRAIN RABAT TUNIS TRIPOLI JEDDA HC ADEN

KHARTOUM ALGIERS CAIRO.

DISTRIBUTION

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAMS AND NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO 1605 (NOT TO ALL).

THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE YOUR EXPLANATION OF VOTE

ON INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS OF THE NON-ALIGNED

RESOLUTION:

PARAGRAPH 1.

WE CAN VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THIS PARAGRAPH BUT WE

MUST EMPHASISE THAT IN OUR VIEW WITHDRAWAL MUST

BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTION ON OTHER ISSUES. WE CAN

ACCEPT THE WORD ~~QUOTE~~ "IMMEDIATELY" ~~UNQUOTE~~ BECAUSE

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

IN OUR VIEW ALL ACTION SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE. BUT

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

the word

THE WORD ~~QUOTE~~ "IMMEDIATE" ~~UNQUOTE~~ MUST NOT BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING IN ADVANCE OF THE ACTION.

PARAGRAPH 2.

WE CAN VOTE IN FAVOUR, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORT HELP BEING GIVEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION. WE ARE ALSO IN FAVOUR OF STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.

PARAGRAPH 3.

WE SHOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT FOR THE REASONS GIVEN.

PARAGRAPH 4.

WE MUST ABSTAIN SINCE WE ARE VOTING AGAINST THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE.

PARAGRAPH 5.

WE MUST ABSTAIN SINCE ISRAEL~S COMPLIANCE ALONE IS SPECIFIED. THIS IS CONTRARY TO OUR FIRMLY HELD VIEWS ON THE RESOLUTIONS AS A WHOLE. THE PARAGRAPH MIGHT ALSO SERIOUSLY EFFECT SUBSEQUENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PARAGRAPH 6.

WE SHOULD VOTE AGAINST SINCE THERE IS A REFERENCE TO ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ~~QUOTE~~ "IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WITH-DRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI armed forces

ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN COMPLETED ~~INDICATE~~. THIS IS

QUITE CONTRARY TO OUR WHOLE POSITITN ON THE

TWO RESOLUTIONS. SOSFA.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag: Cypher/OTP

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 368

[Date] 2 July

Repeated to

[Priority] IMMEDIATE

D M

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to HMC has seen.
OSA(S) 3.VII

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 3507

OF 2 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON,

PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN, BEIRUT, AMMAN

KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, RABAT, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, JEDDA,

HC ADEN, KHARTOUM, ALGIERS AND CAIRO.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 1604 AND 1605 AND MY

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAMS (NOT TO ALL)

WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THE WAY

YOU SHOULD VOTE ON INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS OF THE

NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION. THIS TELEGRAM

COVERS ALL THE OTHER DRAFTS.

2. LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT:

IN THE EVENT OF A PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH VOTE,

YOU SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF ALL PARAGRAPHS EXCEPT

FOR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 ON WHICH WE AGREE

(that you

DISTRIBUTION
1076f

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

THAT YOU SHOULD ABSTAIN. OUR REASONS FOR ABSTENTION

ARE, OF COURSE, THAT

A) THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONALISATION OF JERUSALEM

IS AT PRESENT AN EXPLOSIVE ONE WITH BOTH SIDES: AND

B) VOTING FOR IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO OUR PREVIOUS

ATTITUDE.

IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE

IT PLAIN THAT OUR ABSTENTION DOES NOT (REPEA NOW)

A) IMPLY OUR OPPOSITION IF THE INTERNATIONALISATION

OF JERUSALEM EVENTUALLY APPEARS TO BE BROADLY

ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED: AND

B) IN ANY WAY DEROGATE FROM OUR DECLARED POSITION

VIS A VIS ANY UNILATERAL MEASURES PURPORTING TO

ANNEX JERUSALEM.

. THE OTHER DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENTS:

WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD VOTE AS OUTLINED IN

PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1604

SOSFA.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/Code A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 369 D M

[Date] 2 JULY R M

Repeated to

[Priority] ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECD FROM TUNIS.

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TEL 1402 JULY REPEATED

FOR INFORMATION TO TRIPOLI ALGIERS RABAT UKMIS

NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

1076

1076
(FO 361 Encl)

YOUR TEL 1402 TO AMMAN AND M.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING FROM BRANT

TUNISIANS ARE AT PRESENT TAKING A FAIRLY MODERATE

DISTRIBUTION

AND REALISTIC VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTIES ATTENDING

THE CAMPAIGN TO ACHIEVE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BY

DIPLOMACY. AND ARE UNLIKELY TO MAKE THE UN

VOTING AN ISSUE OF CONFIDENCE IN THEIR RELATIONS

WITH US. RADIO AND PRESS COMMENT HAS BEEN

BALANCED AND REASONABLY RESTRAINED. POLITICAL

DIRECTOR AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS

MORNING DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNAL

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

Reaction

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK. TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT ARE THUS UNLIKELY TO DEPART FROM THEIR PRESENT POLICY OF BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH THE U.K. NOR WOULD WE EXPECT THEM. ALTHOUGH SECURITY FORCES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE STREETS. TO RELAX CONTROL OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION AGAIN. I WOULD NOT THEREFORE RECOMMEND ANY EXTRA SECURITY PRECAUTIONS FOR THEM, THOUGH WILL DOUBTLESS BE KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH HEAD OFFICES OF TOUR OPERATORS TO TUNISIA. IN THIS CONTEXT WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD REMIND THEM OF OUR CONTINUING NEED TO RECEIVE TOURIST NUMBERS FROM THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HERE. THE PROCESS OF CHASING THE MATTER UP IS IN SOME CASES PROVING DIFFICULT AND TIME CONSUMING.

FCO PASS RABAT 18 SOSFA

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxxx~~

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 299 of 2 July, 1967.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 299 of 2 July.

Your telegrams Nos. 360 and 361.

M. Balafrej will receive me at noon to-day.

HOLLIDAY

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~code~~ en clair

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 301 of 2 July, 1967.

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 301 of 2 July. Repeated for information to UKMIS, New York No. 19.

My telegram No. 300.

Following are further extracts from fuller text now available Begins:-

Dealing with the Moroccan attitude Balafrej said "The general lines are naturally the instructions I took from H. M. the King on the eve of my departure, viz. Israel armies must be withdrawn to the truce boundaries. The refugee problem must be solved of course. Our attitude is that of the Arabs. We are solidly. with the Arabs in their attitude. The Israelis must be punished for their aggression which has been proved and admitted by the Israelis themselves and is a historical fact. Morocco stands for punishment of Israel and her return to the formerly held positions.

"Then the King asked me to emphasise the Jerusalem question because it concerns Islamic World opinion and it concerns us here in Morocco as Muslims.

"Our attitude is that Jerusalem must be freed first from the hand of the Zionists!" There were many aspects to be dealt with, Balafrej said, "but the matter must be dealt with as a whole and the main problem of all is Jerusalem"

Balafrej ended by expanding on this theme: "The propaganda which some countries were diffusing in the East undermined for us the question of defence of the Arab rights in Palestine in Europe and America

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

/and.....

and turned world opinion against us. So there must be a review of the meaning of things and we must look at things as they really are and demand our rights by other serious ways and means." Balafrej pointed out the futility of the Arab boycott when it means cutting off the essentials of life for the Arabs themselves. Ends.

HOLLIDAY

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~code~~ ~~procedure~~

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 302 of 2 July, 1967.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 302 of 2 July. Repeated for information to UKMIS, New York No. 20, Washington No. 14, Paris No. 17 and Moscow No. 13.

Your telegram No. 360.

I had half-an-hour at noon with M. Balafrej, who undertook to pass on to King Hassan, later to-day what I had said.

2. M. Balafrej said that personally he could understand H.M. Government's decision though he could not approve it. It was psychologically unsound to suppose that the Arab States could be induced to give in return for the withdrawal of Israeli forces that recognition of the Israeli Government which was implied in Clauses 1(B) and 3(D) of the South American resolution and which they had so long refused. That would be an award to aggression. He recognised the constructive features in the resolution, which he considered an improvement on the United States original, and indeed, though showing no enthusiasm for Clause 4, had no criticism of any clauses but 1(B) and 3(D). On these he was unshakable: they were unacceptable to the Arab world in general and Morocco could not get out of step on so vital an issue.

3. I asked him what he thought the reaction of the Moroccan Government and people would be to our vote. The Government he said would regret it but had no intention of taking any hostile action. They would, of course, be delighted if H. M. Government could

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

/bring....

bring themselves to abstain. He realised that we would not do so on the South American resolution but abstention on the non-aligned resolution would go to show that we were not "against the Arabs". By so doing we should weaken the growing ascendancy of the Soviet Union as sole champion of the Arab world. I asked him whether there was any possibility of Morocco abstaining on the South American resolution. This had not been considered he said, but he thought it unlikely that they would be willing to get out of step.

4. The popular reaction, he thought, would be hostile but not violent. He had done his best in his broadcast (see my telegrams Nos. 300 and 301) to prepare opinion for what would happen - this is true - and order would be maintained. Our vote would, however, make the Government's task of dealing with irresponsible elements incited by Algeria more difficult.

HOLLIDAY

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~[redacted]~~ ~~[redacted]~~

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 303 of 2 July, 1967.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 303 of 2 July.

Your telegram No. 361 and my i.p.t.

Oil exports, nil: M. Balafrej has described this publicly as an unrealistic policy.

British trade, nil: the Government are even taking steps to deal with the opposition's boycott campaign.

Public disturbances: M. Balafrej thought not and I see no reason to disagree with him nor to recommend any special measures.

HOLLIDAY

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

TELEGRAM

Cypher code en clair

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched 2.7.67 Received

No. 300 of 2.7.67

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to F.O. Tel.No.300 of 2.7.67.
Rfi to U.K.Mis.New York (18).

Your tel.No.360.

Following is a relevant extract from a broadcast by M. Balafrej begins

M. Balafrej a indiqué que l'Assemblée Générale de l'O.N.U. était divisée en deux groupes - l'un composé des pays de l'Amérique Latine, d'une bonne partie des pays africains, certains pays asiatiques, les Etats-Unis et les pays de l'Europe Occidentale. Ce groupe, a indiqué M. Balafrej, préconise la reconnaissance de l'état d'Israël par les pays arabes, avant le retrait des forces israëliennes sur leurs positions antérieures du 5 juin.

Le deuxième groupe, a indiqué le Représentant Personnel de S.M. le Roi, s e compose des pays arabes, de l'U.R.S.S. et les pays Communistes, les pays Islamiques de l'Afrique et de l'Asie, et de certains pays amis comme l'Inde. Ce deuxième groupe préconise un retrait pur et simple des forces Israëliennes avant toute négociation.

M. Balafrej prévoit que la Résolution présentée par les pays non-alignées est considérée comme une solution de compromis, pouvant obtenir une soixantaine de voix en sa faveur, avec une abstention massive des autres membres. Evoquant l'attitude des grandes puissances, M. Balafrej a déclaré:

/"Nous

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

"Nous devons savoir que l'Union Soviétique, comme les Etats-Unis, demandent la reconnaissance d'Israël (par les pays arabes) et la liberté de navigation pour l'état Sioniste. Les pays arabes sont donc devant un dilemme, c'est-à-dire, selon ces grandes puissances, il n'y a pas de solution sans reconnaissance d'Israël. La seule nuance est que les uns prévoient cette reconnaissance avant le retrait des troupes israëliennes, les autres après."

HOLLIDAY.

1076

3/7/67

Résolution des Non Alignés -

Paragraphe 1: Le Gouvernement Britannique peut voter en faveur de ce paragraphe, mais souligne que le retrait doit être accompagné de mesures quant aux autres points. Le mot "immédiatement" est acceptable, car toute action devrait être immédiate, mais ne doit pas être interprété comme impliquant que les troupes israéliennes doivent se retirer avant que toute autre mesure soit prise.

Paragraphes 2 et 3: Le Gouvernement Britannique peut également donner son appui à ces paragraphes. Il appuie fermement la nomination d'un représentant personnel du Secrétaire-Général pour aider au contrôle des accords d'armistice par l'Organisation de Contrôle de la Trêve des Nations Unies. Il est maintenant important que toutes les parties observent strictement ces accords.

Paragraphe 4: Le Gouvernement Britannique s'abstient quant à ce paragraphe, puisqu'il vote contre cette résolution dans sa totalité.

Paragraphe 5: Le Gouvernement Britannique s'abstient quant à ce paragraphe, car la stipulation d'acquiescement par Israël seul est contraire à ses points de vue fermes relativement à la résolution dans sa totalité.

Paragraphe 6: Le Gouvernement Britannique vote contre ce paragraphe, parcequ'il stipule des mesures à prendre par le Conseil de Sécurité dès que les forces armées d'Israël se seront retirées. Ceci est contraire à la position intégrale du Gouvernement quant aux deux résolutions, stipulant que d'autres mesures soient prises simultanément au retrait d'Israël.

Résolution de l'Amérique Latine -

Le Gouvernement Britannique peut accepter toute la résolution telle qu'elle est avec l'exception du paragraphe 4.

Left by HE with M. Chorfi, together with French text of both resolutions. AZS 3.VII

/..Il

Il s'abstient quant à la proposition de l'internationalisation de Jérusalem, sans porter préjudice, toutefois, à toute attitude ultérieure qu'il pourrait adopter à ce sujet. L'abstention n'équivaut pas à son opposition à ladite proposition, si, éventuellement, celle-ci paraissait acceptable dans ses grandes lignes à toutes les parties intéressées; de plus, elle ne porte pas atteinte à son opposition déclarée à toutes mesures qui tendent vers une annexion unilatérale de Jérusalem.

Le 3 Juillet 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

1071

A.L. Southorn 6.VII

Have in the post found amusing do. against hypnotised by Nasser's voice on the radio

H. 7/7

617/67

By Bag

No. 6 Saving
3 July, 1967

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 6 Saving of 3 July
Repeated for information Saving to:-

Cairo 1
Algiers 4
Jeddah 1
Amman 2
Rabat 6
~~Tunis 8~~
Kuwait 1
Benghazi 66
Beirut 2
Khartoum 1
Bahrain 1
Aden 1
Doha 1
Abu Dhabi 1
Dubai 1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY - 4 JUL 1967

The extraordinary hold of Nasser and his propaganda machine over uneducated Libyans is illustrated by report from an Italian doctor at the Tripoli General Hospital.

2. For several hours following the radio announcement of Nasser's resignation on the evening of 9 June, "scores" of Libyan policemen and soldiers were brought into the General Hospital in advance stages of hypnotic hysteria. Among the symptoms they manifested were the arching of the back with feet and hands on the ground (which I gather is a manifestation associated with deep hypnotism), rigor, and weeping and foaming at the mouth. The fact that only policemen and soldiers were actually taken to the hospital was the result of the curfew which had confined the civilian population to their homes. It is likely however that similar reactions would have been observed among ordinary civilians in their houses throughout the city.

3. Apparently the hospital medical staff could do little to treat this exceptional influx of hypnotic casualties. The sufferers had however all recovered their equilibrium by the morning, when they were released from hospital.

4. This account illustrates graphically the profound emotional response which President Nasser is capable of evoking from the ordinary Arab even in a "non-revolutionary" country such as Libya. The reaction described above also helps to explain the almost insane depth of feeling which the Arab nation at the popular level has put into the cause for the recovery of Palestine of which Nasser can still claim to be the ultimate leader.

SARELL

CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEW OF THE PRESS.

H.E.

ACS

Is there the criticism & the call for a boycott stopped?

British Embassy, Rabat,
July 3, 1967.

31/VII

Al Alam (Istiqlal) No. 6250 of 3/7/1967.

A. Headlines.

1. "Arab Egyptian forces resist a Zionist attack in the Canal Zone". (3 col.)

2. "How the inhabitants of Jerusalem endured the calamity". "Houses were pulled down, shops looted, women and children burnt with Napalm and religious dignitaries and officials insulted". (10 col.)

3. "Podgorny says in Syria, "Things will not be allowed to go according to imperialism's wishes." "We are aware of the part Israel plays in serving the plans of colonialism". (4 col.)

4. "Algiers has started to interrogate Tshombe, the agent, and the Congolese Government is demanding his extradition". (2 col.)

5. "The consolidation of British colonialist forces for attacking the Arab Quarter in Aden." (2 col.)

6. "The petrol war has commenced, and must go on; and we must be prepared to count and bear the cost". (6 col.)

B. Special News Items.

1. Gives a long account of the maltreatment of Palestinian refugees, as related by some of them. Meanwhile these continue to make for Jordan's Western Bank, including Moslem and Christian religious dignitaries and senior civil servants.

2. Tells of a fresh Zionist act of aggression on the Canal Zone, which U.A.R. forces are valiantly resisting.

3. Gives an account of Pdgorny's statements in Damascus, in condemnation of imperialism. Everybody is almost certain that he will announce his country's readiness to give the necessary help, both military and diplomatic, for the confrontation of the situation in the Middle East.

C. Special News Items.

1. Apart from Turkey and France, Iraqi petrol is to be pumped to Spain because of the stand she has taken towards Zionist aggression, on condition that fuel should not leak to any of the Western States which were in collusion with Zionists.

2. British forces have received reinforcements in readiness for an attack on the Crater Quarter. The Front, however, is prepared to resist and to turn the Quarter into a British soldiers' cemetery.

3. The authorities gave no justification for their seizure of Al Alam and L'Opinion on Sunday, July 2.

4. The Cairo/

4. The Cairo press criticised Roumania's attitude towards the Middle East crisis, which much differed from that of Moscow and other Socialist States, as well as that of Communist China and peace loving countries. The papers were surprised that Roumania should refrain from condemning Zionist aggression and that she should favour direct negotiations between Israel and Arabs.

5. Shaikh Bahakhanov, Mufti of Asia Minor and Head of the Moslem Cultural Centre in the U.S.S.R., announced that 20 million Moslems in the Soviet Union disapproved of Zionist aggression. He said that a large number of these was prepared to volunteer to fight the fo[illegible] on the side of Arab fellow Moslems.

6. Belgrade; M.A.P. Marshal Tito declared before the Central Committee of the Communist Party that Zionist aggression was a colonialist plan for the liquidation of progressive regimes.

D. <u>Comment.</u>

1. The editorial states that whatever decision the General Assembly might adopt, Arabs have benefited from the fact that the majority of world States, including even the colonialist, admitted that Israel was the aggressor. Arabs should start their campaign from this point to recover the losses of the past years. Moreover, the relapse has served to make Arabs more aware than ever of the need for unity, especially in resisting Israel's annexation whims. A very careful plan should be made for resisting Israeli greed, and this should be done urgently.

2. A long article states that petrol is a very powerful weapon in the hands of Arabs which should be used regardless of the cost.

1076

In today's Al Alam there were only the two following slogans:-

"Capitalists, establish companies and factories, thereby you will rescue yourselves, your country and your sons from Zionist domination of life resources."

"Compatriot, boycott all enemy posts, which are known to you. Refuse to have transaction with him. Every Dirham you pay to a Zionist in a shop or café will turn into a bullet in the heart of our heroes. Announce your boycott of Zionists."

M. Balafrej told me that the regime of papers on July 2 was motivated by the King's desire to tone down the anti-Zionist campaign. Its prevention was difficult because it was "une situation qui n'est pas prévue par la loi"

O.S. ALS 4.VII

[illegible]
3/VII

1076/67

Ambassade de Grande Bretagne,
RABAT

Le 29 Juin 1967

Monsieur le Gouverneur,

Au cours de ma mission au Maroc, Votre Excellence a eu l'amabilité de me recevoir en visite officielle, renforçant ainsi les excellentes relations qui existent si heureusement entre nos deux pays. Pendant le conflit récent au Moyen Orient, dont le souvenir douloureux reste encore vif dans tous nos esprits, une tentative, dirigée de l'étranger, a été faite pour ébranler ces relations. Je le dois à Votre Excellence de corriger toute impression désagréable qu'a pu laisser cette campagne de diffamation.

On nous a accusés d'avoir participé à ce conflit contre les pays arabes. C'est un mensonge. Pardonnez-moi le mot fort, mais il faut appeler les choses par leur vrai nom. Mon gouvernement a démenti cette accusation sous toutes les formes qu'elle a prises. Nous avons fourni les preuves matérielles de l'impossibilité d'une telle participation et nous avons prié, et le Secrétaire-Général des Nations Unies et le personnel compétent de tout gouvernement intéressé, de bien vouloir les vérifier.

Mais l'accusation se fait aussi sous une forme plus généralisée: nous aurions appuyé et encouragé Israël contre les pays arabes. Puisque nos intérêts sont beaucoup plus importants dans les pays arabes que dans le seul pays d'Israël, je ne vois pas bien pourquoi nous aurions poursuivi ce qui eût été une politique de folie. De toute manière, il n'en a pas été ainsi. Notre aide au développement des pays arabes a été beaucoup plus importante que notre aide à Israël. (Je cite le cas de la Jordanie). Nos fournitures d'armes pendant les années avant le conflit (et nous avons imposé un embargo pendant son cours). étaient dirigées beaucoup plus vers les pays arabes (je cite le cas de l'Arabie Séoudite) que vers Israël, auquel, en tous cas, nous n'avons accordé aucune aide militaire, nous limitant à quelques ventes payées, dont aucune d'avions de guerre.

Pour ce qui est du côté diplomatique de nos relations, je suis autorisé à vous dire, Monsieur le Gouverneur, que tous nos efforts, avant, pendant et depuis les hostilités, ont été conjugués dans l'intérêt de la paix. Avant, le seul objet de nos consultations - par exemple les entretiens Wilson/Johnson au sujet du Moyen Orient - était de trouver des moyens d'empêcher que la guerre n'éclate. Aux Nations Unies et bilatéralement, nous avons poussé tous les partis en cause - je répète tous - à se modérer et à chercher une solution pacifique de leurs différends. Pendant les hostilités, nous avons donné devant le Conseil de Sécurité, un appui constant au Secrétaire-Général des Nations Unies dans ses efforts pour mettre fin au conflit.

Quant à l'avenir, nous ferons tout ce qui nous est possible afin de contribuer à une paix durable et honorable.

/..Vous

Son Excellence
Monsieur Abdellah Cherki,
Gouverneur de la Province de Kénitra,
KENITRA.

Vous aurez noté, par exemple, la déclaration du 17 juin de mon Ministre, comme suit :

> " Nous sommes, comme nous l'avons toujours été, opposés à l'usage de la force pour résoudre les querelles. Nous avons toujours, de même, soutenu le principe de l'intégrité territoriale et de l'indépendance politique des Etats. Ces deux principes sont nettement exposés dans la Charte des Nations Unies.
>
> Il s'ensuit, par conséquent, que dans le cas du problème du Moyen Orient, on ne peut accepter que des solutions soient imposées par la force. Notre contribution à un règlement doit donc être de reconnaître que la guerre ne devrait pas mener à un agrandissement territorial".

Vous vous serez penché, avec un intérêt tout spécial, sur une autre déclaration de M. Brown, qui disait le 21 juin :

> " Je le dis solennellement au Gouvernement d'Israël, s'il a la prétention d'annexer la vielle ville de Jérusalem ou légiférer pour son annexion, il prendra alors une mesure qui ne l'isolera pas seulement de l'opinion mondiale, mais lui fera perdre toute sympathie qu'on lui porte".

Vous n'aurez pas manqué d'observer que, lorsque Son Excellence énumérait, dans ce même discours, les problèmes principaux à résoudre, il mentionnait :

> " Tout d'abord les intérêts et le bien-être des réfugiés. Ce très grave problème se pose à nous depuis longtemps, et est plus difficile depuis ce qui est arrivé ces dernières semaines. Nous avons tellement échoué dans ce problème dans le passé que nous ne pouvons continuer à vivre plus longtemps avec ce problème".

Et finalement, je crois que la déclaration suivante du Ministre au sujet de la limitation et du contrôle des armements, trouvera un écho favorable auprès de Votre Excellence :

> " Si les pays du Moyen Orient veulent vivre en paix et développer leurs ressources, ils doivent être libérés des pressions qui les ont menés à gaspiller leurs ressources dans la course aux armements. Il est impératif de conclure dès que possible un accord sur la limitation des armes".

Ayant fait ainsi de mon mieux pour dissiper les quelques doutes que Votre Excellence ait pu avoir au sujet d'une complicité anti-arabe de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, j'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Gouverneur, de vous renouveler l'expression de ma sympathie personnelle et les assurances de ma haute considération.

(L.C. Holliday)
Ambassadeur de Grande Bretagne

File
1076

1076/67
No.110

Note

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to transmit herewith letters addressed by His Excellency the Ambassador to those of Their Excellencies the Governors of Provinces and Towns in the Kingdom of Morocco to whom he has paid official visits. The Embassy would be grateful if the Ministry would send these letters on to Their Excellencies.

Her Majesty's Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY

RABAT

3 July 1967

1076/67

No.110

N O T E

L'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et ... a l'honneur de transmettre sous ce pli des lettres que Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur adresse à ceux de Leurs Excellences les Gouverneurs des Provinces et des Villes du Royaume auxquels il a rendu des visites officielles.

... Le Ministère trouvera-ci-joint une copie du texte de ces lettres. L'Ambassade saurait gré au Ministère de bien vouloir les transmettre à leurs Hauts Destinataires.

L'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères l'assurance de sa haute considération.

AMBASSADE DE GRANDE BRETAGNE

RABAT

Le 3 Juillet 1967

Copie d'une lettre adressée à:

Leurs Excellences les Gouverneurs des Provinces de:

KENITRA
CASABLANCA
MARRAKECH
FES
AGADIR
OUARZAZATE
OUJDA
TAZA
BENI MELLAL
TETOUAN
KSAR ES SOUK
TANGER
SAFI

et des Villes de:

CASABLANCA
RABAT.

SAME LETTER TO :

S.E. Mohamed Amor Gouverneur de la Province de CASABLANCA
" Si Tahar Ou Assou " " MARRAKECH
" Mohamed TADLI " " MEKNES
" Ahmed Ben Driss Ben Bouchta " " FES
" Abdesslam Ben Hamou " " AGADIR
" Mustapha Tarik " " TARFAYA
" Lt-Col.M'Hamed Oufda " " OUARZAZATE
" " Larbi Chelouati " OUJDA
" Ben Ammar El Yacoubi " TAZA
" Ou ASSOU SAID " " BENI MELLAL
" Lahoucine Layachi " " TETOUAN
" Mohamed M'Rabet " "
" Mezian Zekri " " KSAR ES SOUK
" Ahmed Fizazi " " AL HOCEIMA
" Abdeslam Bennani Ouazzani El Houceimi " " TANGER
" Omar Benchemsi " " SAFI
" Dr. M'Hamed Ben Bouchaib Gouverneur de la Ville de RABAT
" Col. Abdesslem Sefrioui Gouverneur de la Ville de CASABLANCA

RESTRICTED

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

3 July, 1967.

Further to my letter of 13 June about Kenneth Holroyd's "Big Lie" article - which, incidentally, we published in the 9 June edition of the Embassy's Weekly Bulletin, - you may like to see the enclosed translations from 'Al Masa'.

.....

2. We were rather bucked to think that we had given 'Al-Masa' something to keep them going for almost three weeks! This three-phase 'counter-attack" shows that our Weekly Bulletins are not only being read but being studied too.

3. So far we have had only one copy of our Bulletin returned to us, - with a rather indignant note, from someone saying that we were diffusing lies and would we kindly cut him off the circulation. Two things about this; one, he must have read it and what he read must have made him feel uncomfortable and two; he took the trouble to post it back to us!

4. All this suggests to me that material like the Holroyd article is the right sort of stuff: we guess that it was read widely by the intelligent crust of Moroccan society, including Government circles from whom we have had no protests, and if the more extreme elements are sparked off into irate verbosity that in itself may invite more moderate thinking people to read our Bulletins to find out what all the fuss is about.

(A. S. M. Marshall)

B. R. Pridham, Esq.,
J. I. P. G. Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

BRITAIN UNMASKS HER FACE

A Summary of a Series of three articles by Bunker Mini published in AL MASAA

22 6 '96

An article by Bunker Mini which goes over two pages and is entitled, "Britain unveils her face", makes reference to the British Embassy's Weekly Bulletin No. 21 of June 9, 1967, of which thousands of copies were circulated throughout the [illegible] whose eyes [illegible] Mini follows [illegible] London Times [illegible] British [illegible] Arabs. [illegible] Embassy tre[illegible] of the [illegible] in Kabat. [illegible] of the dignity [illegible] which [illegible] also. [illegible] and surprise [illegible] Embassy that [illegible] Security Council [illegible] behind the [illegible] at the Security Council [illegible] its Embassies [illegible] Dien, [illegible] blow up [illegible] the London [illegible] but Brit[illegible]

23 6 '96

In continuing [illegible] British [illegible] "Britain [illegible] attitude [illegible] statement [illegible] against Britain [illegible] the turbulent [illegible] Somalia, [illegible] herself? The [illegible] complicity in [illegible] for present [illegible] Britain [illegible] than why is [illegible] about the [illegible] the [illegible] North [illegible] correspondent [illegible] that [illegible] patrol [illegible] on milk and [illegible] by shackles with [illegible] right [illegible] interests [illegible] revel in [illegible] when the House of Commons and the British Government

23.6.1967 (cont'd)

could dictate their will on Middle East policy? Does he not realise that Britain has forfeited Arab friendship and is now met with nothing but hatred and distrust? Britain should rest assured that the Soviet Union will use all her naval patrol. This will undermine her economically and politically as she will have to face the anger of her own people whose interests she has jeopardised in such a manner by her participation in the aggression on Arab countries and her support for the disreputable gangs terrorising Palestine twenty years ago. Very soon the British people will rise and overthrow also the government which has brought to power by Jews - enemies of the British people themselves. They will not be able long to tolerate the closure of the pubs in their faces and will lay the blame on their Government. Those responsible for Suez will not care two hoots either for London or the White House and will do what they want. They are free to close Suez and do what they wish, and not one power in the world can force them to go against their will.

26.6.1967

Publishing the first part of Boulter Brent's reply to the British Observer's imprudent bulletin entitled "The big lies which inflame nationalist sentiments during the present circumstances and especially disarm's diplomatic [illegible], Brent in the diplomatic correspondent's [illegible] efforts to find a lasting settlement and the need to [illegible] reasons which caused the battle would indicate that the settlement he had in mind is in Israel's favour as the majority of members of the Security Council were opposed to Israel's condemnation. [illegible] Britain stood behind America at the Security Council alongside their agent in the Middle East, Israel. The Security Council's inaction [illegible] who, with the help of America and British pilots, attacked [illegible] destroyed their economic installations and occupied parts of their territory. Accordingly, no-Israeli [illegible], the greatest [illegible] acted with [illegible] surprise [illegible] battle, they [illegible] the necessity [illegible] the correspondent [illegible] that their forces [illegible] the inmates were stunned by Israel herself [illegible] occupied fresh territory with the blessings of the majority of Security Council members. The failure of

U.N.O./

U.N.O. to execute her decision for their home return is attributable to the pressure America and Britain are bringing to bear on the majority of member states. At any rate it is not the refugees who are the immediate cause of the conflagration but Israel's presence. Once the holy land is purged of the filth Britain set up there twenty years ago with America's help, peace will return for good to that part of the world.

About a quotation from the Bulletin that efforts should be made for the improvement of the situation of the same nature as Britain's embargo on the despatch of weapons to the Middle East - which example Russia is wished to follow, the writer wonders if the British Embassy in Rabat has not yet heard of Britain's lifting of this embargo since the beginning of the battle, or if the Embassy meant to mislead public opinion which is certain that Britain is trying to hoodwink people and force the Russians to stop giving arms to Arabs so that she might alone continue to give destructive weapons to Israel, but in secret.

The article reports that the funny mask Britain had donned was torn up by the recent Middle East events, revealing Britain in the form of a wolf trying to spring on the sheep after disguising itself in the shepherd's garments. The article ends with the statement that "The big lie and demonstrators' and trouble makers' rod are no replacement for political prowess".

All Maroc corroborates the correspondent's statements by adding that the big lie represented in Israel's presence under British and American protecti has been exposed - the two latter states having failed to conceal it properly during the past 20 years, proving to be the gravest mistake these two countries have ever committed. They should wake up from the hallucinations of year 1948 to confront the world of year 1967. Finally the Embassy should be asked to respect the rules of diplomacy and to stop smiting Moroccans with its rude bulletins. Then, turning to the Government, the paper says that to permit any foreign Embassy to publish such poison on the widest scale is regarded as defiance of the people's will and a derogation of Arab dignity.

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

British Embassy,
TUNIS
3 July, 1967

(10610)

For some little while I have had the uneasy feeling that in our struggles to cope with the reconstruction of the Chancery offices, we have missed some major current of official or popular Tunisian opinion on what is now happening in the Middle East. Comparing notes with the U.S. Embassy this morning, however, I was relieved if hardly reassured to find that their crystal ball was as murky as ours for the forthcoming few months.

2. As you will have seen from our telegram No. 190, I took the fairly optimistic view that there was unlikely to be much trouble here over the manoeuvering in the United Nations. The writing on the wall, and the inevitability that some compromise resolution will eventually emerge must be all too clear, and I think that the more realistic Tunisians accept the fact that the Arab cause will not be materially advanced by the General Assembly.

3. It may however be a different kettle of fish if the hostilities of the last two days continue, or there is some major fracas between the Israelis and the inhabitants of their newly acquired Arab territories (the shooting of looters in the Gaza strip may be a foretaste of that sort of trouble). As seen from here, the régime is treading water reasonably successfully at present; but they are in a difficult position and they as much as anyone else in these parts are at the mercy of developments further east. The American Embassy has seen Tahar Belkhodja, the new Director of Security, two or three times since his assumption of office. They have found him reasonably confident of his ability to maintain the government's control over the internal situation during the coming few months, though he was understandably anxious about the need for his security forces to move in on any trouble right from the start. But he was anticipating further trouble in October, possibly because of the return then of the students and the advent of the cooler weather. The big question, again as seen from here, is whether the Algerians are sufficiently antagonistic towards the Tunisians to work to cause trouble here. If they so decided, there would still be plenty of human material to further that purpose. And the U.S. Embassy's firm impression is that the Algerians still clearly regard themselves as being on one side, and the Tunisians on the other, opposing, side.

/4.

P. L. V. Mallet, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In the meantime the prospects ahead of the Tunisian economy seem pretty comfortless, particularly in that the continuing loss of tourist revenues must be pushing the economy even further off balance. The Sales Director of British Eagle expressed to me over the weekend his view that as far as the U.K. tourist trade was concerned, Tunisia was finished as a port of call for the rest of this year. Intending visitors were unable to distinguish between Tunisia and the other and more hostile Arab states: to the British all the Arabs were tarred with the same brush. He maintained that tourism would not pick up again until next April, and then only provided the Tunisians avoided blotting their copy book again. On the internal economic front, over and above the retribution to be exacted from party members to make good the damage of 5 June, the régime have chosen this moment to inaugurate a compulsory loan to provide development revenues. We have yet to work out the implications of the new levy, which is the second of its kind in recent years. (You may recall that in 1965 such a loan was raised for the construction of a new Presidential palace). But it will be a fairly substantial burden to the average Tunisian and must be as welcome as a royal levy was to the English peasantry of the 15th century.

5. Altogether, therefore, the régime will have considerable economic difficulties to contend with; nor am I altogether happy that the country's reputation will emerge further undamaged by the end of the summer. All we can say now is that the prospects for the next week or so seem reasonably assured. I hope to reassess the position again in due course.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Dawbarn in Algiers, Alan Munro in Tripoli, Lewen in Rabat, the Chanceries at Washington and Paris and to UKMis New York.

(C. T. Brant)

CONFIDENTIAL

J. H. Lewen, Esq.,
Rabat

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

A.L. Southorn 13.VII

H. of C. see para 4. - so much for CO's comment on Bancroft-Hyde (10610)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 11 JUL 1967

BRITISH EMBASSY

TUNIS

3 July, 1967

GP 3/17

Daily Tel. June 24

Nasser Back-lash Hits Morocco

RABAT.

By CLARE HOLLINGWORTH

POLITICAL passions unleashed in Morocco during the war in the Middle East are proving difficult to curb now the crisis has passed. Indeed, there are already signs of widespread discontent which could menace the régime. In the past the armed forces gave their wholehearted support to the benevolent dictatorship of King Hassan II, but they have been badly shaken by the events which led to Nasser's defeat, and the loyalty of the younger officers can no longer be taken for granted.

The King is accused of having made a false show of solidarity with his Republican brothers in the east when they were attacked by Israel. Two thousand soldiers were sent off from Rabat with great ceremony but with the certain knowledge that they would never reach the battlefield, for the King had given specific orders that they were not to proceed beyond Benghazi (in Libya) without Egyptian air cover. At that time Hassan already knew Nasser was in a difficult position without fighter protection even for Cairo.

Franco Link

Basically the King is unpopular with the Army because he is believed to have more political sympathy for the West—the imperialist-Israeli bloc—than with his brother-Arabs in the East. This has caused criticisms of the monarch, latent until the present crisis, to be voiced openly and without fear by junior officers. Some soldiers have been reminded by their officers that Hassan II has already entered into a "wicked" defence agreement, or mutual security pact, with Gen. Franco, by which he agreed to curb any popular movement coming from the peoples of Morocco towards regaining sovereignty over the two Spanish towns of Ceuta and Melkna—two Spanish Gibraltars—in the north in return for help from the powerful Spanish forces garrisoned there in case of an attack from Algeria.

And the Algerians are still slightly heroic, in Moroccan eyes, as a result of their lengthy war against the French. Some officers suggest the frontier dispute which revolves around the iron ore deposits near Tindouf—now on Algerian soil but previously administered by Morocco—could have been settled easily by allowing the Algerians to transport their share of the minerals by the short route across Morocco to an Atlantic seaport. A few hotheads (I have heard them) go so far as to suggest that the King actually fostered frontier skirmishes in 1963 in the early days of the Algerian Republic with the hope of unseating Ben Bella, then the Republican Socialist President.

In a somewhat contradictory tone, the King is said to have neglected the Army on the grounds that he obtained only 12 supersonic fighters as a result of his visit to Washington early this year, while Col. Boumedienne has built up a powerful modern army in Algeria with the help of the Soviet Union.

The security forces reflect the views of moderate people here. Every a desire to demonstrate practical sympathy and solidarity with his Arab brothers some 3,000 miles away, and an incompatible urge to live his own life in that sphere of influence which is commercially as well as geographically nearer to Paris and London than Cairo and Damascus.

But logic counts for little when Arab emotions are roused and there is no doubt that Radio Algeria has exercised a profound influence here since June 5. The somewhat hysterical tone of Algiers can be heard not only in many Arab cafés and bars, but from rooms in the *medina* and working-class areas where the short-wave transistor has replaced the iron bedstead or sewing-machine as the status symbol of urban sophistication.

There is no doubt that the gulf between the mass of the people and the "establishment" deepened dangerously during the crisis and, since Boumedienne returned from Moscow, he is now regarded as leader of the Arab world and a far more important figure than King Hassan.

But it is still difficult to judge just how much popular support there is for Arab Republican Socialism of the Algerian type. There is no doubt that the miserable inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* — shanty towns built of mud and petrol tins — which, though often hidden, surround every town will rally to the support of anyone who offers them a better way of life. With the agricultural wage at less than 5s a day and the industrial worker's pay packet twice that amount, there is a constant movement towards the cities where many hundreds, perhaps thousands, are unable to find work. It is natural, too, that this section of the population is deeply impressed by Boumedienne's personal austerity, which is in marked contrast to the opulence of the court in Rabat.

Diplomatic Skill

Since 1965, when he dissolved Parliament, King Hassan has ruled the country virtually single-handed from a back room in the Royal Palace. To the people he is a remote figure who appears at official ceremonies with his Ministers, themselves mostly technicians. But what the monarch lacks in personal appeal has been more than compensated for by the high level of his diplomatic skill which has enabled him to perform a superb balancing act not only between his brother Arabs and the West but among all the different and rival political factions within the kingdom.

Further, he has arranged a splendid shop window, for Morocco is one of the few countries which have not only maintained their trunk roads but extended them since independence. The city centres are kept clean, buildings are painted white and gardens planted and watered and, as internal security was good, the country was ideal for tourism.

A group of American businessmen, who must have been mindful of the underground unrest, have agreed to invest $25 million in the construction of nine hotels. But the experienced after independence, are not putting a sou of capital into the country in spite of their newly found popularity as a result of President de Gaulle's stand against the imperialist-Israeli bloc.

In theory, everything has been calm: only three American cars were burnt, a few plate-glass windows broken and some Anglo-Saxons and Jews spat on in the streets. But the security forces who have been guarding schools, churches and consulates are beginning, at least in the provinces, to show some sympathy with the demonstrators.

The crisis has given the official political parties an opportunity to attack the régime viciously which they would not have dared to do a few months ago when they were looking round for new policies and slogans after their realisation that anti-French propaganda had lost the power to attract the crowds.

The Government insists that Jews should continue to work in banks, schools and the Civil Service and this has incensed the population.

Anti-Americanism

Meanwhile, the anti-Zionist theme has been swallowed up by the most powerful political party—the Istiqlal (Nationalist)—with the result that two of their daily papers, the Arabic *Al Alam* and the *L'Opinion* were, on two occasions days, seized by the police. This in turn has given Istiqlal another stick with which to beat the Government, which claims that there is a free Press; indeed, the party which appeared moribund, traditional and middle-class is rousing some of its former support both in Rabat and the larger towns.

Further, after two years in the political wilderness it is enjoying the attack on the "champions of Israel," "the leaders of the imperialist bloc"—in other words the Americans, who are providing some $40 million (£15 million) aid this year. On one of their former bases at Kenitra near Rabat they are training Moroccan pilots and this has given rise to erroneous reports that the United States Army is still there in force.

But the most dangerous falsehood, which is universally accepted here, is that Britain and America were giving military assistance to the Israeli forces. "Of course, your Prime Minister denies it; so did Eden. But we Arabs can wait for a new Nutting who will tell all 10 years hence"; so runs the Government's official line not only to journalists but to Ambassadors.

The most hopeful sign for the future is that the Moroccans, unlike other Arabs, invest money in their own country, but perhaps, as interest rates of at least 18 per cent. are earned from agriculture, this is hardly a fair test.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the King has not yet renewed his efforts to bring back a return to Parliamentary government. He seems to think it is still safer to play off one movement against another and he believes he can rely on the powerful group of trade unions which have become almost part of

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS MARGIN.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1076.

Please let me have
a copy of the Clare
Hollingworth article on
Morocco in the Crisis

4/VI(

Herewith.

2. Discussing this today Mr. Gaskell told me how his colleague, coming here with a sense of time~~lessness~~ to find material for a thesis on the Spanish Sahara, had managed 'in her spare time' to devote so much attention to the current M.E. situation.

3. I said I suspected her line about the Spanish Sahara was intended to put people off their guard. Mr. Gaskell agreed. He said that in Madrid her line had been that of a "silly-headed ~~girl~~ girl out for a story on palm-trees & bedouin ~~Arabs~~ tribes" & when asked: What are the binoculars for? she explained that she was an ornithologist!

4. Incidentally Miss Hollingworth is taking part this evening in a BBC programme in 'The World Today' series entitled . . . .

No.

[BBC World Service
2309 Moroccan Summer Time

[Repeat: 5/7/67 at
0645 : 0915 : 1415]

entitled "Algeria after 5 years of independence".

Antonia Cunningham.
4 July 1967

HE.

I see no reason to share this view. Her interest in the Sp. Sahara was genuine enough: See Maitland pp. Like a good journalist she exploited news when she found it. Perhaps Mr Oakshott is jealous.

Broadcast was dull.

4/VII

1/6.

5/7

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

4 July, 1967.

Please refer to the recent correspondence about the status of Jerusalem, which rests as far as Rabat is concerned with our report of M. Balafrej's remarks on the subject in our telegram No. 301. Allal el Fassi has now made his re-entry on to the political scene with a declaration to the official news agency M.A.P. on the subject of Jerusalem. His remarks, which were on the same lines as those expressed by Arab politicians in other countries, confirm clearly that there is very little chance of Arab acceptance of the internationalisation of Jerusalem.

2. He said that the Moslems had just suffered their greatest tragedy since the Crusades and that the Jews had decided to annex the holy city of Jerusalem in order to realise their old dream of rebuilding the Kingdom of Solomon. This was a provocation to the whole world, Moslems as well as Christians, and the Jews had "arrogated to themselves the right of guarding over the three religions." The chief priority now was to recover the holy city. The mosque in Jerusalem was one of the three greatest mosques which symbolise Islam in the hearts of the Moslems. "Islam for its part can never acknowledge any exercise of authority whatever over mosques and places of prayer by any non-Moslem country, the Jews or anyone else particularly over a holy place like Jerusalem."

3. Speaking of the profanation of the holy places by the Jewish soldiery, M. el Fassi appealed to Moslem heads of state and politicians to do their political (sic) and, if necessary, military duty to save Jerusalem and all Zionist-held territory. "Jerusalem and Palestine belong to the Arabs. God has made this land a sacred place for the three religions and none of these three confessions has the right to dominate the Arab homeland." Palestine was an Arab holy land and so could not pass under the domination of the "atheist Zionists." The Arabs and

/the.....

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

UNCLASSIFIED

the Moslems had the historical right of protecting these holy places, with the full consent of all the communities concerned that they should foster not only Islam, but also the Christian and Jewish faiths, whose communities coexisted peacefully with the Moslems. Israel by contrast was committing genocide against Moslems, Christians, Arab Jews from Palestine and even certain Jews who had emigrated from different countries (specified as the United States and Central Europe). To allow the present situation to continue would mean that any powerful state would be able to occupy another country and oppress its inhabitants with impunity. "The Moslem Kings and heads of state must unite and close their ranks to declare a war without mercy, to save Palestine and Jerusalem and to protect the holy places."

(A. L. Southorn)

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]

FROM TO

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. D M

[Date] R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

POSTPONE A VOTE ON IT TO A SUBSEQUENT DAY.

5. I SHOULD ADD THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS TOLD US THIS EVENING OF ONE DANGER WHICH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY OCCURRED TO THEM. THE SUGGESTION IS THAT PARA 1 (B) IN THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION (DEALING WITH BELLIGERENCY ETC.) MIGHT BE VOTED OUT IN A SEPARATE PARAGRAPH VOTE. THUS ENTIRELY DESTROYING THE BALANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. IF THAT HAPPENED THEY TOLD US THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE AGAINST THE EMASCULATED RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD RESULT AND WE SHOULD NO

AMENDED SEE TEL NO 1

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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading] _____

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____ D _____ M _____

[Date] _____ R _____ M _____

Repeated to _____

_____

[Priority] _____

(6)

DOUBT DO THE SAME. I MENTION THIS AS A CONCEIVABLE DANGER BUT HOPE IT WILL NOT ARISE.

RMENSDO
SEE ENO 38/
LVSDOM

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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 373

[Date] 4 July

[Priority] IMMEDIATE

CM/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM SOSFA

TO

Repeated to

D M

R M

NOW SEE AS AMENDED

2 Telegrams - the latter [illegible] paragraphs of which are virtually the same. One UN Delegation numbers as missing round in circles.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1636 OF 3

JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON

TEL AVIV PARIS MOSCOW COPENHAGEN AND AMMAN.

YOUR TELNO. 3504: MIDDLE EAST:

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

I WAS VERY SORRY TO HAVE TO ASK YOU FOR

INSTRUCTIONS AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE TODAY.

I AM NOW QUITE CLEAR WHAT YOU WANT US TO DO

(AND IN MY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM I SHALL DEAL

WITH THE QUESTION OF WHAT I SHOULD SAY).

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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Cypher
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Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]_____

FROM_____ TO_____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____ D_____M_____

[Date] _____ R_____M_____

Repeated to_____

_____

[Priority] _____

2. I SHALL SPEAK BEFORE THE VOTE. I SHALL NOT ASK FOR A PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH VOTE ON EITHER RESOLUTION AND IF A PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH VOTE IS ASKED FOR BY SOMEONE ELSE WE SHALL ABSTAIN ON ALL PARAGRAPHS ON THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT AND THEN VOTE AGAINST THE DRAFT AS A WHOLE. WE SHALL VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT/ABSTAINING ONLY ON THE LAST PARAGRAPH ON JERUSALEM IF A SEPARATE VOTE IS CALLED FOR.

3. I DO NOT PROPOSE TO ATTEMPT TO GO OVER ALL THE ARGUMENTS FOR ABSTAINING ON THE YUGOSLAV

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

/draft

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading] _____

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____ D _____ M _____

[Date] _____ R _____ M _____

Repeated to _____

_____ (3)

[Priority] _____

DRAFT. WE CAN TAKE IT AS PRACTICALLY CERTAIN

THAT IT IS GOING TO FAIL. UNLESS THNERE IS

SOME NEW DEVELOPMENT TOMORROW THIS WILL

REPRESENT A FAILURE FOR THE SPONSORS OF THE

DISTRIBUTION

A FAILURE FOR ALL THE ARABS WHOSE FOREIGN

MINISTERS WILL HAVE TO GO HOME TO REPORT THAT

THEY HAVE SUFFERED DEFEAT IN THE ASSEMBLY. IF

WE VOTE AGAINST I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED

STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL AGAIN BE THE

SCAPEGOATS AND THE FACT THAT WE SUPPORTED THE

LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WILL MERELY ADD TO THEIR

ANGER (SINCE THIS IS REGARDED AS THE DEVICE FOR

Amended by Palmo. 381 3/7

/dekalmus

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

DEFEATING THE PURPOSES OF THE ARABS). IT WAS MY VIEW THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAD MORE TO LOSE FROM THE ACCUSATIONS OF THE ARABS THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS ARE BACKING ISRAEL AGAINST THEM THAN WE HAD FROM THE TEMPORARY ANNOYANCE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS WITH WHOM WE HAVE WORKED IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS.

4. BUT I WELL RECOGNISE HOW EVENLY BALANCED THE ARGUMENTS WERE. AND ANYHOW AS I HAVE SEPARATELY REPORTED THERE IS NOW JUST A POSSIBILITY THAT SOME ENTIRELY NEW RESOLUTION WILL EMERGE TOMORROW. UNQUOTE.

2. ERROR REGRETTED. SOSFA.

by FO tel no 28
Actioned

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FCO TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 374 D M

[Date] 4 July R M

circulated with 373 her UK Tels of 4 July.

Repeated to

[Priority] IMMEDIATE.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO 1635 OF 3 JULY.

FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AMMAN TEL AVIV

PARIS MOSCOW AND COPENHAGEN.

YOUR TELNO 3504: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION:

MIDDLE EAST.

THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF SHIFTING TODAY. FIRST

OF ALL WE LEARNED OF THE SUBSTANTIAL

AMENDMENTS TO THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT (NO DOUBT MADE

TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH AFRICANS).

(MY TELNO 1624). THROUGHOUT THE DAY THE RUMOURS

OF VOTING INTENTIONS VARIED, AND IN THE END WE

GATHERED THAT THE FRENCH AFRICANS WERE MUCH

DIVIDED WITH POSSIBLY FOUR READY TO SUPPORT

the Yugoslav

[FO 365 Eus 1076/67.

DISTRIBUTION

N.E. rec'd.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.We.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT BUT TEN STILL INTENDING TO OPPOSE IT OR TO ABSTAIN.

2. MEANWHILE FOLLOWING A MEETING OF THEIR GROUP AFTER LUNCH, THE LATIN AMERICANS WERE SOLID IN THEIR READINESS TO VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT AND IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO BRING THEIR OWN RESOLUTION TO THE VOTE. AND THE WESTERN SUPPORTERS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT SEEMED TO BE EQUALLY DETERMINED TO VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT. THERE WAS SOME SPECULATION EARLY IN THE DAY ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS BUT WE WERE IN DUE COURSE ABLE TO CONFIRM IN CONFIDENCE THAT WE TOO WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION AND IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION.

3. BEFSORE THE ASSEMBLY ADJOURNED AT 5.30 P.M. WE LEARN D THAT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TWO REPRESENT 8:3~ OF THE SPONSORS OF THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AND TWO SPONSORS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT HAD BEGUN DISCUSSIONS IN A SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE TO CONTINUE TONIGHT AND IF WE CAN

clam/

LEARN ANY-THI NG OF THE OUTCOME WE SHALL REPORT

LATER TONIGHT.

4. SEYDOUX KKFRANCE) SAID THIS EVENING THAT HE

THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COME OUT

WITH A SHORT NEW RESOLUTION STATING THE PRINCIPLE

OF WITHDRAWAL COUPLED WITH WHE NEED FOR URGENT

CONSIDERATION ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. POSSIBLY

WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE SECRETARY- GENERAL ADDED. SINCE THE

NON-ALIGNEDVAND THE LATIV AMERICANSHREALISE THAT

TH ERE IS NOW LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT OF THEIR

RESOLUTIONS ESCAPING BLOCKING THIRDS IT MAY BE

THAT THIS EFFORT WILL PRODUCE SOMETHING. IF

SOMETHING ENTIRELY NEW DOES EMERGE WE SHALL DO

OU BEST TO POSTPOE A VOTE ON IT TO A SUBSEQUENT

DAY.

5. I SHOULD ADD THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS TOLD US

THIS EVENING OF ONE DANGER WHICH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY

OCCURRED TO THEM. THE SUGGESTION IS THAT PARA

1(B) IN THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION (DEALING WITH

BELLIGERENCY ETC.) MIGHT BE VOTED OUT IN A SEPARATE

paragraph

PARAGRAPH VOTE. THUS ENTIRELY DESTROYING THE BALANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. IF THAT HAPPENED THEY TOLD US THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE AGAINST THE EMASCULATED RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD RESULT AND WE SHOULD NO DOUBT DO THE SAME. I MENTION THIS AS A CONCEIVABLE DANGER BUT WE HOPE IT WILL NHT ARISE.

SoSFA.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading) Cy/CAT "A"
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 375.

[Date] 4 JULY D M

R M

Repeated to

2 telegrams.

[Priority] FLASH.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 1437 OF

4 JULY AND TO BEIRUT BAHRAIN TUNIS JEDDA

H.C. ADEN ABU DHABI KHARTOUM CAIRO KUWAIT RABAT

TRIPOLI BENGHAZI DOHA DUBAI ALGIERS REPEATED FOR

DISTRIBUTIC INFORMATION TO TEHRAN UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS

TEL AVIV JERUSALEM ANKARA KABUL WASHINGTON

MOSCOW AND COPENHAGEN.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1401 TO AMMAN AND NUMBERS

3504, 3506 AND 3507 TO UKMIS NEW YORK

(NOT TO ALL)

U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHEN THE VOTE WILL BE TAXEN ON EITHER

THE QUOTE NON ALIGNED UNQUOTE OR THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS

AND THE SPONSORS ARE STILL IN CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER.

WE CANNOT YET BE SURE THAT EITHER RESOLUTION WILL ACTUALLY

COME TO THE VOTE. MEANWHILE LORD CARADON HAS MADE A

SPEECH IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE. WHICH RELATES TO THE

NON-AFIGNED AND LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS.

2. THE SITUATION HAS DEVELOPED FURTHER SINCE INSTRUCTIONS

UNDER REFERENCE WERE DESPATCHED. THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED

UNQUOTE RESOLUTION HAS NOW BEEN FURTHER AMENDED BY:

(A) THE SUBSTITUTION OF QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

CHARTER OF THE U.N. UNQUOTE AT THE END OF PARA 4:

(B) THE OMISSION OF QUOTE ISRAEL UNQUOTE IN PARA 5:

(C) THE OMISSION OF QUOTE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL

OF THE ISRAEL ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNQUOTE

AND QUOTE URGENTLY UNQUOTE FROM PARA 6.

3. SUPERFICIALLY (B) IS AN IMPROVEMENT

SINCE ISRAEL IS NO LONGER SINGLED OUT AS THE SOLE COUNTRY

WHICH HAS TO TAKE ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION

AND (C) APPEARS TO REMOVE THE MOST OBJECTIONABLE FEATURE

OF THE RESOLUTION, VIZ. THE SPECIFIC POSTPONEMENT OF ANY

OTHER ACTION ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION

UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN COMPLETED.

BUT THESE CHANGES ARE MORE APPARENT THAN REAL. IT IS

STILL THE CASE THAT ISRAEL IS TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY,

WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO CONSIDER (AND NO LONGER ~~VERY~~

URGENTLY) ACTION ON OTHER POINTS. IN EFFECT, THEREFORE, THIS

IS STILL A CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

4. MOREOVER, THE RESOLUTION IS LESS SATISFACTORY THAN

THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT MAKES NO MENTION

OF OTHER PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, E.G. ESPECIALLY THE END OF

BELLIGERENCY, AND ALSO FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH

INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND THE NEED FOR A FINAL SOLUTION

OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THE RESOLUTION IS, THEREFORE,

EVEN IN ITS AMENDED FORM, ~~FUNDLZ~~ fundamentally

(4)

fundamentally ~~GALLY~~ LACKING IN BALANCE. IN PARTICULAR IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT IT WILL ACHIEVE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE MUST STILL THEREFORE CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE AGAINST IT.

5. IT HAS FURTHER BEEN DECIDED THAT LORD CARADON SHOULD NOT PRESS FOR A PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH VOTE ON THE ~~QUOTE~~ "NON-ALIGNED" ~~UNQUOTE~~ RESOLUTION SINCE OUR OBJECTION TO IT NOW RELATES TO THE INADEQUACY OF THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE AND CANNOT.& AS PREVIOUSLY. BE SPECIFICALLY TIED TO THE SIXTH PARAGRAPH.

6. WE STILL HOPE THAT THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION WILL COME TO THE VOTE AND WE SHALL OF COURSE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF IT ~~EVJ C~~EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT ITSELF ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. WE DOUBT IF IT IS WISE TO ATTEMPT TO STATE ANY IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION ON THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM. (SEE PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 350 TO UMIS NEW YORK). WHEN SPEAKING ABOUT OUR

support/

(B)

(5)

SUPPORT FOR THE LATIN-AMERICAN TEXT. YOU SHOULD ALSO:

(A) NOT. REPEAT NOT. IMPLY THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR IT INVOLVES RECOGNITON THAT A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY EXISTED BEFORE THE FIGHTING BEGAN (OPERATIVE PARA 1(B):

AND

(B) IF NECESSARY CLARIFY OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3(B) AS MEANING THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS RECOGNISED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CANALS.

7. THE TEXT OF LORD CARADON~S SPEECH IS BEING TELEGRAPHED TO YOU SEPARATELY. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THOSE POINTS WHICH YOU CONSIDER WILL BE MOST TELLING IN LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. YOU CAN ALSO DRAW ATTENTION TO OUR SUPPORT FOR THE FOLLOWING TWO RESOLUTIONS:-

(A) THE PAKISTAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM WHICH REFERS TO THE ~~QUOTE~~ "MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE city/.

(6)

(e)

CITY "~~UNQUOTE~~". DECLARES THAT THESE MEASURES ARE INVALID. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO RESCIND ALL MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN AND TO DESIST FROM TAKING ANY ACTION TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION WITHIN ONE WEEK:

(B) THE SWEDISH-SPONSORED RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE OCCUPIED AREAS AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. CALLS FOR THE SCRUPULOUS RESPECT OF HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. COMMENDS THE WORK TO DATE OF . E.G. THE RED CROSS AND UNRWA. AND CALLS FOR SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS.

SOSFA.

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04 OF RABAT

PRODROME RABAT

+.= GOOD EVENING ,MOM ,PLS.

1076

circulated with FO 375.

PRODROME RABAT

PRODROME LONDON

FOR 07 GPS 1060A 04/2054Z

Released in original personally to P.P.S.'s of Bevin, Chuter Ede, Harold Wilson, Lord Strabolgi

'''' F L A S H '''' PRODROME RABAT

U

GUIDANCE 17404

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OF LORD CARADON'S EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

TODAY AFTER OUR LONG DELIBERATIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN THIS ASSEMBLY WE COME TO TAKE ACTION. WE ON OUR PART HAVE MADE OUR PURPOSES CLEAR AND ON THESE PURPOSES WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS IN FACT A WIDE AND GROWING MEASURE OF GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THIS ASSEMBLY.

WE SHALL VOTE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THE ARAB ERRITORY THEY HAVE OCCUPIED AND WE WANT TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT DELAY. AT THE SAME TIME WE WISH TO TAKE ACTION HERE AT THE UNITED NATIONS THAT WILL END ANY CLAIMS TO BELLIGERENCY, AND ACHIEVE A STABLE AND SECURE SETTLEMENT.

WE WISH TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF A DURABLE PEACE. WE WISH TO BRING URGENT RELIEF TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED IN THE CONFLICT, AND WE WISH TO BRING THEM JUSTICE TOO. WE WISH TO BRING LASTING SECURITY TO EVERYONE CONCERNED. WE WISH TO RESPECT THE

HE RIGHT

O ALL THE STATES CONCERNED TO LIVE IN TRUE DIGNITY AND REAL FREEDOM AND ASSURED PEACE. WE WISH NOT ONLY TO MAKE DECLARATIONS BUT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO PUT THESE PURPOSES INTO PRACTICAL EFFECT.

WE HAVE DECLARED THESE PURPOSES, AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THEM.

HOW CAN THEY BEST BE ACHIEVED ?

I SHOULD FIRST OF ALL SAY THAT ON THE RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM PUT FORWARD BY PAKISTAN AND OTHERS WE SHALL VOTE IN FAVOUR. WE HAVE HEARD JUST NOW WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BY THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL. BUT WE ON OUR SIDE WOULD WISH TO REASSERT WHAT WE HAVE SAID AND EMPHASIZED BEFORE. IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE NOW WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE CITY.

WE SHALL ALSO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ADMIRABLE RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY SWEDEN AND OTHERS DEALING WITH QUESTIONS OF RELIEF OF SUFFERING.

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'' IN PARTICULAR, WE SUPPORT THE APPEAL IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 9 OF THAT RESOLUTION, THE APPEAL TO ALL GOVERNMENTS AND OTHERS CONCERNED TO HELP TO SOLVE ONE OF THE PROBLEMS ON WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN NOW TAKE PRACTICAL ACTION. INDEED, IT IS TIME FOR A GREAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO ASSIST THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHOLE REGION ''.

NOW WE HAVE BEFORE US TWO OTHER RESOLUTIONS WHICH COMMAND SUBSTANTIAL SPONSORSHIP. NEITHER IS FULLY SATISFACTORY, IN OUR OPINION, TO ACHIEVE ALL THE PURPOSES WE HAVE STATED.

I TAKE FIRST THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSALVIA AND OTHER DELEGATIONS. IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND TO MANY OTHERS LARGELY BECAUSE IT DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND THUS WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE AIM IT SET. IT WAS INADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE. INDEED IT MIGHT WELL PREVENT THE VERY PURPOSE IT DECLARED.

WE RECOGNISE HOWEVER THAT AN EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SPONSORED THE RESOLUTION HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE HAVE STRONGLY ADVOCATED SUCH A PROPOSAL. WITHOUT SUCH A PRESENCE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PRACTICAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. IT IS A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS OUR WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT.

WE ARE ALSO SPECIALLY GLAD THAT THIS RESOLUTION INCLUDES REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 33. HIS SEEMS TO US A MOST VALUABLE ADDITION. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CAN BE OVER-EMPHASIZED, AND OTHER IMPORTANT CHANGES WERE PROPOSED TODAY.

BUT THE RESOLUTION STILL HAS CERTAIN ESSENTIAL DEFECTS TO WHICH I WILL RETURN IN A MOMENT. IT IS STILL AN UNBALANCES RESOLUTION.

I TURN TO THE RESOLUTION PRESENTED TO US ON FRIDAY LAST BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ON BEHALF OF EIGHTEEN STATES OUR MAIN CRITICISM OF THAT RESOLUTION IS THAT IT DOES NOO INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIS SEEMS TO US A SERIOUS OMISSION, THOUGH IT DOES NOT OF COURSE PRECLUDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM REACHING A CONCLUSION ON THAT OR ON ANY OTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

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WE HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ON OTHER SECTIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION. FOR INSTANCE, WHILE WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF FULL FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO THE HOLY SITES, WE DOUBT IF IT WILB BE WISE TO ATTEMPT TO STATE ANY CONCLUSION AT THIS STAGE ON THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM.

NEVERTHELESS IN SPITE OF THSE RESERVATIONS WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RESOLUTION CONTAINS VERY VALUABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROVISIONS, AND WE GREATLY ADMIRE, IF WE MAY SAY SO, THE SINCERE AND PERSISTENT EFFORT TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES HAVE MADE. THE RESOLUTION PROVIDES FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY. IT PROVIDES FOR THE END OF BELLIGERENCY. IT PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IT STATES ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES, AND WE WARMLY WELCOME THE REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR A FULL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES. THROUGHOUT IT HAS BEEN ONE OF OUR MAIN PURPOSES TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY WE CAN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE WIDESPREAD AND ACUTE SUFFERING WHICH THE CONFLICT HAS CAUSED.

NOW THEN WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHICH OF THESE RESOLUTIONS WE SHALL SUPPORT. IN REACHING THIS DECISION WE APPLY THE TEST OF EFFECTIVENESS WE APPLY THE TEST OF WHICH RESOLUTION CAN MAKE PROGRESS TO BRINGING ABOUT THE PURPOSES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY AND A DRABLE PEACE. IT IS ON THAT TEST THAT WE DECIDE THAT THE SECOND RESOLUTION, THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION, NOT ONLY CONFORMS WITH THE PURPOSES WHICH WE HAVE SET BUT ALSO OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING THEM.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THOSE PURPOSES MAINLY BECAUSE ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS ARE OMITTED. WE SHALL VOTE FOR WITHDRAWAL BUT WE MUST VOTE FOR A BALANCED RESOLUTION. THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS IS STILL NOT BALANCED. ON THE OTHER HAND WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND OTHERS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT. MY DELEGRATION THEREFORE CANNOT SUPPORT THE FIRST RESOLUTION. BUT WILL CERTAINLY VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION.

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WE NOW REACH THE CRITICAL STAGE IN OUR DELI ERATIONS. WHAT WE DO NOW OR WHAT WE FAIL TO DO WILL HAVE IMMEDIATE AND FAR-REACHING EFFECTS NOT ONLY TO THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE DIRECTLY CONCERNED BUT ALSO TO THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION ITSELF. IT IS [redacted]R CONVICTION THAT THE RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT WELL HAVE THE EFFECT OF POSTPONING AND INDEED POSSIBLY FRUSTRATING THE VERY OBJECTIVES WHICH THE RESOLUTION ITSELF AIMS TO ACHIEVE. ON THE OTHER HAND THE RESOLUTION WE SUPPORT, THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION, WILL OPEN THE WAY TO A REALISTIC ADVANCE. FOR THAT REASON WE EARNESTLY TRUST THAT RESERVATIONS AND DIFFERENCES WILL NOW BE PUT ASIDE, HAT THE NEED FOR POSITIVE ACTION WILL NOW PREVAIL AND THAT THE SECOND RESOLUTION WILL TODAY RECEIVE AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY.
SOSFA
/CROSEC

CC. INSERT BEGIHNING TEXT QUOTE
FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OF LORD CARADONS EXPLANATION OF VOTE
UNQUOTE

QSL FOR V
TPD 042114 EHH

?

QSL FOR 07 1015 4 JULY RGG

PRODROME LONDON
PRODROME RABAT

1076
Fuller 5/7

FOR 1 FOLDN GRS 150 050810Z
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 376 4 JULY 1967

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEWYORK
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1650 OF 4 JULY,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN BEIRUT BAHRAIN BENGHAZI
ALGIERS JEDDA KUWAIT HC ADEN RABAT TUNIS TEL AVIV TRIPOLI
KHARTOUM AND SAVING TO CAIRO.

MIDDLE EAST: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

VOTING TOOK PLACE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS EVENING ON INTER ALIA THE ~~/QUOTE~~ "NON-ALIGNED" ~~UNQUOTE~~ DRAFT SPONSORED BY VARIOUS AFRO-ASIAN STATES, AND THE LATIN-AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION. BOTH RESOLUTIONS FAILED. VOTING FIGURES WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) FOR THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT:
YES 53
NO 46 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 20

(B) LATIN-AMERICAN DRAFT:
YES 57 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
NO 43
ABSTAINED 20

FOREIGN VOFFICE PASS RABAT

SOSFA

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON SENT 05/0814Z AJN

QSL YOUR FOR 1 0815Z/05 JULU CJBS

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

LE PETIT MAROCAIN - TUESDAY 4 JULY

Jerusalem - message from King Hassan to the Pope

RABAT, 3 juil. (MAP). — Voici le texte du message adressé par SM Hassan II à S.S. le Pape Paul VI, et que M. Ali Bengelloun a remis cet ap.ès-midi au souverain Pontife, au cours d'une audience au Vatican :

« Sainteté,

« Nos implorons Dieu très haut pour qu'il vous prête assistance dans l'accomplissement de ce qui lui agrée et nous guide Votre Sainteté et Nous-même, dans la voie de sa suprême justice.

« En fidélité aux anciennes et nobles traditions de Nos ancêtres les rois du Maroc, et de Vos illustres prédécesseurs au Saint-Siège, Nous sommes heureux d'adresser à Votre Sainteté le présent message pour Vous exprimer Notre sincère affection et Notre haute considération.

« En cette circonstance, Nous voudrions d'autre part attirer Votre haute attention sur a gravité de la récente initiative des Israéliens dans la ville sainte de Jérusalem.

« En annexant celle-ci aux territoires qu'ils occupent en Palestine et après en avoir profané les sanctuaires et commis une agression contre ses habitants et ses gouvernants légaux, les Israéliens, en effet, n'ont pas seulement bafoué par cette action arbitraire, l'autorité politique qui gouvernait Jérusalem avant l'agression, mais dans le même temps, et plus gravement, ils mettent en péril la situation religieuse des lieux saints.

« Votre Sainteté sait que depuis bien des siècles, les musulmans ont scrupuleusement

LES OULEMAS DE JORDANIE REMERCIENT SM LE ROI POUR SON ACTION EN FAVEUR DES LIEUX-SAINTS (Vp. 3)

veillé à la sauvegarde de cette ville qui fut le berceau de Notre Seigneur Jésus, fils de Marie, esprit et verbe de Dieu, le lieu de l'ascension de notre Prophète Mohammed, serviteur et envoyé de Dieu, et dans l'enceinte de laquelle les fidèles des religions révélées cohabitèrent dans un esprit de paix et d'affection mutuelles. »

« Cette tolérance fut telle que les chrétiens et les adeptes d'autres confessions n'eurent aucune répugnance à confier aux musulmans les clefs de leurs églises et de leurs lieux de culte. Aussi bien, jamais l'histoire n'eut à enregistrer que cette confiance fût trahie ou mal placée. Si ces rapports traduisent une vérité, ce ne peut être que celle des profonds liens spirituels tissés particulièrement entre musulmans et chrétiens. Cette compréhension et cette affection réciproques dont témoigne le livre saint du Coran : « **Proches de vous musulmans en affection ceux qui affirment : « Nous sommes chrétiens », car parmi eux sont des prêtres et des hommes pieux qui ont fait vœu d'humilité** ».

« En considération de ces étroites relations entre nos deux religions et des liens solides et profonds qui, tout au long des siècles, ont uni dans l'enceinte de Jérusalem, les fidèles de l'Islam et du christianisme, Nous avons estimé du plus haut intérêt de déléguer auprès de Votre Sainteté M. Ali Bengelloun, notre ministre de la Justice.

« Nous le chargerons de Vous transmettre Notre salut, de Vous exprimer la haute estime en laquelle Nous tenons les efforts que Vous déployez pour la cause de l'équité et de la paix et de Vous faire part de Notre vœu de voir Votre Sainteté user de son audience spirituelle et de son immense autorité dans le monde pour que les autorités légitimes recouvrent leurs droits spoliés et pour que le statut politique et religieux de Jérusalem et de tous les lieux saints soit rétabli tel qu'il existait avant l'agression israélienne.

« Nous implorons Dieu très haut de maintenir Votre Sainteté en excellente santé et de couronner de succès les efforts que Vous déployez en faveur de la paix et du bien de l'humanité.

« Nous prions Votre Sainteté de croire à Notre sincère et haute considération.

« Fait en Notre palais royal de Rabat, ce samedi 22 Rebiaa I 1387 (1er juillet 1967) - Hassan II ».

This should be reported if my tel comment on the proposal for internationalisation of Jerusalem.

5/VII

NQR

CVK AZS 6.VII

DFH.

Minutes

The General Situation in Morocco.

It might be of some interest to relate what I hear of what is going on within Moroccan and other circles in Rabat.

On Saturday evening at a Dinner Party to which we were invited by a prominent businessman, Mohamed Belghazi, Moulay Ahmed el Alaoui Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines, was there with his wife and some of her family from Fez, M. and Madame Slitchen of the Royal Cabinet who was recently appointed Ambassador to Canada, M. and Madame Abderrazik, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Commerce, and Madame Halima Ouarzazi of the Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and her husband. There was much argument for and against the boycott of Moroccan Jews. Minister Alaoui and his Secretary-General voiced their opposition of all boycotts in general, and more so of Moroccan Jews, saying that these have always been regarded as fellow Moroccans and their persecution would force them to feel like outsiders and act accordingly. Madame Ouarzazi was all for the boycott and said that she now buys her shoes from Medina, as all shoe shops in the modern town are owned by Jews. The majority of the guests, however, were opposed to the agitation of feelings, saying that this is making the Security Authorities' job more difficult, as at all cost they must preserve law and order, and so far they have been doing this admirably.

At one point during the evening General Oufkir, who seemed to be a good friend of our host, called for a drink. After his departure our host told me that Oufkir confided in him that he had more respect for Israel than for the East Arabs who are cowards and bad fighters. They make a fuss and clamour if all States in the world do not literally hold Israel's arms behind her back for Arabs to give her a smack. He said that Oufkir is expecting already for an attack from Algeria which, along with Revolutionary Socialist Arabs, will not rest if they will not overthrow Monarchical and more liberal regimes. Our host said that Oufkir is having a very difficult job in intercepting the infiltration of detrimental propaganda from the Middle East, which has very much increased since the events. Strange enough, the subject of Jerusalem was not broached during the evening.

Haj Mohamed Lebdi, First Khalifa of the Governor of Rabat, told me that at a Dinner Party last week at the Indian Ambassador's to which Mohamed Aziz Lahbabi, Rector of the Faculté des Lettres who belongs to the UNFP, and a couple from U.A.P. were the other Moroccan guests, these said that they had no doubt of the participation of American and British aircraft in the war alongside Israel.

They/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

43715 (7213) A.O.St.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Minutes

They based their argument on the allegation that aircraft from Tel Aviv could not have possibly made that journey to bomb Egyptian airports. The Indian Ambassador explained to them the fallacy of their reasoning and told them that modern Mirage planes which Israel was using could easily travel double that distance to bomb the U.A.R. and return to Tel Aviv. A Polish couple who were there surprisingly defended the Israeli point of view that Maj Zebdi doubted if they were not Jews themselves.

Has shunned me recently when possible.

Meanwhile the Jordanian Ambassador is continuing his condolences sessions and evening as long as he can ever with his wife. At his beach hut he twice invited the Minister of P.T.T., Mohammed Benoussi, and his brother-in-law, Abdelaziz Mardoudi, Procureur du Roi in Tangier, who have a neighbouring hut, to listen to his propaganda and lamentation. Last Sunday he came out with a story that the King of Jordan discovered that one of the pilots he captured was a British officer who used to train his army. When he was reminded that his King had categorically denied British and American participation in a declaration he made before leaving America, he said that the King made the statement just to please the Americans! Then added vehemently that no one can deny Britain's or America's fostering of Israel ever since her creation; whereupon his wife lifted her arms dramatically and prayed God to allow her not to die before seeing America as humiliated as Arabs have now been. Her husband expressed surprise that America should now be the only subject of attack to the exclusion of Britain which is as guilty/. Madame Mardoudi who lost her breath in attacking the Jews and insisting on their complete boycott asked for a glass of Coca Cola. After drinking it in one gulp she looked at the Ambassador reprimandingly and told him he should no longer buy that stuff because it was of Zionist manufacture!

/ He also blamed Saudi Arabia for not helping Jordan at all during the fight.

A. Hasnaoui

4/7/1967.

6/7

L.O

O.S AZS 4.VII

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5/VII

D.A. Rabat X

5/7. CONFIDENTIAL.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

CY Cat A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 377 D M

[Date] 5 July R

Repeated to I hope the tone of your telegram on this tel. proves justified. Personally, I find no cause for satisfaction in our behaving imposed on the Arabs (see 56) a diplomatic defeat on top of the military one imposed by Israel.

[Priority] ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1651

OF 4 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON

MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AMMAN

DISTRIBUTION

BEIRUT BAHRAIN TUNIS JEDDA HC ADEN(PERSONAL)

KHARTOUM CAIRO KUWAIT RABAT TRIPOLI BENGHAZI AND

ALGIERS.

MY TELNO 1642 (NOT TO ALL) :

MIDDLE EAST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE VOTES THIS EVENING WERE MUCH AS WE EXPECTED.

EXCEPT THAT THE SO-CALLED NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION

GOT SOMEWHAT FEWER VOTES IN FAVOUR AND MORE

AGAINST THAN WE HAD EXPECTED.

2. THE SWEDISH RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN

ASSISTANCE WAS PASSED PRACTICALLY UNANIMOUSLY

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

(WITH ONLY SYRIA AND CUBA ABSTAINING).

3. THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM PASSED WITH A VOTE OF 99 IN FAVOUR. INCLUDING THE U.K.. AUSTRIA. CANADA. DENMARK. IRELAND. THE NETHERLANDS. NEW ZEALAND. NORWAY AND SWEDEN: THERE WAS NONE AGAINST AND TWENTY ABSTENTIONS INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE ASSEMBLY HAS ADJOURNED UNTIL TOMORROW AFTERNOON. WHEN THERE WILL BE EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE.

5. THERE MAY BE SOME MOVE TO PROPOSE A PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION REFERRING THE WHOLE QUESTION BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT NO RESOLUTION TO THIS EFFECT HAS YET EMERGED. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WILL INCLUDE A RECOMMENDATION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE ASKED TO APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST (OR A RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD SO REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL). WE SHALL CONSULT OTHERS ABOUT THIS AND DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET SUCH A PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD. BUT WE MUST NOT GET THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD FORMALLY AT ALL UNLESS WE ARE ABSOLUTELY SURE OF GETTING THE necessary/

NECESSARY TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY AND THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE ARABS. IF WE ARE NOT SURE OF GETTING THE NECESSARY MAJORITY. IT WILL BE BEST TO LEAVE ALL FURTHER ACTION TO THE COUNCIL.

6. ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS WILL EXPLOIT THE RESULT IN ANTI-WEST PROPAGANDA. THE RESULTS CERTAINLY REPRESENT A REVERSE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. HAVING THEMSELVES CALLED FOR THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION. THE RUSSIANS RECEIVED VERY WEAK SUPPORT (APART FROM THE COMMUNISTS AND THE ARABS WHO WERE BOUND TO GO WITH THEM) FOR THEIR ATTEMPT TO CONDEMN ISRAEL AND CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS. THE RESULTS ALSO REPRESENT A SERIOUS FAILURE FOR THE ARABS. AT THE SAME TIME ISRAEL CAN DRAW LITTLE COMFORT FROM THE RESULTS SINCE THERE WAS A GENERAL DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS. AND IN PARTICULAR THE VOTE ON JERUSALEM MUST BE GALLING TO THEM.

7. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ESTIMATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALL THIS. BUT IT MAY BE WORTH SAYING NOW THAT AS THE

Assembly

ASSEMBLY DEBATE- WHICH STARTED WITH EMOTIONAL EXPECTATIONS- PROCEEDED ALL CONCERNED BEGAN TO BECOME M ORE REALISTIC. THE CHANGES MADE IN THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT WERE ALL IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SPONSORS OF THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AND THE LATIN AMERICANS. IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A LAST-MINUTE COMPROMISE. FAILED ONLY BECAUSE THE ARABS WERE INTRANSIGENT IN THEIR DEMAND THAT PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL (THE LATIN AMERICANS STICKING TO THEIR POINT ON BELLIGERENCY).

8. A DECISIVE FEATURE WAS THE STEADINESS AND SOLIDARITY OF THE LATIN AMERICANS ONCE THEY HAD MADE UP THEIR MINDS.

9. I DOUBT IF THERE WILL BE A MOVE TO GO BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY. EVERYONE WILL WANT SOME LITTLE TIME TO LICK THEIR WOUNDS AND THINK AGAIN. I THINK THAT THERE MAY BE SOMETHING IN THE VIEW PUT TO ME BY THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT UNTIL ALL CONCERNED HAD SUFFERED SOME REVERSE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HOPE FOR ANY NEW APPROACH.

FO PASS RABAT 10. SOSFA

SERVICE ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE

PRODROME RABAT
FOR [redacted] GPS 260 05/1648Z

[redacted]RIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT
TELNO 378 05TH JULY 1967

Thalben 4
HE seen 1076
I.O.
F.S.G
9.5 ALS 6.VII

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 1649 OF 4/7.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1648. — Ack. recd

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.
VOTING TOOK PLACE THIS EVENING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS FOLLOW .
1. FIRST AMENDMENT IN A/L. 525 (CUBAN AMENDMENT TO QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION)
YES 20
NO 78 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 22
THE SECOND AMENDMENT WAS NOT PUT TO THE VOTE.
2. AMENDMENTS IN A/L. 524 (ALBANIAN AMENDMENT TO QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT).
YES 32
NO 66 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 22
3. A/L. 522 (REV. 3) QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND 17 OTHERS. (HIS WAS GIVEN PRIORITY OVER OTHER DRAFTS WITHOUT OBJECTION):
YES 53

NO 46 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 20
4. A/L. 519 SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION. A PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH VOTE WAS REQUESTED AND RESULTED AS FOLLOWS:
PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS
YES 36
NO 57 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 24
1ST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH
YES 36
NO 57 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 23
2ND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH
YES 45

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TE

Y
NO 48 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 22
3RD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH
YES 34
NO 54 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 28
4TH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH
YES 36
NO 54 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 26
THE PRESIDENT THEN DECLARED THAT AS ALL PARAGRAPHS VOTED ON INDIVIDUALLY HAD FAILED, THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE WOULD NOT BE VOTED UPON.
5. A/L. 520 UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION. THIS WAS NOT PRESSED TO VOTE.
6. A/L. 521 ALBANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.
YES 22
NO 71 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 27
7. A/L. 523. THE QUOTE LATIN-AMERICAN UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND 19 OTHER STATES.
YES 57 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
NO 43
ABSTAINED 20
8. A/L. 526. DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TABLED BY SWEDEN AND 25 OTHER STATES.
YES 116 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
NO NONE
ABSTAINED 2 (CUBA, SYRIA)
DID NOT PARTICIPATE 2
9. A/L. 527 REV.1. DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY PAKISTAN AND FOUR OTHERS ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM.
YES 99 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
NO NONE
ABSTAINED 20 (INCLUDING UNITED STATES)
FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.
SOSFA

SENT 1655CD+

PRODROME RABAT

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇

FOR 5 GRS 40A 051444Z

Further 5/7
D.A. Afr 7/6
1076
This appeared in 'Al Ambar to-day
6/VII

ROUTINE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT

TELNO 380 5TH JULY, 1967.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV.

ADDSD FO TEL NO 767 OF 5/7 RFI ALGIERS BEIRUT CAIRO PARIS RABAT TUNIS. FRENCH BAN ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MIDDLE EAST. DESPITE BAN TODAYS LEAD STORY IN LOCAL PRESS AND MAIN ITEM ON RADIO NEWS DESCRIBE SIGNING IN JERUSALEM YESTERDAY OF AGREEMENT WITH TURBOMECA OF FRANCE FOR LOCAL MANUFACTURE OF JET ENGINES FOR AIRCRAFT. FO PASS RABAT AS MY TEL NO 1

SOSFA+++ SENT AT 1446Z MOE

PRODROME RABAT
RECD 4 AND 5 1443Z/5 JUL WDSG

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/OTP A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0 TO Rabat.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. GUIDANCE 176 D M

[Date] 5TH JULY R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

OIL.

GUIDANCES NUMBERS 162 AND 166.

ON 4 JULY AN ENABLING BILL TO GIVE H.M.G. POWER, IF NECESSARY, TO INTRODUCE OIL RATIONING WAS PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

2. NO (REPEAT NO) DECISION ON RATIONING HAS BEEN TAKEN AND THE TIMING OF THE BILL HAS BEEN DICTATED LARGELY BY THE PARLIAMENTARY TIMETABLE (THE HOUSE WILL BE IN RECESS FROM 29 JULY TO EARLY OCTOBER). IF QUESTIONED ABOUT THE BILL, YOU SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT, IN VIEW OF THE PARLIAMENTARY RECESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES NECESSARY, IT IS ONLY PRUDENT THAT H.M.G. SHOULD SEEK THESE POWERS AT THIS STAGE. THE ACTION SHOULD BE SEEN AS A PRECAUTIONARY STEP ONLY AND NOT AS A SIGN THAT WE ARE PARTICULARLY PERTURBED ABOUT THE OIL SUPPLY SITUATION. SOSFA

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

Minutes.

Al. Maea'

Contrary to what I said at the Staff meeting, I see from my notes that Mr. Ward gave its circulation at around 4,500.

2. IRD have made good use of Al Maea's recent article attacking Russia - see attached, copies of which I have sent to the D.G Sûreté Nationale and to Mr. Mehdi Benaouna.

A.D. Cumming.
5 July 1967

HE Mr 6/VII
DS. ALS 6.VII

M.F.P

CONFIDENTIAL

H&P

Intr.

Al Alam (Istiqlal) No. 6252 of July 5, 1967.

The Istiqlal Party forwards an important memorandum to Islamic States.

Islam makes it encumbent on Moslems to assume the duty of religious defence of Islamic Land.

The Party requests all Moslem States to undertake a serious and direct action for the recovery of Jerusalem from Zionists.

There should be a resistance of any manoeuvre made by any state for the internationalisation of Jerusalem.

At its meeting last week, the Istiqlal Party's Executive Committee had decided to endeavour to draw the attention of Moslem Kings and Heads of State to their duty of defence of the Holy Land and of undertaking serious direct action for Jerusalem's recovery. The Committee sent an important memorandum in this respect to His Majesty the King, to which reference was made in a former number. Memoranda were also sent to all Heads of Islamic States, of which we have the pleasure of publishing the following full text:-

"The Moroccan Istiqlal Party has the pleasure of expressing to you its full appreciation and respect, and to draw your attention to the following:-

Arab and Islamic countries have gone through a serious adversity by reason of the treacherous Zionist aggression on the Arab motherland in the East. Aggressive intentions were made manifest by the occupation of U.A.R., Jordanian and Syrian territory, and by the brutal treatment of the Arab and Moslem inhabitants in a manner incompatible with human principles which the world would want to prevail on Earth. Israeli forces have completely annihilated towns and villages, bombarded hospitals and shelters, destroyed quarters inhabited by Arabs, pursued scores of thousands of Moslem inhabitants and looted all their property.

When Moslems were still suffering from the throes of this adversity Israel ventured to annex Jerusalem - the Sacred Moslem Town - to the Zionist State.

The gravity of the step lies in its confrontation of the world - which is now debating the Zionist aggression at U.N.O.- with an accomplished fact, so that Jerusalem might lie outside the framework of any proposal U.N.O. might make and in whose

execution/

those execution Big Stakes are to participate, on the ground that Jerusalem had become part of Israeli territory.

Jegardless of the Zionist danger to the Arab world and to Palestine in particular, Jerusalem's official annexation to Israel is looked upon as a serious detraction from a Sacred Islamic Land and from a League to which the Project was taken in a stance so that it became a main Islamic concern.

Islam prohibits trusteeship over Islamic principal sanctuaries, namely Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, by non-Muslims and imperatively entrusts to Moslems the duty of the religious defence of these holy places for the recovery of any part of them which might fall into non-Islamic hands. For this reason it is the duty of Islamic States to ensure the duty of action for rescuing Holy Jerusalem from Zionist occupation. Your State is among those which bear the responsibility of defence of Jerusalem and the retrieve from the hands of Zionist Occupation before they will succeed in their intention of pulling down God's Holy Places in the Town of Heavenly Religions.

The Istiqlal Party, therefore, appeals to you to sponsor a serious direct action by all Islamic States for Jerusalem's recovery from Israeli occupation, which is now taking the form of a religious war directed against Islam and Moslems. You are asked to resist any manoeuvre any State, or group of States or any party might make for the internationalisation of Jerusalem.

In view of the positive action undertaken by Israel resultant from occupation and the laying of hands, we, while appreciating the diplomatic and international efforts in this respect, do not consider them sufficient or fruitful in a matter such as the recovery of Jerusalem. We, therefore, expect you and all big Islamic States in Asia and Africa to do something positive compatible with the gravity of the action undertaken by Israel.

In making this positive request the Istiqlal Party will be happy to see perfect readiness on the part of your state to

undertake/

undertake this historical action.

In expectation of your reply, we renew the assurance of our highest appreciation and respect.

Allal el Fassi.

Leader of the Istiqlal Party.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

See X

On this the King (message
to the Pope enclosed separately)
& the Articles seem to be
in agreement.

So report by long to NEDD
ref. earlier tels.

O.S. Dfr. AHS 6.VII

N.Y.T. Tels Jan 7/VII

M.F.P

No. 114

Note

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to transmit herewith a French translation of the speech made to the General Assembly of the United Nations on Tuesday the 4th of July by Lord Caradon, the British Permanent Representative, in explanation of the vote he was instructed to cast on the Resolutions before the Assembly relating to the crisis in the Middle East.

Her Majesty's Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY

RABAT

5 July 1967.

No. 114 Traduction non-officielle

L'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et a l'honneur de transmettre ci-inclus une traduction française du discours fait à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies le mardi 4 juillet par Lord Caradon, le Représentant Permanent Britannique, pour expliquer le vote qu'il avait donné, sous instructions, sur les Résolutions devant l'Assemblée au sujet de la crise du Moyen Orient.

L'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères l'assurance de sa haute considération.

AMBASSADE DE GRANDE BRETAGNE

RABAT

le 5 juillet 1967.

Lord Caradon explique le vote
britannique sur les résolutions
devant l'Assemblée Générale

Aujourd'hui, après nos longues délibérations au Conseil de Sécurité et dans cette Assemblée, nous en venons au moment d'agir. Tous nous, nous avons clairement exposé nos objectifs et nous pensons convaincus qu'un accord général se fait, dans une large mesure, sur nos objectifs en cette Assemblée.

Nous voterons pour le retrait des forces israéliennes des territoires arabes occupés et nous voulons que ce retrait se fasse sans retard. Nous voulons en même temps que les Nations Unies mettent fin à toute revendication de belligérance, et réalisent un accord stable et sûr.

Nous voulons porter les souffrances d'une part devant, nous désirons porter un secours urgent à ceux qui ont souffert dans ce conflit, et nous voulons aussi leur apporter la justice. Nous désirons apporter à tous les belligérants une sécurité durable. Nous désirons respecter le droit de tous les Etats concernés à vivre dans une vraie dignité et une liberté réelle et une paix assurée. Nous ne désirons pas seulement faire des déclarations, mais prendre des mesures immédiates pour que nos objectifs soient mis en application pratique.

Nous avons exposé nos objectifs, et nous sommes déterminés à les poursuivre.

Quand pourront-ils être le mieux réalisés ?

Je tiens à dire tout d'abord que nous voterons en faveur de la Résolution sur Jérusalem présentée par le Pakistan et d'autres pays. Nous venons d'écouter ce que vient de dire le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Israël. Mais nous voulons, de notre côté, répéter ce que nous avons déjà dit. Notre opinion est que rien ne devrait être fait qui pourrait porter préjudice au futur statut de cette ville de Jérusalem.

Nous voterons aussi en faveur de la Résolution admirable présentée par la Suède et d'autres pays sur les questions du secours et du soulagement des souffrances. Nous soutenons en particulier l'appel contenu dans le paragraphe 3 de cette Résolution, appel à tous les gouvernements et à tous les intéressés pour aider à résoudre l'un des problèmes à propos desquels la communauté internationale peut agir pratiquement. En fait, il est temps qu'un effort international soit fait

/pour

pour un meilleur développement de toute la région.

Nous avons maintenant devant nous deux autres résolutions qui requièrent un appui substantiel. Aucune d'elles n'est satisfaisante, à notre avis pour réaliser tous les objectifs que nous avons exposés.

Je prends tout d'abord la Résolution présentée par la Yougoslavie et d'autres délégations. Dans sa forme originale, elle était, pour nous et beaucoup d'autres, inacceptable car elle ne tenait pas compte de toutes les réalités de la situation et, par conséquent, ne pouvait contribuer au but qu'elle visait. Elle ne pouvait, de par son insuffisance, arriver à son objectif. En fait, elle pouvait même empêcher son objectif même d'être atteint.

Nous reconnaissons cependant que l'effort fait a donné des améliorations substantielles. Les pays qui ont parrainé cette Résolution se sont notamment déclarés en faveur de la nomination d'un représentant spécial du Secrétaire-Général pour entrer en contact avec les parties intéressées. Sans une telle présence, il est difficile de voir comment un progrès pratique pourrait s'effectuer. Nous appuyons cette proposition de tout coeur.

Nous sommes heureux, en particulier, que cette Résolution comprenne une référence aux principes de la Charte et en particulier à ceux des Articles 2 et 33. Ceci nous paraît une addition valable. Nous ne pensons pas qu'on puisse exagérer l'importance de ceci, ni des changements importants proposés aujourd'hui.

Mais cette Résolution présente certains défauts essentiels sur lesquels je vais revenir dans un instant. C'est toujours une Résolution déséquilibrée.

J'en viens à la Résolution présentée vendredi dernier par la Trinité et Tobago au nom de dix-huit Etats. Notre principal grief est que cette Résolution ne comprend pas une clause spécifique demandant la nomination d'un représentant spécial du Secrétaire-Général, ce qui nous paraît être une sérieuse omission, bien qu'elle ne puisse pas empêcher le Conseil de Sécurité d'arriver à une conclusion à ce sujet

/ou

ou pour toute autre action requise.

Nous avons d'autres réserves à faire sur d'autres parties de cette Résolution. Par exemple, bien que nous soyons en faveur de la liberté d'accès aux lieux saints, nous estimons qu'il eût déjà été souhaitable de conclure maintenant sur la proposition d'établir un régime international pour la Ville de Jérusalem.

Néanmoins, malgré ces réserves, nous sommes persuadés que cette Résolution contient des dispositions très valables, et nous saisirons, avec votre permission, les efforts continus et sincères pour apporter une contribution efficace et constructive de la part des Etats d'Amérique latine. Cette Résolution demande le retrait des territoires occupés. Elle demande la cessation de toute belligérance. Elle demande la liberté de transit par les voies d'eau internationales. Elle déclare des principes essentiels, et nous accueillons chaleureusement la référence à la nécessité d'une solution complète du problème des réfugiés. L'un de nos objectifs majeurs a toujours été d'aider de toutes manières l'effort international pour régler et mettre fin aux souffrances provoquées par le conflit.

Nous avons maintenant à décider de la résolution que nous soutiendrons. Pour cette décision nous appliquons l'épreuve d'efficacité, nous appliquons l'épreuve visant à discerner quelle résolution pourra mettre en application les objectifs de retrait et de sécurité et d'une paix durable. C'est sur cette épreuve que nous décidons que la seconde Résolution, celle de l'Amérique latine, n'est pas seulement en conformité avec les objectifs que nous avons exposés, mais en outre offre les meilleures perspectives pour les atteindre.

Nous sommes convaincus que la première Résolution proposée par la Yougoslavie et d'autres n'atteint pas ces objectifs car des dispositions essentielles y sont omises. Nous voterons pour le retrait mais nous devons voter pour une Résolution équilibrée. La Résolution proposée par la Yougoslavie et d'autres n'est pas encore équilibrée. D'autre part, nous sommes absolument persuadés que la Résolution proposée par la Trinité et Tobago et d'autres peut contribuer à un règlement. La délégation, en conséquence, ne peut pas approuver la première Résolution. Mais nous voterons certainement pour la seconde Résolution.

/Nous

Nous arrivons maintenant au point critique de nos délibérations. Je vais nous faisons ou ne faisons pas actuellement face à des effets immédiats et à longue portée non seulement sur les millions de personnes concernées directement mais aussi sur l'avenir de l'Organisation des Nations Unies elle-même. Nous sommes convaincus que la Résolution présentée par la Yougoslavie pourrait bien avoir pour effet de retarder et même de frustrer les objectifs même que la Résolution a pour but d'atteindre. Par ailleurs, la Résolution que nous soutenons - la Résolution latino-américaine- ouvrira la voie à un progrès réaliste. Pour cette raison, nous espérons que les réserves et les divergences seront entièrement rejetées, que la nécessité d'une action positive prévaudra maintenant, et que la seconde Résolution recevra une majorité écrasante.

73 Rabat

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat. A

IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 627 5 July 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 627 of 5 July
Repeated for information to Troops Cyrenaica (for Wakefield)
Washington TPS Malta and C.B.F.N.E.
and Saving to Amman, Kuwait, Jedda, Rabat, Tunis, Cairo,
Algiers, Khartoum and Beirut.

When I saw the new Libyan Prime Minister this morning he asked for my view on what had happened between our two Governments during the recent crisis. I led him through the history of the Middle East since 1948 with glances back to the Balfour Declaration emphasising particularly Russian policy of dislodging us from the area and of disrupting our friendship with the Arabs stressing Nasser's economic subservience to Russia and his role in furthering Russian policy. I made a strong plea for Leis[sic] ready acceptance ? Lies by Libyans news media of Egyptian propaganda which was nothing but a part of the wider Russian campaign against us and I stressed how deeply poisoned Libyan public opinion particularly at the lower level had become by Egyptian propaganda and its reproduction by Libyan news media unrelieved by any counterbalancing items.

2. Abdul Qadir Al Badri stressed the deep friendship of the Libyans for Great Britain and particularly of the Cyrenaicans of whom he was one. I was in fact the first Ambassador to be seen. Emphasising that he was speaking in a personal capacity he said that over the years the actions we had taken in support of Israel had made us an easy target for Radio Cairo and for the Russians and had predisposed Arab public opinion to believe the charges against us. If only we had been able to be more positive in support of the Arabs we might have avoided the present situation. I drew attention to your position at the United Nations and he said that this had helped but he asked most urgently that you should now help him to help us by a more positive and definite stand in support of the Arabs most particularly over Jerusalem whose continued occupation by Israelis was an affront to every Moslem and to none more so than one so devout as King Idris Al Senussi. Neither words nor concealed actions were enough. The Libyans needed clearer pressure they felt we should _ bring to bear on the Israelis but he did not specify what we should do. He hoped we would not simply appear to be following American policies.

3. After further expressions of the deep friendship of the Libyans and particularly the Cyrenaicans for Great Britain and our identity of interest he said that any shortcoming in our policy was correspondingly magnified in their minds and hurt them the more deeply and this explained the sharp reaction in Libya.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

A.L. Sowton 13-VII

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4. Al Badri then switched abruptly and said that when he was in Tobruk he had noticed British tanks and armoured cars leaving the port. He wished to ask most urgently that no such equipment should be removed and that negotiations should be opened immediately for them to be purchased by the Libyan Government since they were very worried about their frontiers (the King probably saw this movement from his window and gave these instructions). I explained that these vehicles had been temporarily in Cyrenaica for exercises but I would of course communicate with you (see my separate telegram). Al Badri emphasised that it had not been decided who should have these weapons, the Army or CYDEF, and that discussion of this question should be secret between him and me for the time being.

5. Since I wished to know if there was [grp undec] abrupt change of courses on bases I mentioned that I had explained to the King our view that Benghazi no longer contributed to the defence of Libya. Al Badri agreed that a committee would be set up in due course to handle the withdrawal. He showed no sense of urgency.

6. I then said that I had taken too much of his time (we had talked for one and a half hours) but that the whole question of the security of Libya and what should be done about it required a further detailed talk between us and Al Badri agreed.

7. I then asked:-

(a) that less emphasis should be placed on the withholding of oil from the United Kingdom, [grps undec] for the early resumption of shipments for which I hoped, and

(b) asked how soon British ships could expect to operate normally to Libyan ports.

Al Badri replied that he would be studying this and would take action as soon as possible in the port, but that if we would adopt the right international postures everything else would quickly fall into place.

8. Al Badri's attitude was friendly and his point of view was very similar to that of Sadiq Muntasser (my telegram No. 617). He was refreshingly direct, showed no friendship for Egypt - quite the reverse - but in effect appealed to us to restore our image with our Arab friends who needed such a sign to resume normal relations. Libya could not step out of line with her Arab brothers on oil and economic matters. He was personally very anxious for a solution but in spite of my asking for his ideas on action open to us he was unable to make any constructive suggestion. I therefore expressed the hope that Libya would at least align herself with those Arab States such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who follow an Arab course without subservience to Russian and Egyptian

propaganda.

9. In general Al Badri seemed to be stating facts as he saw them and explaining the limitations to his own freedom of action. I expect to have another meeting shortly on the security point when I shall also continue to press for a more satisfactory attitude on oil and shipping if no improvement has taken place by then.

10. Acting Foreign Minister Suleiman Jerbi was also present.

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Mr. Sarell

Sent 0616Z/6 July 1967
Recd 0957Z/6 July 1967

[Repeated as requested]

[Sent to D.C.C.]

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PRIORITY HOLY SEE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 27 6 July, 1967

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Rec'd. My telegram No. 25: Jerusalem.

Owing to reorganisation in the Secretariat of State following the elevation to the Cardinalate of the two Deputy Secretaries of State, I was only yesterday able to discuss the Jerusalem situation with the new Deputy Secretary of State, Monsignor Casaroli. I asked him whether he could elaborate on the Pope's recent statement that Jerusalem should have its own internationally guaranteed constitution.

2. Mgr. Casaroli said that the Vatican considered it wisest in present circumstances to maintain their demand for the internationalization of the City of Jerusalem while letting it be known that they would be satisfied with something less formal for the Holy places outside the City although they realized that there was no likelihood of the Israelis relinquishing control, at least of the New City. For the Old City, present Vatican thinking was that in the long term something more would be necessary than a simple Israel guarantee of free access to the holy places. The Old City should be treated as a whole and given some form of international régime. The Vatican had an open mind as to the form of any such régime but they did not place much confidence in the United Nations after its recent show of impotence, and I gathered that some thought was being given to the possibility of a régime being worked out between the Vatican, the Israelis, the Jordanians and the representatives of the various religious bodies interested in the City. A Vatican Under-Secretary had been despatched to Jerusalem the previous day to make a report after discussion with all interested parties and the Pope will receive King Hussein in audience today.

3. As regards a wider Middle East Settlement, Mgr. Casaroli said that with one possible exception none of the Arab States had given any hint of being ready to recognize Israel or to enter into direct dealings. The possible exception was Jordan. The Vatican thought that there were certain common interests such as common opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem and the need to deal with refugees which might tempt the Jordanians

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to deal direct with Israel though they greatly doubted whether Jordan would in practice be able to make any separate agreement against the wishes of the other Arab States.

4. Mgr. Casaroli [? grp. omitted] that the present extremely tentative Vatican thinking was that in due course a new status quo might be established of which the essential elements might be the maintenance of Israel control over the Straits of Tehran, some withdrawal of Israel forces from Sinai, an arrangement concerning Jerusalem, an agreement concerning the refugees on both banks of the Jordan, and finally some guarantee for the security of the Israel/Syrian frontier.

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Mr. Williams

Sent 1314Z/6 July
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Minutes.

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LE MONDE — 6 July 1967

La firme française Turboméca va créer une usine de moteurs d'avion en Israël

M. Szydlowski, président de la société française de construction de moteurs d'avions Turboméca, a signé, mardi à Jérusalem, avec le gouvernement israélien un protocole d'accord pour l'installation, en Israël, d'une usine de moteurs d'avions à réaction de petite et moyenne puissance.

La compagnie, qui sera appelée Turboméca-Israël, aura un capital initial de 3 millions de dollars (15 millions de francs) dont la moitié sera fournie par le gouvernement israélien et l'autre par le constructeur français. L'usine, située à 25 kilomètres de Jérusalem, occupera dans un premier temps cinq cents personnes. Elle fera, selon certaines prévisions, un chiffre d'affaires annuel de 6 à 8 millions de dollars (30 à 40 millions de francs).

Bien qu'officiellement on insiste sur le caractère purement commercial de l'accord, il ne fait aucun doute qu'il convient de lui attacher également une signification importante sur le plan militaire et politique.

Jusqu'à présent, seuls des avions légers de combat étaient assemblés en Israël, du type Fouga-Magister depuis un contrat de licence intervenu en 1958. Des accords avaient été passés avec plusieurs fabricants de moteurs (dont les firmes françaises S.N.E.C.M.A., Turboméca et Hispano-Suiza) pour l'entretien de divers modèles de propulseurs aéronautiques. Mais c'est la première fois qu'Israël se lance dans la production de moteurs d'avions à réaction.

Dans l'immédiat, les moteurs construits sur place pourraient être ceux qui équipent les Fouga-Magister et les hélicoptères (Alouette et Super-Frelon), sans oublier que la société Turbomeca collabore avec les Britanniques à la réalisation du Jaguar, cet avion d'entraînement et d'appui tactique auquel — dit-on — les Israéliens s'intéressent également. D'autre part, l'usine ne travaillera pas seulement pour les besoins propres de l'armée de l'air israélienne, mais aussi pour l'exportation.

Des observateurs font remarquer que la décision de fabriquer des moteurs d'avions à réaction en Israël a été prise sans doute à la suite de l'embargo français sur les fournitures d'armes, et que l'accord signé mardi constitue un pas important vers l'indépendance d'Israël en matière aéronautique.

Il semble en fait que l'embargo décrété par le gouvernement français n'ait pas empêché Israël de se ravitailler beaucoup plus en matériels d'armement (engins air-sol notamment) qu'en pièces de rechange, à partir d'aérodromes français avant le conflit, puis à partir d'aéroports européens pendant le conflit.

De plus, le gouvernement israélien négocie actuellement l'acquisition d'une cinquantaine de Mirage M-5 à compter de 1968. Cet appareil — dont le prix est évalué à environ 5 millions de francs sans pièces de rechange et sans taxes — est destiné à remplacer les chasseurs-bombardiers Mystère IV et Ouragan pour des missions rapides d'appui au sol.

Le Mirage M-5 se distingue du Mirage III par sa moindre complexité en équipement électronique. Il a l'avantage d'autoriser soit une plus grande autonomie de vol, soit une charge militaire plus importante.

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middle east debate

following is verbatim text of speech by minister of state for foreign affairs mr. george thomson in the house of commons on july 6.

mr. thomson, the house has had many opportunities during the last few weeks to discuss both the arab-israel conflict and the problems of south arabia. the advantage of the debate which the right honourable member for kinross and west perthshire (sir alec douglas-home) has just opened is that it enables us to discuss the problems of the middle east - the arab-israeli conflict, south arabia and other aspects of the middle east as a whole. one of the useful features of this is that it enables us to remind ourselves that while we may be preoccupied with the arab-israeli conflict our main interests in the middle east and our most direct responsibilities there lie elsewhere than at the northern end of the red sea.

the countries in the middle eastern area are on a good deal better terms with her majesty's government than would sometimes appear from the recent weeks of crisis. a breach of relations with this country always makes the headlines, whereas a decision to continue relations with us seldom counts as news. i find in the foreign office, as in fleet street, where i used to work, that the sad fact is that vice is news but virtue is not.

although our efforts to avert the war before it broke out, and to contain and limit it after it broke out, wer misunderstood and misinterpreted in the arab world, we have been able to maintain our links with the majority of arab governments and our differences with certain other arab governments who have not maintained relations with us have not been of our own making. we would like to have good relations with these countries. we wish them and their people well. we can sympathise with and try to understand their aspirations and desires for a better social order within their own countries. we are not opposed to arab nationalism and in so far as we have clashed with it our quarrel has been only with certain manifestations of it which seem to us to have worked in a negative and destructive way. it is also worth recalling with the opening of this general middle eastern debate that the middle east is more than the arab world. our relations with iran remain close, and we shall continue to foster them.

the main development in the arab-israeli conflict since my right honourable friend the foreign secretary last reported to the house has been - blessedly - the battle of words that has been fought - at the united nations, rather than any serious breach of the cease-fire. there has been some fighting on the east bank of the suez canal, but reports do not suggest that the clashes have been on a large scale. whatever may have been their origin, we deplore these breaches of the cease-fire and we shall give full support to the united nations' efforts to bring them to an end.

i want to give the house a report on the united nations debate. as the house know, after two weeks of discussion the general assembly has failed to agree on any general political recommendation.

it has now adjourned for a week. i hope that this breathing space may be used urgently to evolve some agreed and constructive expresion of the assembly's views. any agreement will have to result in both balanced and realistic terms. this is surely the message of the deliberations of the last two weeks in new york.

the issue was focused in two resolutions. there was d draft resolution from a group of ''non-aligned'' delegations, with arab and communist support, which went rhrough a considerable amount of change before it came to the vote. but in the end, despite a number of amendments it remained the case that israel was to withdraw immediately, while the security council was merely to consider action on other points without any urgency.

in effect, therefore, the resolution of the non-aligned group remained a call for unconditional withdrawal. in addition, it made no mention of other practical problems, especially the end of belligerence. even in its amended form the draft resolution was, therefore, fundamentally lacking in balance. in particular, it was unrealistic to expect that it would achieve an israeli withdrawal. her majesty's government have, therefore, to cast their vote againt it. so did 45 other delegations, including members of almost every group in the general assembly.

the british government voted for the other resolution, sponsored by latin american delegations. it was not a perfect resolution, in our view. for example, it did not propose the appointment of a special representative of the secretary-general as put forward by my right honourable friend, but it would have called for a guarantee for the freedom of innocent passage through international waters, and it stated other essential principles. we warmly welcomed the reference in it to the need for a full solution of the problem of the refugees. this resolution, sponsored by the latin americans, in our view offered a prospect of making progress towards withdrawal and a durable peace.

our decision on these two resolutions was taken on grounds of effectiveness. without withdrawal there is no prospect of progress towards stability in the middle east. without acceptance of the territorial integrity of status - which means the dropping of any claim to belligerence - there is little hope of withdrawal. we voted for the resolution which was balanced and against the resolution which, because of what it left out, would have put the chances of success in jeopardy.

what is the outcome of the general assembly debate? in the first place, the general assembly adopted with near unanimity two resolutions - one on refugees and the other on jerusalem - both of which we supported. the resolution on jerusalem was passed by 99 votes with none against and 20 abstentions. it represented, in my view, a firm international concensus against israel's taking any unilateral action which would prejudice the status of that city in a final settlement. it was a striking endorsement of what the foreign secretary said on this subject at the assembly. his remarks then were misunderstood and misinterpreted in some quarters. but, not for the first time, when the dust has settled his judgment, and his instinct have been confirmed.

in the second place, the assembly - so it seemed to me - showed a growing sense of realism during the debate. it paid scant regard to the more extreme condemnatory resolutions tabled by the soviet union and albania. speaker after speaker emphasised, as my right honourable friend had done on 21st june, the need for balance and a practical approach. there was widespread endorsement of the british suggestions for practical action. the house may recall the three particular points made by my right honourable friend.

first, he said that we must deal at once with the question of

refugees. i shall say something in more detail about that in a moment. secondly, he said that the secretary-general should nominate a representative of high standing to go at once to the are to explore with all the parties the possibilities of conciliation and then to report to the secretary-general. thirdly, he suggested that there should be an immediate strengthening of the united nations truce supervisory organisation which under general bull , has done such fine work.

my right honourable friend, in his speech at the general assembly, urged that the government of israel might permit general bull to reoccupy government house in jerusalem, the headquarters from which he had been excluded during the fighting there. i am glad to report to the house that the israeli government have now agreed to this.

the results of the debate represented a reverse for those who called the emergency special session with the plain purpose of making destructive propaganda rather than seeking to make a positive and constructive contribution to a peaceful settlement. i would not describe what has happened as a failure for the united nations. rather, out of the very frustrations of the voting has come a certain pattern which all parties to the arab-israel conflict would do well to ponder.

it is clear that a substantial body of world opinion does not support the attempt to condemn israel or the unconditional call for the withdrawal of israeli forces, but, on the other hand, virtually every member of the assembly voted for one resolution or another which called for the withdrawal of israeli troops as well as against any action to alter the status of jerusalem. if both sides to the conflict will draw the lesson from this, the hopes for a practical solution will be greatly improved.

equally, there was a wide range of agreement with my right honourable friend's view that any arrangement for israeli withdrawal must deal with other fundamental matters in which both sides of the conflict have a legitimate interest. i would mention two - first, as rightly mentioned by the right honourable gentleman, the need for swift and i hope dramatic action to safe-guard the interests and welfare of the refugees. this is an immediate humanitarian problem and one whose solution is basic to any general and enduring peace settlement to the conflict.

no settlement will be possible while the million arab refugees continue to exist in the demoralising condition of receiving international charity and it is tragic that the recent war added a new dimension to this already intractable problem, by the flight across the jordan of about 150,000 refugees, mostly destitute arabs, though most were in refugee camps on the west bank before and must now be found new accommodation.

her majesty's government have made urgent representations to the israeli government on this problem. we stressed the need not only to refrain from driving the arab refugees out of the occupied territories on the west bank but to encourage them to stay and to allow those who had left to return. we therefore welcome the news that the israeli government has invited those who left since seventh june to come back to the west bank. behind all this, there lies the question of confidence and if the israelis can win confidence in their intentions, a further tragic displacement may be avoided.

i would here pay tribute to the work of u.n.r.r.a. over the years to educate and clothe and feed the refugees and generally care for them. no one who, like myself, has seen its work in the camps can doubt that without its efforts an admittedly tragic situation would have been an absolute catastrophe. we have made an immediate additional contribution of a half a million dollars to u.n.r.r.a. and have also goven fivehundred thousand sterling to the

jordanian government for expenditure on rehabilitation and reconstruction. i have heard criticisms that our emergency contributions in this respect has not been adequate, but i cannot accept that. we are already the second largest contributor after the united states and have been during the whole seventeen years of this united nations agency's life. this year, we shall reach the onehundred million dollar mark in our contributions. i do not want to make invidious comparisons, but while the heaviest burden is carried by the united states, it is proper to put this in perspective and mention that all the other contributor nations put together have contributed less than three-quarters of her majesty's government's contribution over the years under successive governments. the soviet government which is so generous with its arms to countries in the middle east has contributed nothing at all.

i now turn to the question of freedom for all countries in the middle east from the pressures which have driven them to waste their scarce resources on a wholly unproductive arms race. new countries are now becoming involved in the business of supplying arms to the middle east. fresh consignments of soviet arms are already arriving in egypt and other arab countries to replace those destroyed in the war. i do not seek to argue that at this stage the soviet government is planning to re-arm arab countries to the point at which a further conflict would become inevitable. i agree with the right honourable gentleman that the soviet motive at this stage is much more likely to be diplomatic than military, but the dangers inherent in a new middle east arms race are patent to all and this fresh flow of the munitions of war underlines the need for a fresh international agreement on arms limitation. we made one effort to start something on these lines and failed. we cannot act alone. the arms race is a symptom and the disease can be cured only by a peace settlement, but we shall continue trying to bring about international agreement for the limitation of arms flowing into the middle east.

i have outlined the principles on which we believe that a constructive settlement must be based, but how is it to be achieved ? the right honourable gentleman dealt with this point. the israeli government has understandably insisted on direct negotiations with individual arab states. this of course would be desirable if it were likely to happen, but we cannot be optimistic that direct contacts between israel and her arab neighbours are likely in the immediate future and must therefore apply our minds to what other means there are of promoting progress.

in this, of course, we come back to the united nations. whatever the shortcomings of the organisation, and we do not seek to ignore tham, we believe that it can provide a framework in which a settlement can be arranged. despite the differences which manifested themselves at the security council during the earlier discussions, it is still our view that the security council can play a constructive part in the phase which lies ahead. naturally, this pre-supposes a measure of agreement among permanent members of the council which has often been lacking in the past, but whatever the differences in approach now, we all have a common interest in avoding a further round of arab-israel fighting, if this were to happen, it might the next time carry with it even more dangerous possibilities of direct confrontation between great powers, with the possible use of nuclear weapons by the combatants themselves, making the outcome alarming for manking as a whole.

these are the kind of stakes involved in seeking a settlement of the conflict.

i too would like now to turn from the arab-israel dispute to some of the other middle eastern issue, particularly that of south arabia -

mr reginald paget (northampton): my right honourable friend sayd that it depends on the security council agreeing, but agreeing what ?

that the arabs must be compelled to make peace, or that without peace israel should be driven from positions which she regards as necessary to security during war ? what does he say the united nations should agree upon ?

mr thomson: in our view, they ought to agree on the kind of balanced settlement which we have supported at the special session and which i tried to spell out earlier in my speech. in the security council, despite the deep differences, there is bound, i believe , to be in the end and it may mean a long, patient struggle, a common interest in preventing a further round of arab israel fighting with all the implications which i described. this is the best hope of making progress. it is very easy to point to the obstacles but one must be realistic about difficulties in any sort of direct, face-to-face negotiation in this situation.

i want to turn to the wider middle eastern scene -

earl of dalkeith (edinburgh, north): have any discussions been taking place on reviving some scheme like the johnson plan, which was turned down by the arabs as a means of providing some relief for refugees ?

mr thomson: like the right honourable gentleman, i read with great interest the proposals put forward by mr. de rothschild for a desalination schemt to link both water and power and which would be aimed at producing or contributing towards a reconciliation between the countries in the area.

i prefer to leave that to my right honourable friend to deal when winding up at the end of the debate.

i want to go on to talk about our more general interest in the middle east. we have of course the general interest of seeking peaceful change throughout the whole middle eastern area. we have as a government and as a nation an interest - indeed it is a moral imperative - in asserting the principle of the right of small nations whether arab or jewish in the middle east to survive and to enjoy territorial integrity. i believe that we can best pursue those interests through the united nations where our contribution can be an important one.

it is however in other parts of the middle east that we have more direct responsibilities and more direct obligations. in south arabia and the persian gulf we have obligations which we cannot simply shrug away. we have responsibilities which we have to carry out. throughout the area we have legitimate direct national interests in building up our trade in the passage of our ships and aeroplanes freely from one part of the world to another. we have those interests to defend and protect. it is important to keep this in perspective.

the government are for example often criticised for expanding militarily in the gulf while withdrawing militarily from aden. i would like to say a word to my honourable friends about why in my view this does not seem to be the inconsistent policy which they often describe it as being.

the reason for taking this step in the gulf is the necessity for us to be able to fulfil peace-keeping obligations in the gulf area that were formerly undertaken from aden. the gulf is a cockpit of territorial rivalries. it is true that they are less fanatical than those along the arab-israel frontiers but they are still very dangerous rivalries. if the british government were suddenly to withdraw we would leave behind us a dangerous vacuum which might well precipitate in another part of the middle east a dangerous great power confrontation.

her majesty's government's aim is to build up a stable regional

balance of power between the countries of the area but to do that takes time. our forces are not there to keep the oil flowing as is often charged. they have therefore not failed in that task, because it was never a task which was laid upon them. they are there as a peace-keeping presence.

it is sometime argues that if we had no military presence in the gulf our oil interests would not have suffered in the aftermath of the arab-israeli conflict. i believe that to be a fallacy. the americans without bases or forces on arab soil have suffered just the same as us.

our oil has been affected for two reasons: because of a lie about our intervention in the arab israeli conflict and secondly because the british government were willing to take a lead in trying to prevent a war which when it happened brought much suffering to many of our friends in the arab world.

the right honourable member for kinross and west perthshire, had a few words about the oil situation and i would like to give the house some information about the latest position. the arab countries generally have now resumed exports to most destination, although in the case of both iraq and libya and posion is not wholly clear about how much oil is flowing. the arab oil countries are however still maintaing a ban on exports to the united kingdom and the united states.

i understand the pressures which operated on those governments in the highly charged atmosphere at the time when they took action against their oil exports but now that some of the tensions have eased i very much hope as the right honourable gentleman has urged that cooler counsels will soon prevail.

the oil producing countries must be aware as the right honourable gentleman said that while the present ban creates temporary inconvenience for us it is also bound to provoke some fundamental rethinking about the degree to which western economies depend upon arab oil. there is a swiftly changing pattern of energy resources and fast technological developments in the energyfield. by 1980, even on present plans we will have increased our nuclear power and our natural gas output by many times. the implications of this are plain for arab countries. i hope therefore that it will once again be recognised all round that the interests represented by our very substantial oil investments in the arab world and by the supplying companies there are of mutual economic benefit to both sides. the lifting of the ban on shipments to us is at the very least as much in arab interests as it is in ours.

the right hon members for kinross and west perthshire asked what diplomatic efforts we were making in that direction. we have been extremely active in putting the point of view which i have just described. my noble friend at the united nations has engaged in an intensive period of personal diplomacy with the arab foreign ministers who were there which i think made a notable contribution to improving understanding and restoring relations between our-selves and the majority of countries in the arab world.

the ban on oil exports to the united kingdom and the united states does not create for us an insuperable problem . to deal with the general problem of europe's oil supplies the o.e.c.d. with our full support has taken measures aimed at maximising supplies and rationalising deliveries. the key problem is not so much that there is not enough oil being produced in the middle east, but that the closure of the suez canal and the restricted use of the levant pipelines mean that tankers have to make the much longer journey from east of suez roqnd the cape. therefore, many more tankers are required and the flow of oil takes a longer time.

there is also the new uncertainty about the future of the flow of oil from nigeria due to the political situation in

that country. it is because of these uncertainties and the impossibility of forecasting developments during the summer recess which is shortly about to begin that my right hon friend the minister of power is introducing as a precautionary measure his oil rationing bill later tonight. i am grateful for the assurances from the opposition that they will facilitate the passage of that measure.

that brings me to the right hon gentlemans question about the present position regarding the suez canal. it is certainly our information that the canal is physically blocked. not in one place but in several places. it is difficult to form an actual estimate of how long it would take physically to clear the calal but this is much more a political than an engineering problem.

the first thing to keep in mind from the point of view of this country is that free passage through the canal is not simply a british interest. we would be in a difficult position if that were so. it is a an imprtat gnerl iteratinal interest. for example i understand that one of the ships which is blocked in the canal is an american ship carrying much needed wheat supplies to india to relive the food shortage in that country. i hope that the international community as a whole will take active steps to seek to bring about a reopening of the canal.

mr. eldon griffiths : the right hon gentleman has made the important statement that the canal is physically blocked. can he elaborate a little and say where and how it is blocked and on what basis that conclusion is arrived at. ? has there been aerial reconnaissance? has the embassy or our representative in cairo been able to go and see it? can the right hon gentleman give more detail?

mr. thomson: the hon member is an eager hunter after facts but i hope that he will understand if i do not give him the source of the information which i have just conveyed to the house. i ask him however to believe that it is well founded. it is a physical blocking by ships which are sunk in the canal.

mr. marten: i realise that the right hon gentleman cannot give the source of the information but what has worried many of us was the extreme delay - i think ten days - in getting that information according to the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs. can the right hon gentleman explain why there was that delay in getting the information?

mr. thomson: the reason for the delay was that a war was going on. it would have been extremely difficult to get exact information. whereas it is easy for journalists to speculate about information which they receive ministers in this house have to have corroborative evidence before they can give the house firm information. i have given the house this information.

i emphasise that this is a political rather than a physical problem. therefore, one should concentrate on the political aspects of it . the fact is that within the last day or two the breaches of the cease-fire have involved fighting along the banks of the canal. this shows how difficult it is to make progress towards reopening the canal if we take this matter simply in isolation from dealing with the general range of problems associated with the arab-israel conflict.

mr. douglas dodds-parker: who sank the ships? how big are they? have any attempts been made to raise them?

mr. thomson: i would rather not speculate on that point at the moment but would keep to my main point which is that the united nations has an important role to play in terms of establishing free and innocent passage through this great international waterway.

the other major interest which we have in the middle east apart from oil and the free passage through the canal, is our general trading interests. last year, for example, our exports to the area of the middle east exceeded 300 million sterling. the employment, therefore, of many of the constituents of many of us in the house, depend upon that trade with the middle east carrying on and if possible expanding and therefore depends a great deal upon our being able to maintain and improve our relations with all countries of the middle east, on both sides of the conflict, and those who are not directly involved in the conflict itself. in safeguarding all these interests which i have been describing we have an immediate task in reparing the damage to our relations with the arab countries, caused by the erroneous belief that we took the israeli side in the fighting. the right hon gentleman asked me what we had done to dispose of these false allegations. over recent weeks we have been engaged in the most intensive campaign using every information medium available to us in order to get round the world the truth of what had happened. we had a most useful talk with king hussein in london earlier this week and we were glad to see that king usssein said publicly that he had no evidence whatever that the united states and the united kingdom were involved on the israeli side in the fighting. we have not been able to get an investigation mounted by the united nations, but my right hon friend came back from the special general assembly convinced that at the united nations now, there is very little, if any credence given to these allegations.

i want to come to the problems of south arabia raised by the right hon gentleman. south arabia , like other parts of the middle east, has been affected by the arab-israeli conflict and it was the mounting tensions caused by the effect of that conflict that were the background to the mutiny of the federal forces even though the origin of that mutiny lay directly in internal tribal and personal troubles. i know that the house agrees with what the right hon gentleman said in welcoming the news that british forces have completely reoccupied crater. this was achieved with the minimum of casualities. two arabs were killed during the entire operations. this was a spectacular example of the peaceful application of force by the british army. the military and political difficulties were formidable. i know that the house will wish to join in congratulating all concerned on the success of the operation and on the professional skill and patience - which was not wholly shared in the house - during the period we had to wait - with which the local authorities, military and civil, have handled this most dangerous situation. as the house knows, the high commissioner and the commander in chief considered that to seek to re-establish british control of crater earlier would have brought the risk of heavy bloodshed. it was right not to take that risk at that time. their judgment on the delicate and difficult question of timing has been amply justified.
i was asked by the right hon gentleman whether there had been any undue delay in the matter, although i think that he agreed that timing was of the essence in the decision that had to be taken.

rear admiral morgan giles (winchester): the right honourable gentleman has rightly paid tribute to the action of our troops in aden and crater. are these troops considered officially to be on active service when they are operating inside aden and inside the city of crater ? my information is that the troops believe that they are not. they believe that when their friends suffer casualties, the widows will not get full active service pensions.

mr thomson: that is a very important matter, although it is primarily for the defence department. my right honourable friend will give the honourable and gallant gentleman an answer at the end of the debate.

in view of some press comments, i want to add that the high

commissioner and the commander in chief, together with the security commander, have worked throughout on the problems of crater and of internal security in aden generally in the closest consultation and agreement. any illusion in any quarter that we were prepared to abdicate from our responsibilities in crater has been shattered. as i have said many times in the house, it is our duty to maintain law and order in aden and we shall carry out that duty for as long as we have responsibility in aden.

the right honourable gentleman asked me some questions about the authority for using weapons on this difficult task of internal security in aden. there were suggestions that our troops were restricted during the earlier incidents in crater by not being able to use heavy weapons. there is no truth in this at all. the local commanders have - and have always had - authority to sanction the use of whatever weapons are necessary in the circumstances. obviously many factors have to be taken into consideration, among them the question whether the degree of ill-feeling caused among the local population by the excessive use of force outweights the tactical and military advantage gained. i consider that the success of the crater operation is the fullest vindication of the tactics which have been used and of the judgment of both the military and the civil people in control there.

dame irene ward (tynemouth): in view of what the right honourable gentleman has said, when these suggestions were made earlier why was no public statement made immediately to the house and to the country? this matter has caused immense anxiety among the royal northumberland fusiliers and other regiments associated with them. if the statement which he made is true, and if he believes it, is it not extraordinary that he did not - or the foreign secretary - make a statement right away? it would have allayed a great deal of the anxiety.

mr thomson: whatever the honourable lady cares to believe i hope that the rest of the house will believe what i have just said.

i am simply repeating in a longer form what i said to the house very late at night last wednesday when we were discussing the committee stage of the aden bill. there has also been a question to my right honourable friend the secretary of state for defence. i appreciate the anxieties which were aroused and i tried to meet them in the middle of last week.

the right honourable gentleman also asked me, as he has asked many times, about the question of arms in the hands of civilians inside the crater area and the complaints that civilians in aden go about carrying arms. i would tell the house that the instructions to our forces are very firm and direct on this matter. they are that all unauthorised arms should be taken into custody under any circumstances where that is practicable. again, our troops have another difficult task on their hands, but i know that they have done everything possible to carry it out. there is a real problem. from his experience on other occasions in earlier years, the right honourable gentleman will know of the difficulties of putting an effective stop to the flow of arms to terrorist groups in an area such as aden. i can only say that the new high commissioner, sir humphrey trevelyan, is actively seized of the problem and is doing everything possible to improve the position about the spread of arms among civilians.

we have to plan in south arabia and in aden on the assumption that the internal security situation will remain difficult for some time. this is the reason why we decided to fly out an additional battalion to aden last week to lighten the load on the troops already there who have been fully stretched in recent months. at the same time our troops' protective duties will be eased by the departure of all the families of servicemen and british civilian officials as well as most of the non-official families which will be completed by the middle of this month.

it is appropriate for a word to be said here on behalf of her majesty's government in praise of all our british civilians in south arabia, both official and non-official, who have soldiered on - i think that the verb is appropriate - in warlike conditions for a very long time, indeed, in conditions in which their day-to-day work has been increasingly unpleasant and increasingly dangerous.

they have been working, and are continuing to work, for the benefit and prosperity of south arabia.

when the present troubles are over i believe that the south arabia people will say that they owe a debt of gratitude to the many civvlians and their families who stuck it out in conditions of such difficulty.

we shall seek progressively to hand over districts of aden town to local security forces before independence. to accustom them to the problems which they will face after independence. but until independence the high commissioner and british security commander will retain overall responsibility and operational command for these activities: and i thinu that recent events will have convinced the house how essential is this final safeguard.

mr. ben whitaker (hampstead): would my right honourable friend agree that the best and surest method of ensuring the security of aden and the persian gulf in the future would be to evolve a democratic government for both of these places, a government which is representative of the majority of the population?

mr. thomson: i agree with my honourable friend and i was hoping to come to that matter. i apologise to the house for having spoken at such length. the constitution which my right honourable friend the foreign secretary commended to the house is, i believe, a modern constitution, one which provides a framework within which all groups of different political views can come together to work for an independent south arabia. it is a constitution which makes provision for the establishment of a broad-based caretaker government to be eastablished. discussions are now taking place with a view to the establishment of such a government but the house will understand that this is a confidential process and that i cannot go into the details of these discussions at present. i can, however, inform the house that mr. makawee, one of the f.l.o.s.y. leaders, has this week arrived in new york to meet members of the united nations mission. i very much welcome this development and my noble friend lord caradon, who has been keeping in the closest touch with the united nations mission, is hoping to talk with mr. makkawi as soon as possible.

mr. sandys (streatham): the right honourable gentleman has several times today and in previous speeches referred to the formation of a caretaker government . i know that the phrase ''caretaker government'' appears in united nations resolutions, but has it any significance now that it has been decided to initiate this new constitution: to back the federal government and enable it to broaden itself ? is there a suggestion that the federal government will be done away with and that a different government, called a caretaker government, will be set up?

mr. thomson: as the right honourable gentleman said, the phrase come from united nations resolutions which have been accepted by the federal government. indeed, the federal government are co-operating in these efforts to broaden their base and to establish a caretaker government. the phrase is itself a reflection on the fact that there cannot be free elections in aden and south arabia for some time yet. there is, therefore, bound to be a caretaker in the sense of waiting until there can be full democratic elections in the territory.

mr. sandys: does this phrase mean that the federal government will go on as they now are, with such broadening as can be brought about - a process which everybody supports - but that there is no question of doing away with this government and setting up a different government for an interim period.

mr. thomson: the right honourable gentleman must put his own gloss on the words i have used. we are in the middle of delicate and important discussions, and i would rather not go into any great detail on this topic.

mr. francis noel-baker i agree that the arrival of this representative of f.l.o.s.y. in new york is a major development. can my right honourable friend say whether her majesty's government have considered giving facilities for lord shackleton and sir humphrey trevelyan to go to new york to see all these people and f.l.o.s.y. representatives?

mr. thomson: i think that my honourable friend has misunderstood the matter. i sympathise with his motive: he wants direct discussions between her majesty's government and representatives of f.l.o.s.y. under the auspices of the united nations missions in new york. we are fully in agreement with this desire. my noble friend, lord caradon, is a minister of her majesty's government and he is noping to meet mr. makawee - and, therefore, this will constitute direct dicussions between her majesty's government and f.l.o.s.y. under the auspices of the united nations. i do not know what more my honourable friend wants in this respect.

i have apologised to the house for having spoken at such length. i conclude by saying that the recent arab-israel fighting does not in any way affect the principles and policies of the plans which we have put forward for independence for south arabia on 9th january of next year. indeed, it seems that in the particular context of south arabia, the policies which we have put forward - the kind of principles which the foreign secretary put forward in march of this year to the house of our approach to middle eastern problems - have had their validity emphasised. they apply in large measure not only to the problems of south arabia but to britain's relations with the countries of the middle east as a whole. i will restate them. we for our part seek no political advantage for ourselves in any of the countries in the middle east. we desire only that the people there should be able to live their own lives in peace without the threat of attack by their neighbour. in all our relations with middle east countries that is the direction in which we are working and, with the united nations, we shall seek to stand by and fulfil these principles.

ends verbatim service 311/67 lps.

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PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

From my discussion with Mr. Driss Benonna Yesterday I am sure this would go down well in the Palace. Can we give some publicity to it?

1076.

Copy given to 10.

VERBATIM SERVICE 312/67 6TH JULY 1967.

HE
Hakegood
LO. 7/6
AS. ALS 7.VII

do can put this it as the lead story in the Weekly Review. An advance copy will go to Mr Hammedi's P.S. Abdellatif Ahabib.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE VERBATIM EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MR. GEORGE THOMSON IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON JULY 6.

6/VII

MR. THOMSON ....

ALTHOUGH OUR EFFORTS TO AVERT THE WAR BEFORE IT BROKE OUT, AND O CONTAIN AND LIMIT IT AFTER IT BROKE OUT, WER MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISINTERPRETED IN THE ARAB WORLD, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR LINKS WITH THE MAJORITY OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND OUR DIFFERENCES WITH CERTAIN OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHO HAVE NOT MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH US HAVE NOT BEEN OF OUR OWN MAKING. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES. WE WISH THEM AND THEIR PEOPLE WELL. WE CAN SYMPATHISE WITH AND TRY TO UNDERSTAND THEIR ASPIRATIONS AND DESIRES FOR A BETTER SOCIAL ORDER WITHIN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES. WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO ARAB NATIONALISM AND IN SO FAR AS WE HAVE CLASHED WITH IT OUR QUARREL HAS BEEN ONLY WITH CERTAIN MANIFESTATIONS OF IT WHICH SEEM TO US TO HAVE WORKED IN A NEGATIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE WAY. IT IS ALSO WORTH RECALLING WITH THE OPENING OF THIS GENERAL MIDDLE EASTERN DEBATE THAT THE MIDDLE EAST IS MORE THAN THE ARAB WORLD. OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN REMAIN CLOSE, AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO FOSTER THEM.

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THE MAIN DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY LAST REPORTED TO THE HOUSE HAS BEEN - BLESSEDLY - THE BATTLE OF WORDS THAT HAS BEEN FOUGHT - AT THE UNITED NATIONS, RATHER THAN ANY SERIOUS BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THERE HAS BEEN SOME FIGHTING ON THE EAST BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL, BUT REPORTS DO NOT SUGGEST THAT THE CLASHES HAVE BEEN ON A LARGE SCALE. WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN THEIR ORIGIN, WE DEPLORE THESE BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND WE SHALL GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFORTS TO BRING THEM TO AN END.

I WANT TO GIVE THE HOUSE A REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATE. AS THE HOUSE KNOW, AFTER TWO WEEKS OF DISCUSSION THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS FAILED TO AGREE ON ANY GENERAL POLITICAL RECOMMENDATION. IT HAS NOW ADJOURNED FOR A WEEK. I HOPE THAT THIS BREATHING SPACE MAY BE USED URGENTLY TO EVOLVE SOME AGREED AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXPRESION OF THE ASSEMBLY'S VIEWS. ANY AGREEMENT WILL HAVE TO RESULT IN BOTH BALANCED AND REALISTIC TERMS. THIS IS SURELY THE MESSAGE OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE LAST TWO WEEKS IN NEW YORK..... .....WITHOUT WITHDRAWAL THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATUS - WHICH MEANS THE DROPPING OF ANY CLAIM TO BELLIGERENCE - THERE IS LITTLE HOPE OF WITHDRAWAL. WE VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION WHICH WAS BALANCED AND AGAINST THE RESOLUTION WHICH, BECAUSE OF WHAT IT LEFT OUT, WOULD HAVE PUT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS IN JEOPARDY.

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SE

WHAT IS THE OUTCOME OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE?
IN THE FIRST PLACE, HE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED WITH NEAR UNANIMITY TWO RESOLUTIONS - ONE ON REFUGEES AND THE OTHER ON JERUSALEM - BOTH OF WHICH WE SUPPORTED. THE RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM WAS PASSED BY 99 VOTES WITH NONE AGAINST AND 20 ABSTENTIONS. IT REPRESENTED, IN MY VIEW, A FIRM INTERNATIONAL CONCENSUS AGAINST ISRAEL'S TAKING ANY UNILATERAL ACTION WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THE STATUS OF THAT CITY IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT. IT WAS A STRIKING ENDORSEMENT OF WHAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE ASSEMBLY. HIS REMARKS THEN WERE MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISINTERPRETED IN SOME QUARTERS. BUT, NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME, WHEN THE DUST HAS SETTLED HIS JUDGMENT, AND HIS INSTINCT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED.

IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE ASSEMBLY - SO IT SEEMED TO ME - SHOWED A GROWING SENSE OF REALISM DURING THE DEBATE. IT PAID SCANT REGARD TO THE MORE EXTREME CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTIONS TABLED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ALBANIA. SPEAKER AFTER SPEAKER EMPHASISED, AS MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND HAD DONE ON 21ST JUNE, THE NEED FOR BALANCE AND A PRACTICAL APPROACH. THERE WAS WIDESPREAD ENDORSEMENT OF THE BRITISH SUGGESTIONS FOR PRACTICAL ACTION. THE HOUSE MAY RECALL THE THREE PARTICULAR POINTS MADE BY MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND.

FIRST, HE SAID THAT WE MUST DEAL AT ONCE WITH THE QUESTION OF REFUGEES. I SHALL SAY SOMETHING IN MORE DETAIL ABOUT THAT IN A MOMENT. SECONDLY, HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD NOMINATE A REPRESENTATIVE OF HIGH STANDING TO GO AT ONCE TO THE ARE TO EXPLORE WITH ALL THE PARTIES THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONCILIATION AND THEN TO REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIRDLY, HE SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANISATION WHICH UNDER GENERAL BULL , HAS DONE SUCH FINE WORK.

MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND, IN HIS SPEECH AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, URGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL MIGHT PERMIT GENERAL BULL TO REOCCUPY GOVERNMENT HOUSE IN JERUSALEM, THE HEADQUARTERS FROM WHICH HE HAD BEEN EXCLUDED DURING THE FIGHTING THERE. I AM GLAD TO REPORT TO THE HOUSE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAVE NOW AGREED TO THIS.

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THE RESULTS OF THE DEBATE REPRESENTED A REVERSE FOR THOSE WHO CALLED THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION WITH THE PLAIN PURPOSE OF MAKING DESTRUCTIVE PROPAGANDA RATHER THAN SEEKING TO MAKE A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I WOULD NOT DESCRIBE WHAT HAS HAPPENED AS A FAILURE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. RATHER, OUT OF THE VERY FRUSTRATIONS OF THE VOTING HAS COME A CERTAIN PATTERN WHICH ALL PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT WOULD DO WELL TO PONDER.

IT IS CLEAR THAT A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF WORLD OPINION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ATTEMPT TO CONDEMN ISRAEL OR THE UNCONDITIONAL CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES, BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, VIRTUALLY EVERY MEMBER OF THE ASSEMBLY VOTED FOR ONE RESOLUTION OR ANOTHER WHICH CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS AS WELL AS AGAINST ANY ACTION TO ALTER THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. IF BOTH SIDES TO THE CONFLICT WILL DRAW THE LESSON FROM THIS, THE HOPES FOR A PRACTICAL SOLUTION WILL BE GREATLY IMPROVED.

EQUALLY, HERE WAS A WIDE RANGE OF AGREEMENT WITH MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND'S VIEW THAT ANY ARRANGEMENT FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MUST DEAL WITH OTHER FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST. I WOULD MENTION TWO - FIRST, AS RIGHTLY MENTIONED BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN, THE NEED FOR SWIFT AND I HOPE DRAMATIC ACTION TO SAFE-GUARD THE INTERESTS AND WELFARE OF THE REFUGEES. THIS IS AN IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM AND ONE WHOSE SOLUTION IS BASIC TO ANY GENERAL AND ENDURING PEACE SETTLEMENT TO THE CONFLICT.

NO SETTLEMENT WILL BE POS IBLE WHILE THE MILLION ARAB REFUGEES CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THE DEMORALISING CONDITION OF RECEIVING INTER-NATIONAL CHARITY AND IT IS TRAGIC THAT THE RECENT WAR ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO THIS ALREADY INTRACTABLE PROBLEM, BY THE FLIGHT ACROSS THE JORDAN OF ABOUT 150,000 REFUGEES, MOSTLY DESTITUTE ARABS, THOUGH MOST WERE IN REFUGEE CAMPS ON THE WEST BANK BEFORE AND MUST NOW BE FOUND NEW ACCOMMODATION.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE URGENT REPRESENTATIONS O THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON THIS PROBLEM. WE STRESSED THE NEED NOT ONLY TO REFRAIN FROM DRIVING THE ARAB REFUGEES OUT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON THE WEST BANK BUT TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO STAY AND TO ALLOW THOSE WHO HAD LEFT TO RETURN. WE THEREFORE WELCOME THE NEWS THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS INVITED THOSE WHO LEFT SINCE SEVENTH JUNE TO COME BACK TO THE WEST BANK. BEHIND ALL THIS, THERE LIES THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE AND IF THE ISRAELIS CAN WIN CONFIDENCE IN THEIR INTENTIONS, A FURTHER TRAGIC DISPLACEMENT MAY BE AVOIDED....

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I NOW TURN TO THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM FOR ALL COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE PRESSURES WHICH HAVE DRIVEN THEM TO WASTE THEIR SCARCE RESOURCES ON A WHOLLY UNPRODUCTIVE ARMS RACE. NEW COUNTRIES ARE NOW BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE BUSINESS OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. FRESH CONSIGNMENTS OF SOVIET ARMS ARE ALREADY ARRIVING IN EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO REPLACE THOSE DESTROYED IN THE WAR. I DO NOT SEEK TO ARGUE THAT AT THIS STAGE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS PLANNING TO RE-ARM ARAB COUNTRIES TO THE POINT AT WHICH A FURTHER CONFLICT WOULD BECOME INEVITABLE. I AGREE WITH THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN HAT THE SOVIET MOTIVE AT THIS STAGE IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO BE DIPLOMATIC THAN MILITARY, BUT THE DANGERS INHERENT IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE ARE PATENT TO ALL AND THIS FRESH FLOW OF THE MUNITIONS OF WAR UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR A FRESH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION. WE MADE ONE EFFORT TO START SOMETHING ON THESE LINES AND FAILED. WE CANNOT ACT ALONE. HE ARMS RACE IS A SYMPTOM AND THE DISEASE CAN BE CURED ONLY BY A PEACE SETTLEMENT, BUT WE SHALL CONTINUE TRYING TO BRING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR THE LIMITATION OF ARMS FLOWING INTO THE MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE OUTLINED THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE BELIEVE THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE SETTLEMENT MUST BE BASED, BUT HOW IS IT TO BE ACHIEVED ? THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN DEALT WITH THIS POINT. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERSTANDABLY INSISTED ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL ARAB STATES. THIS OF COURSE WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF IT WERE LIKELY TO HAPPEN, BUT WE CANNOT BE OPTIMISTIC THAT DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS ARE LIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND MUST THEREFORE APPLY OUR MINDS TO WHAT OTHER MEANS THERE ARE OF PROMOTING PROGRESS.

IN THIS, OF COURSE, WE COME BACK TO THE UNITED NATIONS. WHATEVER HE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ORGANISATION, AND WE DO NOT SEEK TO IGNORE THAM, WE BELIEVE THAT IT CAN PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH A SETTLEMENT CAN BE ARRANGED. DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES WHICH MANIFESTED HEMSELVES AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DURING THE EARLIER DISCUSSIONS, IT IS STILL OUR VIEW THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN THE PHASE WHICH LIES AHEAD. NATURALLY, THIS PRE-SUPPOSES A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WHICH HAS OFTEN BEEN LACKING IN THE PAST, BUT WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH NOW, WE ALL HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN AVODING A FURTHER ROUND OF ARAB-ISRAEL FIGHTING, IF THIS WERE O HAPPEN, IT MIGHT THE NEXT TIME CARRY WITH IT EVEN MORE DANGEROUS POSSIBILITIES OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GREAT POWERS, WITH THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE COMBATANTS THEMSELVES, MAKING THE OUTCOME ALARMING FOR MANKING AS A WHOLE.....

END VS 312/67.

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PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

CONFIDENTIAL.

Minutes

Official Views on the General Situation in Morocco and the Middle East.

At a luncheon Party today given by M. Bosei, Inspector of Finance, to which a number of important senior Moroccan Government officials were invited, Ahmed Bennani, Secretary of State in the Premier's office, proffered a very reasonable argument which seemed to go down very well with the others. He said that the characteristics of both Arabs and Jews are basically the same, both being of the same semitic race. Thus, by nature, both Arabs and Jews are lazy, uninterprising, cowardly, and their spontaneous reaction in times of stress is to lay the blame on others for their mistakes.

However, years of persecution, bondage and hard work among other more serious and interprising communities in Germany, America, Russia, Britain, Poland, etc. drilled the need for hard work in Jews and transformed them completely so that they became a very clever, disciplined and serious people. And these qualities enabled them to defeat the Arabs who, for centuries, have not taken the trouble to improve or consolidate themselves. Their arrogance, however, blinded them to their negligence and mistakes and, as usual their easiest way out was to lay the blame on others and "allege" that Britain and America have directly participated in the war on Israel's side.

Bennani said that this accusation was circulated to all Arab countries with the hope to break their relations with America and Britain after the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq and Algeria had done so.

Morocco's first reaction was to examine the validity of the accusation. The British and American Ambassadors in Rabat were summoned and asked if their countries had really participated in the battle. Their honest answer was "No". The Soviet Ambassador was then summoned and reminded of his country's promise to prevent any outside interference in the Arab-Israeli war, and he was asked why had not the Soviet Union then prevented Britain and America from giving help to Israel? His frank answer was that <u>they did not</u>. Thereupon Morocco felt under no obligation to maintain the big lie [sic] or to break off relations, which it intend to promote, instead.

Mr. Bennani was also full of praise for our Ambassador's very tactful behaviour which, he said, has very much helped the Government in performing its difficult and tedious task.

By the way Moulay Ahmed el Alaoui, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines, also was loud in his praise of H.E.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Minutes

Dinner Party at the Moroccan Businessmen's last Saturday which I mentioned in a previous minute. He said that apart from his extreme tact which has been noted by the higher authorities and which has greatly contributed to the maintainence of good relations, he himself was very impressed by the Ambassador's outstanding technical knowledge when he visited the mines and various industries during a recent tour. His engineers and technicians had reported to him the keen interest H.E. had taken in the works, and the very knowledgeable questions he asked which made him rise in their esteem, as well as in the Minister's. Moulay Ahmed concluded by saying that Britain was among the very few countries which still take the trouble to send "des hommes de grand valeur" as their Representatives to friendly countries.

A. Hassouna
6/7/1967.

O. S. ✓ ALS 6.VII
I.O. Schumacher 6/7/1967
Hofstetter 7/7
H.E.

X is perhaps worth reporting for the record.
The flattery can be discounted

6/VII

Dfr. ALS 11.VII

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

7 July, 1967.

Please refer to Foreign Office telegram No. 1291 to Amman and subsequent telegrams about Jerusalem. I reported in my letter 1076/67 of 4 July Allal el Fassi's remarks about Jerusalem in his statement to M.A.P, with the comment that this reinforced our previous impression that internationalisation of Jerusalem was a non-starter as far as Morocco was concerned.

2. There has now been further confirmation of this from two sources: one is the highest authority in the land, the King, and the other is el Fassi once again.

3. A personal letter from the King to the Pope, dated 1 July, was delivered to the Pontiff on 3 July by the Minister of Justice, M. Ali Benjelloun, who made a special journey to Rome for the purpose. This letter, which was written as from one great religious leader to another, asked the Pope to use his authority towards the restoration of the status quo in Jerusalem "so that the legitimate authorities recover their usurped rights and so that the political and religious status of Jerusalem and of all the holy places may be restored as it was before the Israeli aggression." The letter, which makes no reference to the Vatican's renewed call for an international status for the city, uses as its main argument the tolerance shown by the Arab Moslem authorities in the city towards other religions throughout the centuries, and stresses the extreme sanctity of this city "which was the cradle of Our Lord Jesus, Son of Mary, Spirit and Word of God, and the place of the Ascension of our Prophet Mohammed, Servant and Messenger of God, and within whose walls the faithful of the revealed religious coexisted in the spirit of mutual peace and affection." It also underlines the close fraternal links between Christianity and Islam, quoting the Koran to this effect. It is noteworthy that nowhere is there any mention of Judiasm, and indeed throughout reference is made to "our two religions."

4. The second instance to which I referred above was the memorandum addressed by the Istiqlal party to the Kings and Presidents of all Islamic states which was published in the Istiqlal press of 5 July. This followed closely the terms of el Fassi's own statement

/under.....

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

under reference, although since it is addressed strictly to co-religionists it does not mention Christian or other rights in Jerusalem. Reiterating that the Moslem holy city of Jerusalem cannot be allowed to fall into Zionist or any other non-Moslem hands, the memorandum appeals to the other Islamic states "to initiate serious direct action to recover Jerusalem from Israeli occupation, which is now taking the form of a religious war directed against Islam and Moslems. We request you to resist any manoeuvre by any state, group of states or party for the internationalisation of Jerusalem .....We therefore expect you and all great Moslem states in Asia and Africa to do something positive in keeping with the gravity of the action undertaken by Israel."

5. What both these appeals, and indeed other statements on the subject, show is the tendency to regard Islamic rights in the city as paramount. It strikes me that this is dangerous ground, and that in the purely religious context of this argument Islam has no more, and possibly rather less, rights than Christianity or Judaism, for whom Jerusalem is the Holy City. Obviously the Arabs have a case on political and historical grounds, but to put such emphasis on the religious aspect of the case can only weaken their argument in the eyes of international opinion. For example, I wonder whether Christians are seriously impressed by the Arab assertion that the fact that the Old City is under Israeli, rather than Arab, political control is a severe blow at Christian rights.

6. It is also interesting in the light of Kuwait telegram No. 362, Beirut telegram No. 717 and Jedda telegram No. 475, to note that on this question of Jerusalem the Moroccan attitude at all levels seems to be more unyielding than that of the governments of these three countries. It looks as though we should alienate Moroccan sympathies widely if we gave our support to a formula of internationalisation .

(A. L. Southorn)

D/S Reuter 1076

RESTRICTED

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABU DHABI AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno. 63 Saving 7 July 1967 (J.I.P.G.D.)

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Abu Dhabi telegram No. 63 Saving of 7 July And Saving to certain Missions.

Middle East Talking Points.

IRD's letter IR 2/23/1 of 21 June 1967 (not to all) offered a weekly collection of "Middle East Talking Points" suitable for use in conversation by members of Missions. In future and for as long as there is a requirement, we propose to send these "Talking Points" as a weekly Saving telegram.

2. These small items do not always lend themselves to transmission on LPS or the BBC's Overseas Services. Wherever possible, they are sourced but there will usually be one or two where, for obvious reasons, the source cannot be quoted.

3. "The U.A.R. is bearing great sacrifices as a result of the closing of the Suez Canal, which provides Cairo with a third of its hard currency income, namely about £132 million sterling a year, from passage dues, fuel and food supplies and income from tourists".
Cairo Radio, 27 June.

4. Egypt lost 5,000 soldiers killed in action during the Middle East war, the Cairo newspaper 'al Ahram' reported on 30 June. It was the first estimate of losses published in the U.A.R.

5. Lebanese Television on 28 June showed President Atassi of Syria disembarking at Beirut from a Pan American aircraft on his return from New York.

6. Many Arabs are saying that Nasser should have withdrawn his forces entirely from the Yemen when the Middle East war broke out, thus showing that he was genuinely committed to the destruction of Israel. In fact, only a token U.A.R. force has been withdrawn.

7. "The Soviet Union, like the United States, asked for the recognition of Israel (by the Arab countries) and freedom of navigation. The Arab countries are therefore faced with this dilemma: that, according to the Great Powers, there is no solution without recognition of Israel. The only difference is that some people expect recognition to take place before the withdrawal of Israeli troops, and others expect it after withdrawal". From a Rabat broadcast on 1 July by M. Balafrej, personal representative of King Hassan II of Morocco.

See also Tripoli-FO 627
Holy See-FO 27
below.
A.L. Sowton 13.VII

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

H. [illegible]
H.E. 13/VII

/8.

RESTRICTED

S

8. "It is possible to remove generals, but this does not solve other serious questions concerning the country's future. The U.A.R.'s choice of Socialism has been upheld, but many people are now calling for a reconstruction of machinery of government and of the Arab Socialist Union. The victory of the national liberation revolution must be attended by the dissolution of the old machinery of government. Yet doubts and fears immediately spring to peoples minds. They remember that far from all senior officials are 100 per cent Socialists. How will they be able to carry out a Socialist policy? There is no answer to this question." From a leading article in the 27th issue of the Soviet weekly magazine 'Za Rubezhom' (Abroad), written jointly by two 'Pravda' correspondents, Belyayev and Primakov.

8[sic] In a television interview in New York, King Hussein of Jordan said he had "no evidence whatsoever" that the United States and/or Britain were involved in the Middle East fighting. "The aircraft we had sighted on radar apparently were Israeli aircraft returning from their attacks on the United Arab Republic." There were, he explained, "some wrong identifications of aircraft".

9. Arab oil-producing countries are beginning to express fears about the economic consequences of their oil boycott of Britain and the United States. In Kuwait the national income has been cut by 40 per cent. Saudi Arabia has estimated its losses at £11.3 million during 24 days ending on 30 June. The present partial boycott is costing £125,000 a day.

10. The Kuwaiti newspaper 'Al Rai Al Aam' on 27 June attacked Egypt for asking Kuwait to withdraw deposits from British banks. It pointed out that for years the Kuwait Government has been withdrawing deposits from British banks "and giving this money in aid to Egypt and other Arab States".

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

J.I.P.G.D.

sssss

D/W Retent 1076

RESTRICTED

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABU DHABI AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

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See also Tripoli-Fo 627 Holy See-Fo 27 below.

A.L. Sowton 13.VII

H. of Chancery

H.E. 13/VII

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

/8.

AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BUT THERE ARE SIGNS TOO THAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC WIRES GET CROSSED. THE MFA STILL SEEM VERY MUCH AMONG THE HAWKS. THE MOOD OF THE MAN IN THE STREET IS HARDEST TO JUDGE. THE ASU IS OUT OF THE NEWS DEMONSTRATIONS ARE STILL BANNED. SUCH EVIDENCE AS THERE IS SUGGESTS THAT THERE IS STILL A FAIR HEAD OF STEAM.

F O PASS UNNUMBERED. SOSFA.

1076

Presse arabe

"Al-Alam" (Istiqlal) -- 8 juillet 1967 (Editorial)

L'internationalisation de Jérusalem est une idée dangereuse et insidieuse

Dans les milieux colonialistes des Nations unies, dans certaines capitales engagées et dans diverses assemblées favorables à Israël, circule avec insistance l'idée d'internationaliser Jérusalem pour résoudre ce que l'on qualifie de différend entre Arabes et Israël à propos de la ville sainte. Or, l'internationalisation signifierait que la ville serait enlevée à la souveraineté du peuple qui y a vécu pendant des milliers d'années, pour être sous l'autorité d'un groupe d'Etats étrangers, ou de l'O. N. U. qui en confierait l'administration à un groupe d'Etats. Si, nous examinons la conjoncture internationale, nous constatons que l'Amérique serait fatalement au nombre de ces Etats vu qu'elle fait partie des grandes puissances et qu'elle "se préoccupe de la sécurité" dans le Moyen-Orient, et aussi parce qu'elle a une grande influence à l'O. N. U. et sur nombre d'Etats membres. L'administration internationale de Jérusalem serait confiée à des Etats satellites de l'Amérique et de l' Angleterre, dont l'influence serait alors absolue dans notre ville sainte. Et, par l'intermédiaire de ses deux grands alliés, Israël y aurait aussi une influence prépondérante.

Pour donner un aperçu de l'internationalisation, nous rappelerons le régime de Tanger, à la grande différence qu'à Tanger, la souveraineté appartenait au roi du Maroc et que l'internationalisation de la zone était liée au régime du protectorat. C'est pourquoi le régime international est tombé avec la chute de celui-ci. Mais il n'en serait pas de même pour Jérusalem, dans la mesure où la souveraineté serait définitivement enlevée au peuple arabe pour être attribuée à un groupe d'Etats par l'intermédiaire desquels s'exercerait l'influence sioniste.

Tel est le grand danger qui menace Jérusalem. Nous pouvons affirmer qu'il est bien plus grave que l'occupation de la ville par Israël, car cette occupation dépend de l'issue d'une guerre qui risque de durer des dizaines d'années, jusqu'à la libération de la Palestine. Mais l'internationalisation de Jérusalem, il serait bien plus difficile au peuple arabe, détenteur de la souveraineté de la ville sainte, de s'y attaquer, car il s'agirait d'un droit que le monde, représenté à l'O. N. U., aurait reconnu à ce groupe d'Etats.

.../

AZS 13.VII

Ce danger qui menace la ville sainte, le peuple arabe le repousse catégoriquement. Il combattra pour faire disparaître cette idée, tout comme il luttera contre l'occupation de Jérusalem par Israël.

Avant d'être la ville des religions, Jérusalem est une patrie. Le peuple arabe y est profondément attaché pour deux raisons : d'abord parce que c'est une patrie. Les Arabes y ont vécu pendant des milliers d'années et en ont toujours été les habitants. Or, il ne saurait être question pour eux de vendre leur patrie à un Etat ou à un groupe d'Etats ni d'accepter l'internationalisation, devraient-il perdre définitivement Jérusalem. Aux yeux des Arabes, cette ville a autant de valeur que Le Caire, Damas, Bagdad, Fès, Alger ou Tunis dont aucun citoyen arabe ne pourrait accepter l'internationalisation car cela reviendrait pour eux à vendre leur patrie à un groupe d'Etats colonialistes que rien ne distingue de l'Etat sioniste ;

- ensuite parce que c'est la ville des religions et que du jour où les Musulmans y sont entrés et en ont chassé le colonialisme romain, ils y ont protégé toutes les religions et tous les fidèles, gardant les clés des églises et des lieux saints vénérés par les Chrétiens et par les Juifs, tout comme ils le faisaient pour les mosquées. L'histoire conserve d'illustres exemples de la tolérance des Musulmans. Toutes les religions ont confiance en la protection de la ville sainte par les Musulmans et n'ont par contre aucune confiance en sa protection par les Sionistes qui ne respectent aucune religion, ni morale, ni valeur.

Pour toutes ces raisons, le peuple marocain tout entier rejette catégoriquement toute idée d'internationalisation de Jérusalem, quelle que puisse être l'origine de cette idée.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CM:A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM Cairo TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 388 D M

[Date] 8 July R M

Repeated to

[Priority] Routine.

A.L. Souttom 10.VII
H. of C. Deb 11/7
H.E. Seen by me on 11/VII only. Minute

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO

ADDSD TO F.O. TEL NO.668 OF 7 JULY

RPTD FORINFO TO WASHINGTON 84 PARIS 17 UKMIS NEW YORK 55 AND USUN NUMBERED TO ALGIERS AMMAN BEIRUT JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV BENGHAZI TRIPOLI TUNIS

MIDEAST CRISIS:UAR

PRESS REACTION TO DEFEAT AT UN IS THAT USA PRESSURE IS RESPONSIBLE. WORLD OPINION HAS BEEN THWARTED AND THE UN CHARTER VIOLATED. AND UN'S FUTURE IS IN DOUBT. LITTLE HOPE FROM FURTHER INITIATIVES. FRANCE GETS GOOD MARKS PLUS A LONG ARTICLE BY AHMED BAHAEDDIN IN ~~QUOTE~~ "MOISSA-WAR" ~~UNQUOTE~~ IDENTIFYING FRENCH AND RUSSIAN POLICIES. WE FIGURE ONLY AS AUTOMATIC ALLIES OF USA. ALTHOUGH INFORMED EGYPTIANS (EG INTERVIEW OF STEWART HARRIS OF

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

the Times

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

~~QUOTE~~"THE TIMES "~~UNQUOTE~~ WITH RIAD THREE DAYS AGO)
PROBABLY DO NOT RPT NOT NOW THINK BRIT FORCES TOOK
PART IN THE FIGHTING.THIS DOES NOT AFFECT THEIR
BASIC ATTITUDE THAT THEY LOST THE WAR.AND HAVE NOW
LOST IN THE UN.BECAUSE ISRAEL WAS SUPPORTED BY THE
USA AND ITS ALLIES.

2.THE PROBLEM IS WHAT CAN THE UAR AND THE ARABS
NOW DO.FROM HERE FOLLOWING SEEM LIKELY:

(A)UAR DRIVE TO CONSOLIDATE THE ARAB WORLD.
POSSIBLY VIA A SUMMIT MEETING.AND IN PARTICULAR TO
MOBILISE ITS CAPACITY FOR ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND
TO ERADICATE ~~QUOTE~~"REACTION"~~UNQUOTE~~.THE FOCAL POINT
OF ARAB NATIONALIST FEELING IS NOW EGYPT AND NASSER.
WHATEVER RESERVATIONS OTHER ARAB GOVTS MAY STILL HAVE
ABOUT BOTH.THE UAR LINE NO RPT NO TERRITORIAL
CONCESSIONT AND NO RPT NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

A LONG HAUL?
K LBNG HUJL AND A ~~QUOTE~~"PEOPLES WAR"~~UNQUOTE~~
TO ROOT OUT IMPERIALISM AND ITS BASES FROM THE
MIDEAST.ON LATEST EVIDENCE SEE MYTEL 666. THERE
ARE PRESUMABLY STILL PLENTY OF RESERVES OF POPULAR
FEELING FOR NASSER TO MOBILISE IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

(B) HARASSMENT OF ISRAEL.

NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT SEEMS TO BE ARRIVING.THE

PUBLIC FICTION IS BEING MAINTAINED THAT THE FIGHT
IS STILL ON. AND THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION. HOWEVER
UNREALISTIC. ABOUT ANOTHER WAR. I THINK THE EGYPTIANS
AND SYRIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO RISK FURTHER
ISRAEL ATTACKS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE ILLUSION
AND MAKE LIFE UNCOMFORTABLE FOR THE ISRAELIS.
THIS MAY HAVE STARTED ALREADY. VIDE RECENT CLASHES:
(C)A RAPID DIGGING IN BY THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND
WEAKENING OF WESTERN AND PRO WESTERN ELEMENTS:
VIDE POWERFUL RUSSIAN, CZECH AND NOW EAST GERMAN
MISSIONS HERE ALREADY. REPORTS OF RUSSIAN HAND IN
ARMY PURGE. AND CAMPAIGN BY MOSCOW AGAINST WEST
GERMANS.

3. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEDGER, THERE ARE
CERTAINLY PEOPLE HERE WHO THINK AT LEAST THAT
TOTAL COMMITMENT TO THE RUSSIANS IS UNDESIRABLE
AND TIES WITH THE WEST NECESSARY. BUT SUCH SIGNS
AS THERE ARE SUGGEST THAT THEY HAVE TO BE VERY
CAUTIOUS. IT IS INTERESTING THAT RIAD, TALKING
TO STEWART HARRIS, REFUSED TO COMMENT ON HEIKALS LAST
FRIDAY ARTICLE AS SUCH AND WENT ON TO COMMENT
FAIRLY BITTERLY ON HOPELESSNESS OF TRYING TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE.
THERE SEEMS TO BE A DESIRE TO TRADE WITH THE WEST

las Jaras

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

~~Cypher~~ ~~code~~ en clair

From:— RABAT *To:—* FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 315 of 10 July, 1967.

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 315 of 10 July.

Speaking in Moroccan Arabic King Hassan broadcast on 8 July an analysis of the political aspect of the recent Middle East crisis.

2. The moment, the means and the place chosen for the conflict were, he said, misjudged. Arab Heads of State and the United Arab Command were divided. The great powers were chiefly concerned with an East-West reconciliation. All of them recognised the existence of Israel, none had committed itself to give military aid to the Arabs in a conflict with Israel. The blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was not related to Arab objectives and was not calculated to attract support e.g. of the Soviet Union, which depends on free access through straits to the outside world.

3. "The Arab States" His Majesty continued, "are considered in international diplomatic circles as really responsible for the outbreak of hostilities" because for seven days prior to the outbreak of hostilities they had been mobilising and stating their readiness to attack. They should either have launched a surprise attack or stayed on the alert. The result of these mistakes is "thousands of martyrs, millions of wounded and homeless, millions, if not milliards, of dollars lost in unused armaments and a like quantity of means of development destroyed."

4. In these circumstances the duty of Moroccans was to mobilise for constructive effort. Yet agitators

/inspired.....

Wt.64978 Dd.D559 50m 12/56 LP1698

inspired by foreign ideologies were trying to stir up trouble. They would be punished according to the law and the Constitution. The State would remain master of the situation. The least embryo of anarchy would be stifled.

5. Full text follows by bag.

6. See also my i.f.t.

HOLLIDAY

1076

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

10 July, 1967.

Dear Head of Mission,

It is not easy to make comparisons between the burdens laid on missions and the Foreign Office by different crises, but in terms of the number of countries involved, the number of interests affected, the amount of international activity engendered, and general messiness, a full-scale Middle East crisis such as we have had during the past two months would be hard to beat.

Perhaps those who had it worst were Peter Wakefield, Robin Hooper and Hugh Pullar and their staffs. The two former had their Embassy and Consulate-General burned about their ears, the latter managed to keep the D/S working and us informed during three days whilst a war went on around them. Our posts in Tunis, Benghazi, Tripoli, Aleppo, Basra, Alexandria and Port Said suffered mob violence, others the threat of it: we had some very anxious hours on 10 June when Cairo informed us that they were breaking their cypher machines and leaving the building. The Embassy in Tel Aviv, deluged by us with importunate requests for more and more information, answered us between spells in their air raid shelter, during what they thought might be a naval bombardment. There were breaches of relations imposed in an uncivilised fashion by the Syrian and Iraqi Governments. The care and protection of British subjects, and emergency evacuations superimposed more and heavy burdens. Throughout all this, missions had to cope with a quite exceptional weight of telegraphic traffic. It seems little short of miraculous that under all these strains the machine kept turning and there were no breakdowns.

/ Nevertheless

H.M. Representative,
Rabat.

though we fortunately raised no wound stripe, these thanks and my own are due to all members and staff of this Embassy also.

Please circulate. [signature] 25/VII.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 25 JUL 1967

Nevertheless, with so much going on, it has not always been possible to deal from here with the problems of posts as quickly or as satisfactorily as we would have wished, much less to find time and words for appreciative messages. Now that the General Assembly has temporarily adjourned, may I take an overdue moment to let you know how much Ministers and officials here have admired and appreciated the service given them, under the greatest stress, by our missions in the Middle East? Will you please pass this on to all members of your staff with my thanks and that of all of us, and my hope that things will not continue at quite this pace.

I am writing in similar terms to H.M. Representatives in Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Ankara, and am sending copies to Dick Beaumont, Trefor Evans and Hugh Pullar.

(P. H. Gore-Booth)

CONFIDENTIAL

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

11 July, 1967.

I am reporting for the record remarks made at an informal occasion by the Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office, Ahmed Bennani about Morocco and the "big lie".

2. After some general remarks about the resemblances and differences between Arabs and Jews, in which he referred to the "arrogance" of the Arabs, he said that this blinded them to their negligence and mistakes. Accordingly, to explain their recent defeat at the hands of the Israelis, they had taken the easy way out and laid the blame on others, alleging in this case Anglo-American military support for Israel. M. Bennani went on to say that this allegation had been circulated to all Arab countries (presumably by the U.A.R.) with the request that they should break off relations with Britain and America.

3. Morocco's first reaction was to examine the validity of the charge. The British and American Ambassadors in Rabat were summoned and asked if their countries had really taken part in the fighting. Their honest answer was "No". The Soviet Ambassador was then summoned and reminded of his country's promise to prevent any outside interference in the Arab-Israeli war, and he was asked why the Soviet Union had not in that case acted against British and American intervention. His reply was that no such intervention had taken place. The Moroccan Government had accordingly felt itself under no obligation to comply with the U.A.R. request or to "maintain the big lie". (M. Bennani's own words).

(A. L. Southorn)

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

This is almost as grim a prospect for King Hussein as for us. I regret (as UKMIS N.Y. tendwelling DD - see this bel Nos 1636 of 3 July) that such voices as Bolaffej's, urging us to abstain and "not vote against the Arabs" on the non-aligned resolution, were not listened to. This must be making it more difficult for the King to resist pressures from the revolutionary Arab camp and from his domestic opponents.

Hoffmann 11/11

L.D. 12/11

D.D. [illegible] 12/11.

O.S. ALS 12.VII

11/VII

1076

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

JULY 10, 1967 NO. 156

United States passports are now valid, without special endorsement, for travel of American citizens to Lebanon.

Travel restrictions remain in effect, however, for eight countries of the Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Republic and Yemen. These restrictions will be lifted as soon as conditions warrant.

On June 21 the Department removed the ban on American travel to Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.

* * *

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
21 JUL 1967

1694

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY

A.B.Urwick

Department of State Press Release 156
of July 10 1967
Our telegram 2123 of 22 June

Copied to: Eastern Dept. F.O.
Chanceries, Algiers, Amman, Beirut,
Benghazi, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait,
Tripoli and Tunis

WASHINGTON, D.C.
11 July 1967

The Chancery
Rabat.

26.7.67

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag: Cypher/Cat A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 393 D M

[Date] 13 July R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

Hwalker 14/7
H.Adm 17/VII
as Adm 17.VII
I.O. 17/7

RESTRICTED

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 692

OF 13 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFO TO UKMIS NEWYORK WASHINGTON

ALGIERS TUNIS RABAT BENGHAZI JEDDA TEL AVIV AND

SAVING TO BEIRUT

ARAB MEETINGS

PRESIDENT AREF OF IRAQ.IN AN INTERVIEW WITH AHRAM

.SAID THAT THE ASSESSMENT TO BE MADE NOW AFFECTED

NOT RPT NOT PARTICULAR TERRITORIES BUT THE

WHOLE ARAB WORLD.AMERICA WAS THE DANGER.AND

COVETED THE REGION.ASKED ABOUT AMERICAN COLLUSION

THE PRESIDENT REFLECTED A MOMENT THEN SAID THAT

THE ARABS HAD TAKEN THE AMERICANS FOR HONEST MEN

AND HAD BEEN TRICKED.THIS WAS HIS MAIN POINT:HE

WENT ON TO REFER TO THE WEIGHT OF AMERICAN ARMS

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

/Brehud

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

BEHIND ISRAEL.VOLUNTEERS.AND THE ~~QUOTE~~ LIBERTY ~~UNQUOTE~~.

PASSING QUICKLY TO THE CONFIRMATION OFFERED BY

AMERICAN BLOCKING AT THE UN HE DID NOT RPT NOT

MENTION BRIT.

2.ON THE FUTURE.HE SAID THE ENEMY UNDERESTIMATED

ARAB ARMS AND THE EFFECT OF THE OIL BOYCOTT.AND

THE WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDS.ON ~~QUOTE~~ THOSE WHO

BETRAYED US AND WHO WERE HOSTILE. ~~UNQUOTE~~. ~~QUOTE~~

"WE SHALL MAKE SACRIFICES AND LOSE MONEY BUT WE

SHALL WIN HONOUR". ~~UNQUOTE~~

FO PASS ALGIERS 13 JEDDA 47 TUNIS 3 RABAT 2.

SOSFA.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS MARGIN.

minute 1/14/7

CONFIDENTIAL. 1076

Minutes.

News Commentaries.
and general gossip about the situation.

Yesterday when visiting Abdelwahed Chraibi, Attaché at the Minister of P.T.T.'s Cabinet, and his wife who is the Minister's sister, they put on the Television to listen to the commentary after the news, and it was identical with the editorial in today's Al Anbaa.

Both of them were very vehement in condemning the interference in Morocco's internal affairs by other Arab countries, particularly the U.A.R. and Algeria which, they said, were waiting for an opportunity to invade Morocco, and would have done so had their attention not been diverted by the Israeli danger. Madame Chraibi said that the wife of the Saudi Ambassador told her that, up till now, three hours are devoted daily in Egyptian broadcasts to attacks on King Faisal - a lesson not having been gleaned from the defeat which was mainly brought about by dissension among Arabs and the grudge revolutionary Arab countries harbour for Monarchical regimes, just because these are superior from every point of view to theirs.

The wife of the Jordanian Ambassador who was there (in her husband's absence at a Dinner Party the Algerian Ambassador was giving for the Kuwaiti), also condemned dissension"which was hindering Arabs from jointly attacking Israel", and commented on the good relations between Arab Kingdoms. She said that King Hassan sent his brother H.R.H. Prince Moulay Abdallah expressly to Paris to see King Hussein when he was there.

Sulaiman Dajjani the Jordanian Counsellor said that, on their way to the French Reception yesterday, he said something to his Ambassador which made them both shed many tears when they left the Reception. He said to him "You and I, of all the crowds at the Reception, are now without hometowns" as both Jerusalem and Nablus are now part of Israel. However, I noticed that humours have now much improved that sometimes they

joke/

M.F.P

joke about the question; and today all Arab Ambassadors are invited to the Jordanians to celebrate the marriage of Khaled Obeidat, Second Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy, who is marrying one of the Jordanian teachers who are running the school for Military children in Ifran. Likewise the wife of the Egyptian Ambassador has resumed her daily visits to her dressmaker to have a new dress for every occasion, but her voice is still completely lost because of her loud screaming the day Jamal Abdul Nasser announced his theatrical resignation. She keeps flitting from one hair dresser to another on the least suspicion that he or one of the assistants might be Jewish. Other Arab wives follow her lead.

The wife of the Lebanese Ambassador who is Christian and has now joined him temporarily with her daughter, tactfully (or tactlessly) reminds him whenever he enlarges on Israeli atrocities against Arabs, that the greatest atrocities and trouble making in the Lebanon are committed by his town people (Tripoli Moslems) who are breaking into and ransacking homes to see if any of the contents come from Britain or America. She said that Palestinian refugees there set petrol reservoirs on fire and killed the guardsmen so that Lebanon might not be the only Middle East Arab country not to suffer from the effects of aggression. I thought she also ridiculed him a bit when he alleged that Israeli pilots in worn out planes used to land during the battle in American bases in Libya to exchange these for big and more suitable American aircraft after exchanging the markings at top speed. At one moment he was so much on the point of losing his temper that he got up abruptly and faced the wall in the other end of the room until he could count ten.

A. Marsouk
14/7/1967.

O.S ALS 9.VII
J.O [illegible] 9/7
H [illegible] 17/7
H. [illegible] 18/VII

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Minutes

Please see file copy below of my letter of 29 June to various Governors of Provinces.

2. At the French reception yesterday evening M. Lamrani, Head of the European Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, took me aside and asked whether I recalled sending these letters to the Ministry. When I said I did he told me that they had not been sent on. I expressed (genuine) surprise. The Ministry considered, said M. Lamrani, that it was improper for an Ambassador to address these senior members of the service of the Interior on questions of foreign affairs. An Ambassador should address himself to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it was for the Moroccan Government to give such information as it thought fit to the Government services.

3. I said that I found this difficult to accept. Had he noticed that I was writing only to those Governors with whom I had established friendly personal relations? (Obviously he had not.) Was he aware that the Egyptian Embassy, for example, had been sending out to everyone of importance in the Kingdom a stream of bulletins attacking and calumniating the country I represented and propagating the lie that we had joined in the Israeli attack on the Arabs? (M. Lamrani contented himself with saying that he could not be expected to read all the Embassies' press releases.) All I was doing, I continued, was to exercise a right of reply and doing so in a factual manner. I attached importance to my friendly relations with the Governors, for whom I had great respect, and I would regret if their attitude towards me and my country should become hostile because they were misinformed. I already had evidence that some of them had been influenced by this hostile propaganda. (I was thinking of Layachi of Tetouan, who, when I met him on the beach at Restinga, though personally friendly, said he considered that I stood for "un cas indéfendable".) M. Lamrani said that the objection was to my writing letters as from Ambassador to Governor but when I said that in that case I would merely turn my letter into a bulletin and send them that he was clearly still unhappy. I went on to say that I had sent these letters via the Ministry for onward transmission. Had I realised that the Ministry would exercise a censorship I would have sent them to the Governors direct. This would have been <u>much</u> worse, said M. Lamrani. The Governors would have reported to the Minister of the Interior, who would have reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who would have had to express their strong displeasure to me.

/4. I

4. I concluded that I could not accept this discriminatory attitude on the part of a Government which professed a policy of non-alignment. They did nothing to prevent my country being publicly slandered by other Embassies but when I took relatively mild defensive action they wished to prevent it. M. Lamrani admitted that I had put the matter in a new light and undertook to consult his Minister further.

5. Clearly it would be against our interests to make a major issue of this. Even if the decision were now to be reversed the letters are getting rather stale. It is a distressing example, however, of the "colonial prejudice" from which H.M. Government suffers in so many countries.

(L.G. Holliday)
14 July 1967

O.S. AUS 14.VII
L.O. 14/7
CAS 14/7
R.G.H. v interesting. I suspect that direct communication with the minister may be something which the Moroccans find difficult to accept despite their liberal theory. Psychologically they must remember French and Spanish direct intervention, and now at a time when they are trying to unify and control the country resent Egyptian and Algerian contacts. A press release is less of an intervention and difficult when they are having to clamp down on the press. 17/7

Hitherto their attitude has been completely liberal & tolerant & to a more likely reason than X

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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1076

FRIDAY 14TH JULY 1967

(MIDDLE EAST)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, LORD CARADON, TO THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK ON 14TH JULY 1967:

THIS IS NOT THE TIME TM START ALL OVER AGAIN A GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL THE QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE RECENT CONFLICT.

THROUGHOUT THE LONG DEBATES IN THIS ASSEMBLYHAND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ANXIOUS TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION NOT ON ACCUSATIONS AND GENERALISATIONS BUT ON PROPOSALS FOR EFFECTIVE, PRACTICAL, IMMEDIATE AND IMPARTIAL UNITED NATIONS ACTION. WE HAVE THROUGHOUT ADVOCATED THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL STEPS, HOWEVER LIMITED, IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

WE WARMLY WELCOME WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS ALREADY BEEN ABLE TO DO IN ACHIEVING A CEASE-FIRE, IN ENSURING THAT IT IS OBSERVED, AND IN MAKING A START IN DEALING WITH THE VAST PROBLEM OF RELIEF OF SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP. WE HAVE CONSTANTLY ADVOCATED THAT AMONGST THE FIRST STEPS SHOULD BE A REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SEND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA TO CONSULT WITH ALL CONCERNED ON DISENGAGEMENT, WITHDRAWAL AND THE BUILDING OF FOUNDATIONS FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT.

WE ALSO WARMLY WELCOME THE EFFORTS TO FIND COMMON GROUND OF AGREEMENT. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS IN FACT FAR MORE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAN OUR PUBLIC SPEECHES ALLOW TO APPEAR. GOOD WILL AND GOOD SENSE MAKE SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESS UPSTREAM, AGAINST A TORRENT OF RECRIMINATION.

I AM BOLD ENOUGH TO BELIEVE THAT THE FRAMEWORK OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT IS CLEAR TO MOST OF US. THERE MUST BE DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL. THERE MUST EQUALLY BE FINAL SECURITY AGAINST RENEWED HOSTILITY. THERE MUST BE RELIEF AND REHAILITATION ON A NEW AND IMAGINATIVE SCALE NEVER BEFORE CONTEMPLATED. THERE MUST BE DEMILITARIZED FRONTIERS. THERE MUST BE AN END OF THE ARMS RACE. THERE MUST BE A RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY. ALL THE PEOPLES CONCERNED MUST BE ENABLED TO EARN THEIR LIVING IN PEACE AND IN SECURITY AND IN HOPE. THE HOLY CITY MUST BE NOT A CENTRE OF DISCORD AND CONFLICT BUT A SUMMIT OF CONCORD AND CONCILIATION.

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SE

WHEN I WAS MYSELF TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE I FIRST WENT TO LIVE
and work in Jerusalem. In my first week in my first post I saw
~~AND FORSTINAJERUGAWAL RIOTS FIRST WEEKHENBLYOFIRST COMMUNASAWIOTS~~
the first wailing wall riots - one of the bloodiest communal riots
THAT EVEN THE HOLY LAND HAS KNOWN. I SAW THEN THE TERRIBLE RESULTS OF REGLIGIOUS AND POLITICAL CONFLICT. IN THE INTERVENING DECADES THERE HAS BEEN DIVISION AND DISPUTE AND BITTERNESS AND BLOOXYHED. THE TIME HAS COME TO FINISH IT. WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY NOW, SO I TRQST, TO BRING GOOD OUT OF EVIL. THE VERY INTENSITY OF RECENT ANIMOSITIES AND THE COUNTERACTING INFLUENCES OF OPPOSING INTERESTS GIVE US AT LAST, SO I BELIEVE, THE HOPE OF A SECURE SETTLEMENT.

P PT IS THE QUESTION OF THE HOLY CITY WHICH IS THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE. THIS IS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM. THIS IS THEPISSUE WHICH EXCITES BOTH THE FIERCEST FEELING AND THE NOBLEST ASPIRATIONS.

WHEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL COMES TO ADVOCATE THE DEEP LONGINGS OF HIS PEOPLE FOR FREEDOM AND UNITY AND PEAQE HIS BRILLIANT ADVOCACY TOUCHES US ALL. WHEN HE SPEAKS OF RELIEF AND RECONCILIATION WE ALL SHOULD WELCOME WHAT HE SAYS. WE RESPECT THE DEPTH OF HIS FEELINGS AND THE SINCERITY OF HIS DEOTION.

BUT HE WOULD NOT CLAIM THAT HIS PEOPLE HAVE ANY EXCLUSIVE CONCERN FOR THE HOLY SITES SACRED TO THREE GREAT RELIGIONS. MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS TOO HAVE A DEEP AND PASSIONJTE CONCERN.

IT IS THIS COINCIDENCE OF CONCERN AND THIS COMMON DEVOTION WHICH MUST NOW BE RESPECTED, AND IT IS THIS CONCEPT OF JOINT INTEREST WHICH LED MY FOREIGN SEVVETARYHTO GIVE HIS SOLEMN WARNING IN THIS ASSEMBLY LAST MONTM, A SOLEMN WARNING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT PURPORT TO ANNEX THE OLD CITY OR LEGISLATE FOR ITS ANNEXATION. HE WARNED, AS YOU WILL REMEMBER, AGAINST ANY SUCH STEP WHICH WOULD ISOLATE ISRAEL FROM WORLD OPINION.

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇

WE WELCOME ANY STEPS TO RELIEVE DISTRESS AND DISLOCATQON AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. BUT WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY STATED WOULD BE WRONG, AND WHAT WE MAINTAIN WOULD BE WRONG NOW, IS ANY ATTEMPT NOW TO ALTER OR PREJUDICE THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE CITY. WE TRUST THAT ISRAEL WILL RECOGNISE AND ACCEPT THE FORCE OF THAT CONVICTION AND THAT STRONG CONTENTION.

IN THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION OUR FIRST OBLIGATION IS FOR THE WELFARE AND RELIEF OF ALL THE PEOPLE CONCERNED, AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EASING AND NOT A WORSENING IN THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

WE HAVE NOTED ALL THAT THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER HAS SAID BUT WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THIS ASSEMBLY WAS RIGHT TO JUDGE THE ISRAEL MEAYURES INVALID. HEY WERE INVALID BECAUSE THEY WENT BEYOND THE COMPETENCE OF AN OCCUPYING POWER AS DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WE ARE NOT HERE TODAY TO DEAL WITH LONG TERM SOLUTIONS. SOME SPEAK OF PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONALISATION. WE ARE OF COURSE FULLY IN FAVOUR OF FREEDOM OF ACCESS FOR ALL TO THE HOLY SITES, BUT WE THINK IT WOULD BE WISER TO DEFER FOR THE TIME BEING CONSIDERATION OF THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT. WE ARE NOT DEALING WITH THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT NOW.

WE ARE DEALING WITH AN IMMEDIATE QUEQTION. WE DEPLORE ANY IMMEDIATE AND UNILATERIAL ACTION MN A SEPARATE ISSUE. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL SUCH ISSUES OF CONFLICT SHOULD BE SETTLED IN THE FRAMEWOGKH OF AN EVENTUAL GENERAL SETTLEMENT.

ACCORDINGLY, WE RESTATE AND REINFORCE OUR STATEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY. THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY OTHER PRESENT ACTION WHICH PREJUDICES THE CITY'S FUTURE STATUS.

IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT WE VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION PASSED LAST TUESDAY. WE HAVE NOT CHANGED OUR STRONG VIEWS ON THIS CENTRAL QUESTION. NEITHER BY UNILATERAL LEGISLATION NOR BY ANNEXATION CAN OR SHOULD OME FUTURE OF JERUSALEM BE NOW DETERMINED. IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY A SUBSEQUENT SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THE INTERESTS OF ALL MUST BE FULLY PROTECTED AND PERMANENTLY INSURED.

END VS 322/67 L P S

PRODROME RABAT
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A.L. Soutton 26.VII

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D.A.G.W

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY
A.B. Urwick

Article from THE WASHINGTON POST
FRIDAY JULY 14 1967
TODAY ABROAD By Flora Lewis
Algeria Worries Its Neighbors

Copied to: N.E.A.D. F.O.
Chanceries at Algiers, Benghazi,
Paris, Tripoli and Tunis

WASHINGTON, D.C.

14 July 1967

The Chancery
Rabat.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
21 JUL 1967

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, July 14, 1967 A21

Today Abroad . . . . . By Flora Lewis

Algeria Worries Its Neighbors

PARIS—When it comes to bellicose talk, the most furious Arabic now is pouring out of Algiers. Soviet guns give the words metallic resonance, a pattern that is ominously familiar.

Flora Lewis

Algeria is over 1500 miles from Israel, so its proclaimed refusal to accept any cease-fire has no immediate effect on whether or not war is renewed in the Middle East. On the surface it looks silly to keep shouting from 3000 miles away that the fighting must continue.

But Algeria's moderate neighbors, Tunisia to the east and Morocco to the west, are unhappily convinced there is much more to it than the silliness that meets the eye. Why, they ask, is Algeria arming to the teeth with a continual stream of planes and tanks from Russia, supported with equipment from France?

Moroccan leaders think it is against them. Morocco has territorial disputes with Algeria that have already given rise to one inconclusive war. More important, there is fundamental political divergence between Morocco's Atlantic-oriented King Hassan II and Algeria's pro-Soviet Boumedienne.

The Tunisians do not shrug off the danger of Algeria provoking local war, but they see an even greater threat in Boumedienne's importing the cold war to North Africa. The same risk of Soviet-American confrontation that existed in the Middle East is building up all along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. And what especially distresses the Tunisians is that de Gaulle's France seems to be promoting it.

De GAULLE, the Tunisians argue, could discourage Algeria's voracious appetite for Russian arms in outrageous disproportion (ten to one) to its neighbors' equipment. Instead, he messages Boumedienne that "we are in full agreement on essentials" and supports close contacts with Moscow.

Tunisia's ambassador in Paris, Mohammed Masmoudi, has spoken candidly to the French government. Paris must share the blame, he has said repeatedly, for growing Soviet penetration of North Africa. Furthermore, he warned, if French withdrawal from NATO is turning into French endorsement of Soviet aims, Tunisia will not follow but will look to America and Britain for balancing support.

So far Tunisia has concentrated resolutely on its own development, spending nearly half its budget on education and youth welfare and about an eighth on its army. That would seem imperative common sense for a developing country. But Algeria's reversal of priorities is working on its neighbors. Morocco is already looking for more American weapons and Tunisia is sadly considering the inevitability of an arms race.

Though North Africa is not now so explosive as the Middle East, the time for a return to reason is growing short. The focal point of danger is in Libya, the great oil-soaked desert between Tunisia and Egypt. Only aged King Idris, 77, keeps Libya together. There is no political structure beneath him.

FOR BOTH Egypt's Col. Nasser and Algeria's Col. Boumedienne, whose countries are rich in weapons and unemployed but poor in most everything else, Libya's disorganized society and unprotected wealth create an obvious temptation. And since both use "Arab revolution" with anti-Western slogans as their political fuel, the advances one or both might make in Libya would be a vanguard for Russian influence.

The one big obstacle to such ambitions is the great American airbase at Wheelus Field. Libya has renewed demands for talks on U.S. withdrawal in a reaction to the Arab-Israeli war. But King Idris is not asking for immediate evacuation and there has been quiet word that he is not in a great hurry for a decision. He, too, sees the dangers on the horizon. Abrupt abandonment could be as disastrous as the sudden removal of United Nations forces from the Egypt-Israeli border.

Because of what Boumedienne has been up to, and because Tunisia is what separates Algeria and Libya, the Tunisians firmly hope the U.S. will keep the base. Theirs is not the only Mediterranean country with a new interest in continued American presence.

The alternative to spreading cold war is to convince the Russians that North Africa is as dangerous a place as the Middle East to bet Migs and missiles on ranting, emotional colonels. That's the sort of thing that leads to acute crisis and Soviet-American confrontation.

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CYPHER/OTP Ref. No. 76 SAVINGS TO Beirut 1076

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno. 17 Saving 14 July 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

AJS 21.VII

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 17 Saving of 14 July And to certain other FO/CO Posts.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 21 JUL 1967

Middle East Talking Points.

July 14, 1967.

The Russians are taking advantage of the tanker boom caused by the Suez Canal's closure. The London "Times" reported on 7 July the chartering by Japan Lines of a 45,000 ton Russian Flag oiler for five voyages from the Persian Gulf to Japan. The rate charged was 67s. per ton of freight compared with around 20s. paid before the blocking of the Canal.

2. King Hassan of Morocco, in a broadcast on 8 July, criticised the part played by the Arab States in the outbreak of the Middle East fighting. "The moment, the means, and the place chosen for the conflict were misjudged", he said. "The blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was not related to Arab objectives and was not calculated to attract support, e.g., of the Soviet Union, which depends on free access through straits to the outside world. The Arab States are considered in international diplomatic circles as really responsible for the outbreak of hostilities". For seven days before the fighting they had been mobilizing and stating their readiness to attack. They should either have launched a surprise attack or stayed on the alert. The result of these mistakes was "thousands of martyrs, millions of wounded and homeless, millions, if not milliards, of dollars lost in unused armaments and a like quantity of means of development destroyed".

3. Saudi Arabia's Jedda Radio reported on 7 July that there had been a public protest regarding the ban on the export of oil to Britain and the United States. A commentator said it had been pointed out that since King Hussein himself had now expressed his conviction that no British or United States aircraft had taken part in the fighting, there was no logical or practical basis for maintaining the embargo.

4. In an interview with a "Times" correspondent on 4 July, Mahmoud Riad, Egypt's Foreign Minister, when asked if he really thought British bombers or pilots had been attacking Arab people during the fighting, replied that he had no proof of such attacks. He added that the Arabs did not think this point "important".

5. 'Al Ahram', the semi-official Cairo newspaper, reported on 9 July that the President of the International Red Cross Committee, Professor Gonard, was going to Cairo for talks

/with

with the UAR authorities. This announcement was made within a few days of the publication in the 'United States News and World Report' of 3 July of International Red Cross documents, signed by doctors, which proved that Egypt had used poison gas in the Yemen. This subject was no doubt the principal reason for Professor Gonard's visit but 'Al-Ahram' implied that it was being made in connection with Egyptian allegation of the violations by Israel of the Geneva covenants on the treatment of prisoners of war, the wounded, and refugees.

6. The Indian Government is having to pay substantially more to ship American grain to India. For 26 freighters chartered recently they had to offer 129s. per ton, via the Cape. The pre-Middle East crisis level was in the region of 99s, per ton. ('The Times' 10 July).

7. The Progressive Socialist Party in the Lebanon, which has been co-operating with the Lebanese Communist Party in a left-wing Progressive Front, has criticised the attitude of Arab Communists towards Palestine in its journal, 'Al Anba'. On 26 June the paper reported that Arab Communist and Marxist parties recognised in principle and effect the entity of Israel created by "the aggression of 1948" and "the Soviet Union's recognition of the State of Israel". Arab Communist Parties denounced Israel because it was a base for Anglo-American aggression, but should Israel stop being such a base and rid itself of Anglo-American influence, "Arab Communist Parties would then accept this State".

8. 'United States New and World Report' of 17 July quotes "authoritative sources" as having definitely established that the Soviet Union faked intelligence reports that Israel was mobilizing troops to attack Syria, thus precipitating the Middle East fighting. The intention was to create a crisis atmosphere that would unite the Arab nations, but the Russians underestimated the Arab temperament and the situation got out of control.

9. "In many Arab countries the conditions are not ripe for the creation of strong Communist parties because the working class is not strong enough ... [but] even in the conditions of the weakness of Communist parties, some forces must arise and take the lead; come out in the Socialist trend. And this is just what happened in Egypt, in Syria and Algeria, and the revolutionary democratic governments there are playing a vital rôle in bringing these countries on the path of non-capitalist development ... And the Communists in these countries are supporting these régimes". Moscow Radio broadcast in English for North America by Georgiy Mirskiy, the historian, on 6 July.

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J.I.P.G.D.

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1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

SAVING TO Rabat

Telno 702 14 July 1967

AS 26.VII

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 702 of 14 July.
Repeated for information to: Arab posts
UKMis New York Washington
And Saving to Paris Moscow
Beirut.

Arab Meetings (see also my telegram No. 700).

Except for pronouncements of individual Arab leaders there is no (repeat no) evidence of what is going on. Nor can much be expected yet. "Ahram" says cautiously that the meetings do not (repeat not) rule our wider Arab action but mean only that the four (sic) like-minded States at present involved see the need to coordinate their plans without delay, particularly in view of pressures whose effects are appearing among the Arabs. "Ahram" also "learned" that the delegations have decided to extend their stay beyond their original intentions, until aim is achieved; and that while a final communiqué will be published, it will be brief and "global", not (repeat not) detailed.

2. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Malik has been in consultation with Feki. Under Secretary M.F.A. but his visit has not (repeat not) been highlighted.

3. In spite of various indications(e.g. Aref's interview - my telegram No. 692) that we ourselves are out of the limelight, it would be rash to assume that if the Arabs do employ economic measures they will be content to vent them on the United States. UAR at least are publicly committed to the theory of our support of Israel, the Americans are much less vulnerable, and I have seen virtually no (repeat no) signs of a wish to mend fences with us. The West Germans here for their part are still half expecting to join us officially in the ranks of aggressors.

4. In the light of this, and of the difficulties involved in boycott measures, it is perhaps worth reporting an indication received by my West German colleague from a "moderate" Egyptian official source, that the UAR might be considering agreeing to reopening the Suez Canal but refusing passage to the "collaborators" including the Americans and ourselves.

Foreign Office pass UKMis New York No. 61, Washington No. 90, Arab posts as necessary and Saving to Paris No. 17, Moscow No 20 and Beirut No. 11.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 1000Z 14 June
Recd 1305Z 14 June

[No repetition action taken re Arab posts, but otherwise repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 25 JUL 1967

H.E.

Copy sent to R.H. Baker, 18/7/67

Al Alam (Istiqlal) No. 6261 of July 14, 1967.

The Vatican and Jerusalem's Occupation. Editorial.

It is common knowledge that the policy of the Pope, the Head of the Catholic Church, regarding Jerusalem tends towards the internationalisation of this Holy City, the homeplace of the sanctuaries of the three heavenly religions. This is a political solution which is not based on religious, ethical or historical values. Colonialist States have favoured this solution since Israel's usurpation of Arab Palestine, and Arab and Islamic States have opposed it. This view was renewed after the recent aggression; and we and Arab and Islamic States objected to it because, as already stated, Jerusalem had been Arab before it was a religious centre, and because internationalisation would mean colonialist domination; and colonialist States would, most probably, enable Israel to dominate Jerusalem by means of internationalisation just as they have now made it possible for her to predominate by way of usurpation.

But recent news foretells something much worse, that is the Vatican's readiness to agree to the accomplished fact in Jerusalem, in other words to Israeli occupation, provided the Church would have control over the Christian Holy Places there. This self-same suggestion had been made by the Zionist Premier to the Vatican Emissary.

Should this report, which has been denied by News Agencies, prove to be true, the Holy See in the Vatican would be helping Israel reap the full benefit of the invasion, and would be giving agreement to a transaction made by colonialist forces by means of violence, terrorism, dispersal, extermination and torture. We do not believe a religious authority could bless such an act. Moreover, the Vatican's agreement to Jerusalem's occupation would amount to an adoption of a combined political and military attitude Hitherto the Vatican has always endeavoured to remain neutral even in big wars and in those raged between principles and ideologies notwithstanding the incompatibility of some of these ideologies with the bases of Christianity. Likewise, it would amount to bias in a deadly conflict between the adherents of two religions. As the Pope in Rome very well knows, the Zionists forced Judaism into their war with Arabs. All Moslems regard Israel as an aggressor and a colonialist creature which is devoid of all values, ethics or faith. They are obliged to fight all Jews who profess Zionism. The Catholic Church's bias to a State which has arisen from aggression and involved religion therein, will have its deep effect on all those who profess Islam, whether Arab or non-Arab.

Moreover, many Arab Catholic Christians are not pleased with this attitude when they are in the throes of the battle with Israel which pulled down their shrines, insulted their religious dignitaries, transgressed against their fellowmen and stranded their compatriots. At any rate the Holy Places in Jerusalem are not an exclusive property of Catholics but of all Christians, whether Protestants, Orthodox, Copts or Greeks, all of whom had been happy with the Arab custody from the era of Omar Ben el Khattab until June 5th last. How will these view the Catholic Church's attitude should this Church agree to Israel's domination of Holy Jerusalem?

An attitude such as this if adopted, and it is hoped it never will, will give rise to serious controversies between religions and between the various sects of Christianity. This is what Israel wants and what the Protocols hints when promising Jews to create religious and political discord in the world to enable Zionism to set up a world Jewish State. We are reluctant to have the Catholic Church in Rome help to bring this about.

Reference 1076

Have we done a round-up on the Moroccan attitude on Jerusalem? If so, this ought to be sent, ref. If not such a round-up should be done, taking note of this.

I fear the result may be a further hardening of the Moroccan attitude to mission-aries and christians in general.

[illegible]
O.S.

17/VII

Article copied to NEAD, ref. my letter 1076/67 of 4 July.

ALS 18.VII

1076

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PRIORITY ALGIERS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 295 17 July, 1967.

See also F.O- Abidjan No. 17 S. Cairo - F.O. No. 702 below A.L. Southorn 26.VII

CONFIDENTIAL

H.O. 28/7

H. of Com 31/7

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 295 of 17 July. Repeated for information Priority to Cairo, Moscow and Saving to Khartoum, Washington, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Amman, UKMis New York ~~and~~ Paris, Tunis + Rabat.

Algeria and the Middle East Situation.

This morning's announcement of Boumedienne's visit to Moscow, the second in just over a month, has surprised everyone here. It looks like a last moment decision since this morning's papers announced his return to Algiers today.

2. In the absence, so far, of any indication other than yesterday's Cairo communiqué of how things went at the various Cairo and Damascus meetings, there is very little on which to base an assessment of the purpose of the visit.

3. From the Algerian point of view the Middle East situation has in recent weeks gone from bad to worse. The defeat in the United Nations showed once again that the Russians could not deliver the goods. It showed too that there were many "tractors" in the third world. Israel has consolidated her conquests and the annexation of Jerusalem has not been effectively challenged. Some of the oil-producing Arab States have been half-hearted, to say the least, about the oil embargo whose success was a major feature in the picture of an Arab world united behind the revolutionary flag which for a moment looked so real. Now the U.A.R. appears to have accepted in principle the return of United Nations observers - and this while the Cairo meetings were going on.

4. Boumedienne is, therefore, likely to have gone to Cairo in a mood of angry frustration. He may have been encouraged to assert himself by the enthusiastic receptions he is said to have been given in Cairo and Damascus. It can be assumed that his relations with Nasser are once again mutually distrustful: but Boumedienne may now think he has got Nasser's measure. He must have written off Jordan (without regret) whatever King Hussein may have said to him. His meetings with Aref on the other hand may have confirmed their identity of view on the situation generally though Afef can hardly have concealed his weakness: Iraq's dependence on her oil revenues. In short, his visits and

/conversations

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conversations are likely to have strengthened Boumedienne's conviction that Algeria can and must now take the lead.

5. From here it hardly seems possible that Boumedienne and Aref were deputed to represent all five Heads of State in Moscow. Syria yes: the Sudan perhaps: but Nasser with so much already lost and so much more at stake can have agreed only with the greatest reluctance to put his fate in their hands. This suggests either that Algeria and Iraq have decided to set the pace regardless of Nasser or that the two Heads of State have been given a strictly limited mandate.

6. But if Boumedienne has a free hand I would expect him to make some at least of the following points:-

(a) After the United Nations debacle the Russians are even further in the debt of the Arabs.

(b) Those Arab States that are continuing the fight are determined to recover occupied Arab territory. For this they need military assistance which they look to the Russians to provide. Their demands may be specific and could include support for contingency plans, perhaps for guerilla operations. Boumedienne had talks with General Pavlovki, described as Vice-Minister of Defence, immediately before leaving for Cairo and Major Chabou, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence was in Moscow in the last week of June.

(c) The Arab States that are suffering economically because of the embargo must be helped. No doubt Aref will lead on this item.

(d) The Soviet Union must come out more strongly for the revolutionary countries of the third world and must make those countries that betrayed the cause feel her displeasure. They must give up their useless manoeuvrings in the United Nations and above all not compromise with the United States. (Glassboro).

Foreign Office pass Priority to Cairo 23, Moscow 7 and Saving to Khartoum 1, Washington 48, Beirut 10, Tel Aviv 7, Amman 6, UKMis New York 8 and Paris 40. Tunis 11, Rabat 10.

Mr. Dawbarn Sent 1852Z 17 July.
Recd.2052Z 17 July.

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts.]

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(Confidential)

H.E.

Minutes

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I doubt whether our basic attitude to Jordan under Hussein is unduly tinged with sentiment. Mr Hadow, (with whom I worked for two years) has a healthy disrespect for the Arabs, and a corresponding respect for the Jews. He realises that he does not have to dissuade H.M.G from giving undue support to the Syrians or the Egyptians, while he does have to do so vis à vis Hussein.

2.) The reason why we support Hussein is that he is a moderate, though at the same time an Arab apt to be divided by emotion and his own and others propaganda. If his Government had not existed - and it would have ceased to exist long ago without western support there would have been an Arab Israel war of this sort long ago. No Government controlled by people like the present Jordan or Ambassador in Rabat (who I gather was sent here by Hussein with a warning that he should be watched) could or would

62805 (5640) A.O.St.

have resisted unification with the U.A.R a unprovoked 'Arafa' type attacks on Israel in the way that Hussain has. Our support of Hussain has in the past been a policy of insurance in our own interests, against the sort of chaos in the Middle East that we are now suffering. Besides this Hussain was a developer (like Hassan II) and hoped to have his country standing on its own feet (without aid) by 1970. No wonder the Magnet press (especially the official press) backs Hussain rather than the new developing progressives of the middle East. Once again we may be too much of a romantic a Charles the Bold - for us. But I doubt whether a colder blooded man would have been able to inspire the loyalty in an impassioned Arab atmosphere.

3.) King Hussain's conduct may have been poor in the war as far as we are concerned

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Minutes

Unl· I doubt· whether the Kuwaitis or other Arab Rulers would have done much better in the Sanction (geographical + political) (though the age and political experience of some may have helped) One must remember that he had the following difficulties to cope with.

a.) A large section of his population was decisively loyal and stidently demanding his participation in the war. Even the Iraqis could not hold out against pressure from the Army and the National Kurds against Syria.

b.) The Syrians had a force on his border ready to invade, they and the U.A.R were fomenting trouble within the Kingdom, and shouldering the leader of the palestinians was urging the overthrow of the Government. Any passivity on the his war Kings part would have meant the downfall of his government. In fact the King stymied the Syrians, much to their

disquet, by making a United command agreement- and with the U.A.R, and purchased the acquiescence of the Palestinians by partaking up with shukairy.- a dangerous game - and Jordan is a dangerous country.

c.) The Israelis' peaceful entitlement them war with Jordan by their miscalculation in not attacking the Syrians. Jordan could not sat on the Egyptians with untouched Syrian forces in the field. Egyptian permission to do so had to be obtained, or sank at Arab would with the help of Syrian forces - have completed the Kings' downfall.

It is strange that the Israelis who were little deterred by the Russians in entering the war (para 16 of despatch No 18) should have held back so far over attacking Syria because of the Russians (para 9 of Despatch No 19) I assume that this is because the latter were already calling for a

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cease fire and that an attack on Syrian positions without proper preparations (as often argued before me by Mr Hadow) would have meant heavy casualties. That they should choose to attack Jordan before Syria is understandable. While the action of the two Arab armies was about the same - bombardment, not attack - (paras 5 and 9 of Despatch No 19) the Jordanian action was far more damaging than the Syrian one for geographical reasons.

4.) King Hussein did, in fact, what he had to do, though he may have been swayed by emotion in doing it and thus helped to propagate the big lie. He lost the West Bank and Jerusalem - but had he acted otherwise he might well have lost his throne. If that had happened, chaos + Syrian interventions would have occurred in Jordan. The war not against the Israelis but amongst the Arabs might still be being fought now

+ Iraq

with greater damage to our own interests. If we do not continue to support Hussain this may yet happen.

5.) King Hussain helped in the propagation of the big lie – and it was Nasser – not Hussain who ensured its success – and it was probably the speech at Bengazi and our actions before the outbreak of War (in an effort to hold the Israelis) that laid the ground for its propagation more effectively than anything else.

No Nothings work simply added conviction for the Arabs.

F Walker 17/7

Very eloquently argued.
I agree that it is not in our interest to let Jordan be swallowed up by Egypt/Syria or Egypt/Syria/Iraq but I think we should be clear that we back Hussain from necessity not from choice i.e. without sentiment. I still think that he is a weak ruler in an inherently weak position. If we allow ourselves for sentimental reasons

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reasons to do more for him than the minimum which our interest demands. I fear that we shall not have enough resources to spare for other recipients with whom improved relations would pay a handsome dividend.

I do not question Jordan's importance. I do question how much priority should be given to it within the Arab world as a whole.

HMG 17/VII

Agreed. JFW 17/7

Ed (1626)

A.P.

BATTERIE DE FUSÉES SAM II DANS LE SINAI.
Miracle pour les services secrets.

ARMES

Sam II et Mirage IV

La plus belle prise de guerre de l'armée israélienne excite depuis quelques jours l'intérêt passionné des états-majors occidentaux.

On a, en effet, révélé, à Tel-Aviv, la semaine dernière, qu'une batterie de fusées sol-air Sam II de fabrication soviétique, absolument neuve, a été capturée dans le Sinaï, avec tout son dispositif électronique de guidage.

Or, depuis deux ans, de multiples conférences interalliées, réunissant des experts de la balistique stratégique, essayaient vainement de reconstituer, en échangeant les renseignements des services secrets, le système soviétique de guidage. Les Occidentaux n'auront plus, désormais, à s'inquiéter. A condition toutefois que les Israéliens acceptent de leur montrer leur miraculeuse trouvaille.

Paradoxalement, l'état-major français pourrait être favorisé ; un groupe d'experts appartenant à l'armée de l'Air et à la commission de la Défense nationale doit arriver cette semaine en Israël pour observer, en « première », les fusées soviétiques. Motif de cette amabilité : les services rendus par la France aux Mirage et Mystère de l'aviation israélienne, avec discrétion mais efficacité.

Si les diplomates israéliens et l'homme de la rue montrent beaucoup d'humeur devant la neutralité diplomatique du gouvernement français, les militaires, en revanche, admettent qu'ils « n'ont pas eu à se plaindre ». L'embargo sur les armes a souffert de multiples exceptions. Non seulement on a continué à livrer des pièces de rechange, mais quand, au deuxième jour de l'offensive, les stocks israéliens de roquettes antichars ont commencé à s'épuiser, Paris n'a pas refusé de les recompléter. On a utilisé des voies de livraisons détournées.

Le 6 juin au soir, un premier avion-cargo israélien s'est posé sur le terrain d'Orly. On l'a obligé à repartir à vide, spectaculairement, pour respecter les consignes officielles d'embargo. Mais on l'a discrètement guidé sur un aérodrome hollandais, pour y embarquer une quantité de roquettes de fabrication française. Il se confirme, d'autre part, comme « L'Express » avait été le seul à le révéler la semaine dernière, que l'armée de l'Air israélienne possède secrètement, depuis quelque temps, outre des Mirage III, des bombardiers Mirage IV, en service depuis dix-huit mois dans l'aviation française.

Raison de cette coopération militaire, contraire à l'embargo et au choix de la diplomatie française : l'exécution de contrats commerciaux antérieurs. Les Etats arabes, eux, n'en avaient pas signé.

GEORGES CHAFFARD ■

Rabat 1076

With the compliments of

JOINT INFORMATION POLICY AND
GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT

Ref. Guidance 168

ARS 20. VII

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
OFFICE, S.W.1.

H. Fulton 21/7

I.O. 21/7

D. Bg 21/7.

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CIRCULAR RETRACT 94217

A SPOKESMAN TOLD TODAY'S FO NEWS CONFERENCE ''WE HAVE NOTED WITH SURPRISE AND REGRET THAT THE ARAB LEADERS ASSEMBLED IN CAIRO HAVE THOUGHT FIT TO SEEK TO REVIVE IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE THE EXPLODED ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF BRITISH ARMED FORCES ON THE SIDE OF ISRAEL IN THE RECENT WAR.

''HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER IN THIS DISCREDITED MYTH.

''INDEED, THE ALLEGATIONS HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO BE TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND THIS FACT IS NOW GENERALLY RECOGNISED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST''.

= CENTROFORM +

We are no longer going out of our way here to put out démenti on the "Big Lie"; but we could conveniently fit this into the Weekly Bulletin as a snippet. Mr [signature]
18 July 1967

FIGS 94217 +

HE [signature] 18/7
H [signature] 18/7
[signature] 18/7
[signature] 18 Jul
[signature]

N
PRODROME RABAT

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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher / CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0. TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 396 D M

[Date] 18 JULY R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

Thatcher 20/7 NEA
NOTED VII P24/7
DS/ALS 20.VII
FS/Emm 20/7
D Mayor

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ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1545 OF

18 JULY AND TO PARIS. BEIRJT. CAIRO. KUWAIT.

JEDDA. BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY). AMMAN. RABAT. TUNIS.

TRIPOLI. BENGHAZI. ALGIERS. JIG CYPRUS. ADEN

(PERSONAL) AND KHARTOUM.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 826: CANBERRA AIRCRAFT

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ISRAEL (NOT TO ALL).

THERE IS NO REPEAT NO TRUTH IN THE REPORT BEING

CIRCULATED BY THE FRENCH AIR ATTACHE IN TEL AVIV

TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAVE AGREED

TO SELL CANBERRA AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL.

2. THERE ARE AT PRESENT NO REPEAT NO PLANS TO

SELL CANBERRAS OR ANY OTHER TYPE OF AIRCRAFT TO

ISRAEL. SOSFA.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:--

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

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CONFIDENTIAL

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM
PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno. 6 Saving 19 July 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office Saving telegram No.6 of 19 July, repeated for information Saving to Washington, UKMis. New York, Ottawa, Moscow, Paris, Delhi and certain Arab posts.

Arab/Israel

As this is drafted, Presidents Boumedienne and Arer have returned for further consultations after their packed visit to Moscow; President Azhari has gone back to Khartoum leaving his Prime Minister Mahgoub; President Atassi has dropped mysteriously out of the picture after his four hour session with President Nasser immediately followingthe departure of Boumedienne and Arer, and Soviet Deputy Premier Malik, having been kept in the wings for three days, has at last seen President Nasser and Foreign Minister, and is said to be leaving for Moscow today. The communiqué of 17 July repeated the "Great Lie" against both us and the Americans, hinted generally at a reconsideration xixxx by all Arabs of their relations with those countries who had not toed the Arab line, forecast an Arab meeting at only foreign Minister level, but otherwise said no more than that "we shall do great things: we know not what they be". The Moscow communiqué which followed again avoided naming the U.K. and the U.S.A. but agreed on the basic point that "the liquidation of the consequences of Israel's aggression is the most important condition of the restoration of peace in the Middle East" (which Gromyko has since repeated to the Security Council). The Arab Boycott Committee planned for 15 July was quietly postponed. There is a rapid coming and going of top people, and consultations with Ambassadors. But one can only deduce that for the moment: (a) the old "progressive" group are still trying to assess their position and assets, and (b) that the extent of Russian support is a crucial factor which may not yet have been finally determined. In none of this is there any "peace" talk; on the other hand sniping at the outer fringe of Arabs has appreciably and I believe deliberately diminished for the time being.

/2.

A.L. Sanderson 3.VIII

H. of/Sec.

L/O 8/8

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 1 AUG 1967

CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 6 SAVING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

2. The following are very speculative thoughts on possible positions of some of the protagonsits, based mainly on diplomatic contacts (who admit they have little to go on).

(a) Boumedienne is trying to build himself up as an Arab and third world leader, and also as one who has as free access to the Kremlin as Nasser. It is thought that he is not keen to be involved in an Arab Summit and (from an odd conversation between a Swedish diplomat and the Algerian Military Attaché) may be fairly realistic about the possibility of any major new military adventure. One would expect him to be fairly contemptuous of the Egyptian Army.

(b) Arer's position is puzzling. His own people at home are crying the loudest about boycott measures, in spite of Iraq's notable vulnerability. It may be that he would derive secret satisfaction from the weakening of the U.A.R. and sees a chance to establish himself as at any rate par inter primos while the present mood exists.

(c) One would expect Azhari to have the same secret satisfaction about the Egyptian defeat. He seems likely to be disposed to turn towards an Islamic rather than a Nasser-Nationalist solidarity against Israel. Both Aref and Azhari seem to have avoided picking us out as aggressors in their own pronouncements.

(d) The Russians were very quick to step in to support Nasser. My Greek colleague has a story there were signs of an Egyptian move to make contact with the Americans through the Tunisians immediately after the cease fire. But such signs as there are point to Russian unwillingness to build up an Arab aggressive potential, or to support any new Arab offensive against Israel. The Russian Ambassador, talking to the Canadian Ambassador, also seemed to reflect concern about the possibility of internal opposition to Nasser appearing. But every economic and political advantage is being sought from the present situation.

(e) The legalistic public stand of the Indians is not reflected by their Political Counsellor here, who seemed anxious about the Canal and impatient of Egyptian intransigeance about any accommodation with Israel. A press interview by the Indian Ambassador yesterday notably avoided political questions except in the most general and secular terms. He also, I understand, does not seem perturbed (as he was earlier reported to be) about Egypt's slipping into alignment, and his Counsellor spoke in much the same way.

(f) Syria: No evidence.

CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 6 SAVING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(g) U.A.R. The general impression in diplomatic circles seems to be that the Egyptians do want an Arab Summit, and Heikal's recent articles have supported this. But Nasser would probably want to be assured against a public humiliation and will therefore presumably want to do a great deal of ground work first. Perhaps the next step will be to turn the heat on the non-progressive Arabs. There is also an impression that while Nasser is in no way threatened with overthrow from within at the moment, he does not necessarily feel free to overrule his advisers of whom the pragmatic Mohieddin is probably the most influential.

3. This seems to add up to a phychological and political impossibility of aquitting the aggressors, of accepting negotiations with Israel or abandoning the thesis that the war is still on; but not necessarily to imply that the Arabs are very near to taking any effective decisions on action in the near future.

4. It would be normal for President Nasser to make a public speech on 22 July though only one paper has referred to it.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington, New York, Ottawa, Moscow, Paris, Delhi and to Arab posts as necessary.

Mr. Tesh Recd 24 July 1967

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SSSSS

Presse arabe

"Al-An'bâ" (officieux) -- 20 juillet 1967

Les chefs de la diplomatie de deux pays arabes frères : le ministre des affaires étrangères du Koweït et le secrétaire permanent du ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume d'Arabie séoudite, sont au Maroc depuis avant-hier.

Cette double visite a lieu en la période cruciale que traverse actuellement la nation arabe. Si cette conjoncture commande que l'on procède à des contacts directs et à des échanges de vue, elle exige aussi, en raison de sa fragilité et de sa précarité, que toute rencontre entre dirigeants arabes soit imbue d'un esprit de sincère fraternité et animée en même temps de ce réalisme grâce auquel les problèmes sont posés avec tout ce qu'ils comportent de bon et de mauvais, et étudiés en profondeur à la lumière des faits visibles et invisibles.

Les circonstances critiques que la nation arabe traverse en ce moment réclament une action inuette qui soit à même de placer le problème dans son véritable contexte, c'est-à-dire dans son cadre purement arabe, et d'embrasser parfaitement tous ses aspects politiques, économiques et militaires. Cette action doit se développer grâce à une réflexion sérieuse et mesurée, car il faut parfois savoir maîtriser ses sentiments, affronter froidement la situation et tenir le plus grand compte de tous ses éléments. Et cela est d'autant plus vrai que l'épreuve que la nation arabe vient de subir à mis clairement en évidence les éléments qui ont provoqué la tragédie et qui ont été causes de notre défaite.

Toute rencontre entre Arabes -- à quelque niveau qu'elle se déroule -- doit avoir avant tout pour objet d'étudier d'une manière approfondie les causes de la défaite. Elle ne doit pas hésiter à mettre objectivement et impartialement en évidence les erreurs passées afin de pouvoir les éviter à l'avenir. L'erreur est humaine et elle n'est peut-être pas blâmable en soi. Ce qui est tout à fait répréhensible, par contre, c'est de vouloir l'ignorer et de procéder à un dialogue sans en tenir compte.

Nous sommes certains que la peur et la terreur s'empareraient des ennemis de l'arabisme et de l'Islam s'ils voyaient les Arabes affronter ces erreurs avec le courage et le sang-froid dont ils sont coutumiers. En outre, ce n'est pas le moment de faire des discours et de se lamenter sur ce qui est passé. Comme on dit, le passé est mort et une page a été définitivement tournée. Si les événements de l'histoire ancienne continuent à nous fournir maintes occasions de méditation, ceux de l'histoire tout proche et très récente contiennent certainement des leçons plus utiles.

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This would appear to be designed for internal consumption, to counteract the impression that Morocco is forming a cabal of like-minded Arab countries.

JH
24/VII

Telles sont quelques-unes des vérités dont il importe de faire cas dans toute rencontre entre Arabes, en cette période difficile que nous vivons.

L'héritage laissé par la défaite est lourd à porter et il intéresse chaque Arabe individuellement. Pour liquider cet héritage, il nous faut conjuguer nos efforts car chaque arpent de terre arabe perdu pour un pays arabe, l'est aussi pour tous les Arabes. De même, la lutte pour récupérer cet arpent est un devoir qui incombe individuellement à chaque Arabe capable de la soutenir.

En conséquence, la position commune des Arabes doit se matérialiser en un seul et même bloc : celui de la nation arabe, qui s'étend de l'Atlantique au Golfe. Si certains porte-parole colonialistes s'empressent à la moindre occasion -- qu'ils créent parfois eux-mêmes -- de diviser le monde en deux camps, une pareille initiative doit être accueillie par des mises en garde et des blâmes et rejetée impitoyablement par les Arabes afin que, selon les termes d'un dicton marocain, ils ne façonnent pas, pour leur ennemis, une bague à la mesure de leur doigt.

Si ce sont là quelques-unes des vérités valables pour la politique arabe en général, ce sont elles qui constituent en tout cas les fondements de la politique de S.M. notre roi vénéré Hassan II. Ce sont elles qui dominent chacune des rencontres entre Arabes qui se déroulent au Maroc ou auxquelles notre pays participe. Grâce à ces principes fondamentaux, le Maroc, a pu, dès qu'il est devenu membre actif au sein de la Ligue, élever la cause arabe au-dessus de l'accessoire et la mettre à la place qui lui revient, c'es-à-dire en faire la cause de peuples, la cause de leur grandeur et de leur dignité et avant tout la cause de leur prestige. Car le prestige des Arabes constitue, lui aussi, une arme quasi invincible. Il est même le substrat de toutes les armes matérielles. Sans lui toutes ces armes matérielles auront toujours besoin d'un élément capital pour s'imposer.

En outre, il importe d'avoir une vue d'ensemble et générale des choses afin de pouvoir apprécier exactement les événements internationaux, de connaître les éléments favorables ou défavorables à la cause arabe et de savoir quels moyens les Arabes possèdent et ceux qui leur manquent.

Il y a quelques jours une agence officielle soviétique, l'agence Novosti, a publié un article sur la situation au Moyen-Orient. Cette agence n'a pas hésité à écrire que la politique arabe n'avait pas une appréciation exacte de la conjoncture internationale.

.../

Toutes ces choses-là, il convient, à l'heure actuelle, d'en tenir le plus grand compte, surtout à l'occasion des rencontres entre Arabes, car dans notre monde d'aujourd'hui, il ne suffit pas de démontrer le caractère légitime de ses droits ; il faut également déterminer les moyens par lesquels il est possible de les arracher. Parallèlement aux champs de bataille, il existe une guerre de propagande, une guerre de coulisses, une guerre économique, et chacune d'entre elles a les armes, les dispositifs et les terrains qui lui sont propres. Les Arabes doivent s'exercer à l'art de ces divers types de guerre, en collaborant entre eux et en harmonisant leurs efforts. Il faut, que dans leurs prises de position politiques, ils accordent leurs violons et n'émettent aucune fausse note, faute de quoi leurs discordances risquent de porter le plus grand tort à la cause arabe et d'être exploitées par les ennemis de l'arabisme qui ne manqueraient pas de sortir cette carte de leurs valises diplomatiques et de la jouer dans les coulisses des organisations internationales.

Mais tout est clair et limpide maintenant. La voie que doivent suivre les Arabes est toute tracée. Elle est droite et ne comporte aucune déviation. On voit ainsi l'importance de la responsablilité arabe dans ces circonstances difficiles.

Le Maroc, Roi et peuple, a estimé et estime à leur juste valeur ses responsabilités au sein du monde arabe. Il les assume ainsi que le lui dictent sa conscience arabe et l'intérêt supérieur de la Nation arabe dont la protection est la seule façon de récupérer ce qui a été usurpé, de recouvrer les droits perdus, de créer, le cas échéant, une force de frappe arabe, d'établir une coopération étroite qui assurera le bonheur des communautés arabes et relèvera rapidement leur niveau social et économique.

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PRODROME RABAT

21 July 1967

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Q. AUS 24.VII

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VERBATIM SERVICE 330/67 THURSDAY 20TH JULY 1967.

MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF.

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 20 JULY.

I WAS GRATEFUL FOR WHAT THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MEMBER FOR KINROSS AND WEST PERTHSHIRE (SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME) SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS SPEECH ABOUT THE LIE WHICH THE LEADERS OF ARAB NATIONS ARE PRETENDING TO BELIEVE. AS HE SAID, IT IS UNTRUE. THEY KNOW IT TO BE UNTRUE, AND IT IS TIME THAT SOME OF THEM HAD THE COURAGE TO STAND UP AND SAY THAT IT IS UNTRUE AND ARRANGE THEIR POLICIES ACCORDINGLY...''

IN THE MIDDLE EAST LET US DEAL WITH NATIONS AS GROWN-UP NATIONS, AND IN OUR POLICY WITH THEM ACCORDING TO THE WAY WE SEE IT. DO NOT LET US GO ON IDENTIFYING THOSE WHOM WE LIKE AND THOSE WHOM WE DO NOT LIKE AND USING EMOTIVE TERMS ABOUT THEM. IT DOES NO GOOD TO US OR TO THEM''

AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE EMERGENCY SESSION IS NOW DRAWING TO A CLOSE, AND AGAIN IT IS TRUE THAT THE DEBATE SHOWED A NOTABLY GROWING SENSE OF REALISM AMONG THE NATIONS AND THEIR DELEGATES. AS THE DEBATE PROGRESSED FROM WEEK TO WEEK IT SHOWED A WIDE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT IN ANALYSING A NUMBER OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS ON MATTERS LIKE HE NEED FOR A HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO BE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT DESPITE ALL THAT IT SEEMS LIKELY - AND TO SOME EXTENT I REGRET IT - THAT THE ASSEMBLY WILL NOW ADJOURN WITHOUT GIVING ANY FORMAL EXPRESSION OF OPINION OTHER THAN THE NEED - AND THIS IS IMPORTANT IN ITS WAY - NOT TO PREJUDICE THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM, AND ON THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO HELP REFUGEES. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST NOW TAKE THE PROBLEM BACK, TAKE UP ITS WORK AGAIN AND GET ON WITH THE TASK OF WORKING OUT ANSWERS TO THE DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS PROBLEMS, AND HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN THAT.

TELEX ◇ SERVICE ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

AS WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST IN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT PERHAPS I MIGHT TURN BRIEFLY, AS THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN DID, TO THE PERSIAN GULF AND SAY A WORD ABOUT THAT. THIS IS A DELICATE AREA WHERE WE HAVE BOTH MAJOR INTERESTS AND CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS. AS THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN POINTED OUT, AND AS THE HOUSE KNOWS, WE SHALL HAVE LEFT ADEN BY THE NEW YEAR.

WE HAVE DONE AND ARE DOING OUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT SOUTH ARABIA BEGINS ITS INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE IN CONDITIONS OF SECURITY, BUT IN THE PRESENT DISTURBED SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE MUST BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE GULF AREA FOR WHICH WE STILL HAVE TREATY RESPONSIBILITIES.

IT IS OUR LONG-TERM AIM TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THESE SMALL STATES CAN STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET. AT PRESENT THEY NEED OUR HELP AND WE PROPOSE TO KEEP SMALL FORCES THERE TO MEET OUR OBLIGATIONS.

I WOULD LIKE TO CORRECT ONE WIDESPREAD MISAPPREHENSION. OUR FORCES ARE NOT IN THE PERSIAN GULF SIMPLY TO PROTECT OUR OIL INTERESTS AS SUCH, BUT TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THE AREA. MANY OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE GULF HAVE UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON EACH OTHER. THE HOUSE WILL REMEMBER THAT IN NINETEENSIXTYONE THERE WAS A THREAT TO KUWAIT FROM IRAQ. IF WE WERE TO PULL OUT AT ONCE WE COULD ONLY EXPECT THESE OLD CLAIMS TO COME TO THE SURFACE, AND THE STABILITY OF THE GULF WOULD THEREBY BE PUT AT RISK.

MR JOHN LEE (READING): MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND SAYS THAT OUR FORCES ARE THERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF HELPING TO DELIMIT FRONTIER DISPUTES. BEARING IN MIND THE FACT THAT MOST OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF HAVE NEVER HAD RECOGNISED FRONTIERS, DOES MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND MEAN THAT WE CAN CARRY OUT A CADASTRAL SURVEY AND COMPLETE THIS TASK IN THE SHORT TIME THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO BE THERE?

MR. BROWN: NO, BUT KNOWING THE AREA PERSONALLY, AS I DO, I AM CERTAIN THAT BY BEING THERE FOR THE TIME BEING - IN THE WAY IN WHICH WE ARE - WE ARE HELPING TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN THE PERIOD OF CARRY-OVER DURING WHICH PEOPLE CAN LEARN TO LIVE WITH EACH OTHER AND PERHAPS CARRY OUT THEIR OWN CADASTRAL SURVEY.

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SE

MR. JAMES DAVIDSON (ABERDEENSHIRE, WEST): THE QUESTION OF OUR TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF IS FREQUENTLY RAISED, BUT AS FAR AS I CAN ASCERTAIN THEY ARE LIMITED TO A TREATY DATING BACK OVER ONE HUNDRED YEARS, BY WHICH WE ARE OBLIGED TO PREVENT SLAVE TRADING IN THE GULF. BEYOND THAT WE HAVE NO TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA.

MR. BROWN: MAY I ANSWER FOR THE GOVERNMENT? I AM GRATEFUL TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN FOR TRYING TO HELP, BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS USEFUL. THE HONOURABLE MEMBER IS WRONG IN WHAT HE SAYS . THERE ARE OTHER TREATIES, EXCHANGES OF LETTERS AND VARIOUS MATTERS OF THAT KIND. WE CERTAINLY HAVE OBLIGATIONS THERE.

BUT THE REAL POINT IS NOT THAT, SO MUCH AS THE FACT THAT I BELIEVE THAT AT THE MOMENT, BY MAINTAINING WHAT WE ARE DOING THERE WE ARE DOING BETTER THAN WE WOULD BY GETTING OUT, IF WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF STABILITY, SECURITY AND A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO A DIFFERENT ORDER, WHEN THESE COUNTRIES CAN STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET.

SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME: BEFORE THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN SITS DOWN, MAY I ASK WHETHER HE HAS READ ACCOUNTS THAT EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS IN SAN'A ARE SAYING THAT IF THE ROYALIST GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CAPITULATE, VILLAGES IN THE YEMEN WILL BE BOMBED WITH GAS? IS NOT THIS AN OCCASION ON WHICH THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN MUST TAKE AN INITIATIVE IN THE MATTER?

MR. BROWN: I HAVE READ THE REPORTS, BUT, AS I SAID TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEBATE THE OTHER DAY, THIS IS A MATTER IN WHICH THE INITIATIVE OUGHT TO BE TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE COUNTRY ON WHOSE TERRITORY IT IS HAPPENING. (HONOURABLE MEMBERS: ''WHY?'') HONOURABLE MEMBERS CAN CONTEST THAT WITH ME, BUT I TAKE THE VIEW THAT THAT IS THE RIGHT WAY IN WHICH TO APPROACH IT. I DO NOT THINK THAT I WOULD HELP BY MYSELF RAISING IT OR GETTING IT RAISED ON OUR INITIATIVE.''

END VERBATIM SERVICE 330/67 L P S.

PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

~~Cypher~~ ~~code~~ en clair

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. ASIDE 331 of 20 July, 1967.

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 331 of 20 July.

Considerable coverage being given in Moroccan Press to an article on the Middle East from Novosti News Agency which says inter alia:-

> " Les arabes prétendent dans leurs malheurs- que des avions impérialistes americains et britanniques ont aidé les Israeliens alors que les pays arabes ont été abandonnés à leur sort.
>
> L'Union Sovietique sait, depuis toujours, que cela ne correspond pas à la reálité."

2. Published extracts follow in tomorrow's bag.

HOLLIDAY

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

LE PETIT MAROCAIN - THURSDAY 20 JULY

Arab-Israel conflict

N.D.L.R. — L'agence M.A.P. a reçu —sous pli de Moscou, un article consacré entièrement par l'agence officielle « Novosti » aux événements du Moyen-Orient, et à la position officielle soviétique quant au problème palestinien, expliquée, commentée et détaillée pour la première fois depuis le début du conflit. Vue l'importance de cet article et de la prise de position qu'il contient l'agence M.A.P. a jugé opportun d'en donner les larges extraits que l'on va lire.

RABAT, 19 juillet (M.A.P.). — L'agence soviétique « Novosti » après avoir rappelé en préambule les événements douloureux qu'a connus le Moyen-Orient à la suite de l'agression sioniste, et que l'Union soviétique prend en considération le bien-fondé des revendications arabes, rappelle que l'URSS avait déclaré à maintes reprises qu'elle n'interviendrait dans une guerre entre les Arabes et Israël que si elle était persuadée d'une intervention effective des Etats-Unis pour soutenir l'Etat sioniste.

« Les Arabes prétendent — dans leurs malheurs — que des avions impérialistes américains et britanniques ont aidé les Israéliens alors que les pays arabes ont été abandonnés à leur sort.

« L'Union soviétique sait, depuis toujours, que cela ne correspond pas à la réalité. Il ne fait aucun doute que si les allégations arabes étaient fondées, les mesures qui s'imposent auraient été prises. Cela explique pourquoi l'Union soviétique n'a pas repris à son compte les allégations arabes concernant la participation des Etats-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne dans cette guerre. L'expérience a prouvé que les allégations de ce genre, qui ne reposent sur aucun fondement, se retournent fatalement contre ceux qui en sont leurs auteurs. Dans certains milieux, on rapporte que la R.A.U. et la Jordanie ont inventé cette accusation afin d'atténuer l'humiliation que ne peuvent que ressentir ces deux pays à la suite de la défaite.

« L'Union soviétique a déployé tous ces efforts jusqu'aux dernières minutes avant le déclenchement de la guerre afin d'inciter le président Nasser de ne pas persévérer dans ses provocations contre Israël et de ne pas prendre l'initiative de la guerre et ce, parce que l'URSS a toujours clamé qu'à notre époque, on ne peut résoudre des problèmes par la force. »

Politique soviétique : « Chaque peuple a le droit de créer un Etat indépendant »

L'agence soviétique rappelle ensuite le discours prononcé par Alexis Kossyguine devant l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies et au cours duquel il a rappelé les principes fondamentaux de la politique soviétique, à savoir « le droit de chaque peuple de créer un Etat indépendant propre. » Il a ajouté que la position soviétique n'a guère changé depuis qu'elle a voté en 1947 en faveur de la décision des Nations Unies relative à la création de l'Etat d'Israël. Si donc nous revenons en arrière, aux événements des dernières semaines, nous sommes convaincus que les leaders arabes clairvoyants considèrent qu'Israël à lui seul ne constitue pas un danger ou une menace pour le peuple arabe. C'est plutôt le colonialisme occidental qui a incité Israël à entreprendre une agression traîtresse contre les pays arabes, et c'est ce même colonialisme occidental qui entreprend actuellement d'encourager les visées expansionnistes de cet Etat. »

L'agence « Novotsi » fait état ensuite d'accusation qui ont été lancées par certains pays arabes, laissant entendre que l'Union soviétique a abandonné les Arabes à leur sort, accusations qui ont été exploitées par des pays occidentaux opportunistes afin de troubler les relations arabo-soviétiques.

« L'Union soviétique veut ignorer ces accusations dont elle ne tient pas compte et n'accorde aucun crédit aux allégations et aux insinuations de la République arabe unie.

« Il n'est pas raisonnable du tout que les leaders de la R.A.U. oublient dans ces circonstances la dette énorme contractée auprès de l'Union soviétique qui les a soutenus résolument pendant de longues années.

« L'Union soviétique n'a-t-elle pas pris à son compte d'équiper entièrement les forces armées égyptiennes ? Il est impossible que les leaders arabes aient oublié les chars, les véhicules blindés, l'artillerie, les fusées, les avions et les navires de guerre dont elle les a dotés au cours des dernières années, livraisons qui ont été parfois prélevées sur les besoins propres de l'Union soviétique et qui constituent un armement des plus modernes.

Gaspillage

Abordant ensuite la question du passage de bâtiments soviétiques à travers le Bosphore, l'agence « Novosti » ajoute : « Il est regrettable qu'un autre facteur de la défaite arabe ait eu pour origine un malentendu : le passage des navires de guerre soviétiques par le Bosphore a été interprété par les leaders arabes comme des préparatifs pour un éventuel affrontement avec la 6e Flotte américaine en vue de défendre les Arabes. Or, le passage de la flotte de la mer Noire soviétique par le Bosphore entre dans le cadre de manœuvres navales annuelles. Il est donc très regrettable que les leaders arabes y aient attaché une grande importance. L'Union soviétique a fait preuve de sa magnanimité mais elle s'étonne qu'il n'existe presque pas un leader arabe, y inclus le président Nasser, qui ait compris que le gouvernement soviétique a le droit de dénoncer le gaspillage énorme d'un potentiel militaire qui a nécessité d'énormes dépenses.

La liste des avions qui ont été détruits au sol — du fait que le commandement suprême de la République arabe unie n'a pas pris les dispositions mettant l'aviation en constant état d'alerte — des chars, de l'artillerie lourde, qui a été détruite ou abandonnée dans le désert du Sinaï, fait que l'Union soviétique agisse avec prudence dans l'exécution des projets entrant dans le cadre de l'assistance étrangère. En outre, l'aide militaire soviétique à la R.A.U sera à l'avenir fonction, bien entendu, de l'éloignement des éléments qui sont à l'origine de la défaite égyptienne.

« Quoi qu'il en soit, l'Union soviétique considère qu'il n'y a aucun intérêt que les Arabes continuent à justifier leur défaite par des reproches inconsidérés. Elle considère qu'il faut plutôt reconnaître et tirer la leçon de cette défaite et de ses conséquences, et de la transformer à leur avantage pour l'avenir et pour la reconstruction nécessaire à laquelle doit faire face le monde arabe. »

Pourquoi donc, s'interroge « Novosti », les choses n'ont pas tourné en faveur des Arabes ? Parmi les causes de la défaite arabe citons que la plupart des soldats étaient des paysans non initiés, qui ont vécu toute leur existence dans les légendes islamiques réactionnaires et ne possèdent pas, la plupart du temps, l'expérience des armes modernes.

« Les Arabes n'étaient pas préparés psychologiquement et matériellement à la guerre moderne ; sans compter qu'un autre facteur important a contribué à la défaite arabe : les faux renseignements recueillis par les services d'espionnage de la R.A.U. Car, en dépit des mises en garde soviétique, les services de renseignements égyptiens ont convaincu leur gouvernement que, le moment venu, une guerre contre Israël ne peut qu'aboutir à la victoire arabe »

Avenir des relations soviéto-arabes

L'agence « Novosti » s'en prend ensuite à la Chine populaire qu'elle accuse de répandre toutes sortes de calomnies sur son compte, notamment, en affirmant que l'Union soviétique était de connivence avec l'impérialisme américain et britannique.

« ...Les combattants yéménites et palestiniens — abandonnés actuellement aux caprices du sort, conséquences des pertes militaires graves de la R.A.U. — ont découvert que la Chine populaire attend impatiemment de leur imposer son dictat, sous forme d'assistance ».

Se prononçant sur l'avenir des relations soviéto-arabes, l'agence soviétique déclare :

« Il n'est un secret pour personne que l'Union soviétique a considéré Nasser pendant de longues années comme l'un des plus éminentes personnalités du mouvement de libération nationale dans le monde, l'ayant encouragé résolument à prendre le leadership du monde arabe. Nasser était l'astre éclairant le monde arabe et indiquant aux peuples le moyen d'échapper à l'emprise colonialiste et du sous-développement. Nasser était, avec l'approbation de l'Union soviétique, l'homme qui a fait de la République arabe unie un pays à l'avant-garde des pays arabes, en suivant une voie de développement indépendante, non capitaliste. Mais la R.A.U. doit, après cette défaite, vivre une période d'auto-critique et réévaluer son énergie. »

« Novosti » évoque en conclusion la visite à Moscou du président Boumedienne soulignant que des rumeurs avaient laissé entendre que le président algérien effectuait cette visite pour exprimer aux dirigeants soviétiques la « déception des Arabes et leur colère à l'égard de ce que l'on a appelé, une attitude négative de l'URSS. En fait, la visite du président Boumedienne était plutôt empreinte de franchise et de cordialité, ce qui prouve une fois de plus la solidité des liens d'amitié soviéto-arabes.

« Il faut voir les problèmes auquel fait face le monde arabe d'une manière objective, et à la lumière des événements récents, afin que de la défaite subie par la R.A.U émerge un peuple arabe socialiste nouveau et unifié qui constituera une grande puissance, impossible à soumettre par une agression colonialiste et israélienne ».

Wow!

Could you get a complete text from MAP?

21/6/67

MAP phoned me up proudly about this article & made sure I had seen it!

2. They have sent a full text in French (only in Arabic) but I am trying to get one from Novosti here.

20 July '67

HE

I should like to see it

1076

SAVING TELEGRAM.

FROM TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE No. 10.

By Bag.
Confidential.
En Clair.

Sir D. Wright.

20 July, 1967.

Saving to:-

Ankara No. 13.
Kuwait No. 6.
Washington No. 17.
Amman No. 9.
UKMIS New York No. 8.
Tel Aviv No. 5.
Bahrain No. 11
Moscow No. 5.
Paris No. 3.
Rabat,
Khartoum,
Tunis.
Beirut No. 18.
Rawalpindi No. 9.
Algiers.
Tripoli.

Your telegram No. 1200 /of 27 June/: Iran, the Soviet Union and the Middle East.

In the course of a general conversation with the Iranian Prime Minister on 17 July (two days before his departure on an official visit to Moscow), I told him that I thought it would be useful if the Iranian Government could keep in touch with the Soviet Government on the Middle East situation, and made to him the points in your telegram under reference. These seemed to be very much in line with Mr. Hoveyda's own thinking. He told me that he had discussed the subject with the Shah a few days previously, and emphasised that in the Iranian view it was essential that Israel be recognised by the Arabs and that a permanent peace settlement be reached. He also made the point that the Soviet Government had been among the first to recognise Israel.

2. The Shah himself is still on holiday in the Caspian area.

A2S 3.VIII

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY -1 AUG 1967

London Press Service
Verbatim Service

verbatim service 329/67 thursday 20th july 1967.

suez canal.

following is text of prime minister's reply and supplementaries to parliamentary question in the house of commons on 20th july.

mr. neil marten asked the prime minister, what consultations proposes to have with leaders of other countries about the suez canal: and if he will make a statement.

prime minister: i have nothing to add to the information my right honourable friend the foreign secretary and i have already given to the house on this subject.

mr. marten: does the right honourable gentleman recall the foreign secretary saying that we must wait until the political conditions are created before the canal can be cleared? how long are we prepared to wait? would the prime minister not consider trying at least to get the southern end below the bitter lakes clear so that the trapped ships can get out?

the prime minister: we all want it to be cleared as quickly as possible but those on the spot are taking no action to clear it until there is certain political action in the shape at any rate of a partial withdrawal. while we are using all our influence at the united nations and elsewhere with the countries concerned to get this, there is nothing else that can be done in these circumstances. certainly physical action by britain would be disastrous, as it was the last time.

mr. ogden: does my right honourable friend, who is a member for a merseyside constituency, confirm that the shipping authorities of this country have made long-term plans to deal with the situation and that if the suez canal were opened now it would not mean great changes in our shipping arrangements?

the prime minister: certainly not in the immediate industries future. the british shipping industry, other western shipping and the oil industry have shown flexibility and adaptibility in dealing with the situation. nevertheless all of us want to see the canal opened as quickly as possible.

sir ian orr-ewing: is it not true that britain as a maritime nation has the greatest interest in the flow of shipping through this international waterway, as the prime minister was so anxious to take a lead with the maritime nations in opening the straits of tiran, why is he not more robust in getting the suez canal open, which otherwise may remain closed for five years?

the prime minister: it is a fact that we have a very leading part in the use of the canal. i think the actual figures show that liberian tonnage is ahead of british tonnage, but a fair amount of that is probably on charter for the supply of oil and other things to britain. i have said what the problem is. it is all very well talking about being robust. the honourable gentleman and his honourable friends were robust ten years ago. it did not get the canal open.

mr. shinwell: is my right honourable friend aware that nobody in this house or outside it can expect that physical action will be taken by the government? nobody is asking for that, for a gunboat or anything else. but is my right honourable friend aware that his right honourable friend the other day said that he was trying? could we have some indication whether any protest has been made by our representative at the united nations about this?

the prime minister: we have had discussions with everyone concerned with this matter at the united nations, including of course, the egyptians who are very much involved, and the israelis and other countries too. it would not be helpful towards getting the objective that we all have in mind by publishing protests or making ringing declarations about this. the important thing is to try to get the situation settled so that the canal can be opened.

ends verbatim service 329/67 1 p s.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

21 July, 1967.

.....

Further to our telegram No. 331 of 20 July, I enclose a cutting from Le Petit Marocain of extracts from a Novosti Article on the Events of the Middle East which the Maghreb Arabe Presse say they have given full coverage to, and which have caused quite a sensation locally.

2. We are trying to obtain a copy of the full text which M.A.P. tell me runs into 17 or 18 pages and is available to them in Arabic only; but meantime I have no doubt that the enclosed condensed version can be put to good use by the B.B.C. and others. It may well be of course that the article has already come to your notice from other sources.

(A. S. M. Marshall)

B.R. Pridham, Esq,
J.I.P.G.D.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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TELEX ◇ SERVICE TEL

1076

PRODROME RABAT
RODROME RABAT

CENTROFORM LDN

VERBATIM SERVICE 335/67 FRIDAY 21ST JULY 1967

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DENIAL OF AIRCRAFT DEAL
WITH ISRAEL

REPORT APPEARS IN THE LONDON EVENING NEWS TODAY FRIDAY JULY 21 (A
THAT AN ISRAELI MISSION IS IN LONDON TO DISCUSS NEW AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND TO NEGOTIATE THE PURCHASE OF LIGHTNING AIRCRAFT).

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TODAY FRIDAY: ''THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THE STORY THAT ISRAELI OFFICIALS ARE IN LONDON FOR TALKS OVER THE SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS AT ALL.''

ENDS VERBATIM SERVICE 335/67 L P S
U
PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

I have tagged this onto the Weekly Bulletin
24 July 1967

24/VII
24/7
25.VII

1076

u/n Rabat

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

AZS 1.VIII
OS
10 P 7/8

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 18 Saving 21 July 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 18 Saving of 21 July And to certain other FO/CO/ Posts.

Middle East Talking Points. 21 July 1967.

"There is no point in concealing, Arab journalists told us, that some of the military leaders in the UAR regard socio-economic changes as the end of their own privileges, as an axe which would chop down that branch of material well-being om which they had once sat, in the field of trade and industry, or in the field of land ownership. And if the first task of the Israeli aggressors and their imperialist inspirers was the overthrow of the progressive regimes in the UAR and in Syria, was not this similarly a task of internal Arab reaction, representatives of which undoubtedly were to be found in the armed forces?" - Izvestiya article, 13 July.

2. "Our people fully respect all the peoples of the world, including the Jewish people, a people with an ancient culture. We support the right of every nation to form its own independent State."- Moscow's "Radio Peace and Progress", in English for Asia, 13 July.

3. "The Arab States consist of two groups these days. One group possesses sufficient manpower while the other possesses the power and prestige of money ... If the three front-line countries (the UAR, Jordan and Syria) should one day collapse, can any Arab country consider itself safe from the usurpation of its riches and territory? This is the gloomy fact with which we must resolve to live until we can achieve a life of safety with honour. This cannot be achieved unless the moneyed Arabs meet their responsibilities just as the manpower rich Arabs are meeting theirs." The Jordanian paper Al-Difa, quoted by Amman Radio, 16 July.

4. Bayda Radio of Libya on 14 July quoted local newspaper comment on a "Voice of the Arabs" broadcast about a strike of oil workers in Benghazi. One paper said: "Why is Libya singled out as the target of the campaign of the 'Voice of the Arabs'? The Libyan people are sacrificing more than 80 per cent of their national income in the interests of Arab honour. Their honourable attitude should not be slandered in this manner ... Instead of good words encouraging them, the Libyan people find themselves in the dock."

5. "On the first day of the war Egyptian propaganda proudly announce that 70 Isareli planes had been shot down, but failed to mention its own losses. At the same time Israeli propaganda cleverly decided not to reveal either successes or losses. This helped to create a wrong idea of the course of the operations, and as a result four days later many friends of the Arabs in this country received a shock when hearing the truth about the Arab defeat. The decisive fact seems to have been that the Egyptian Air Force was

/practically

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 28 JUL 1967

practically annihilated during the first three hours of the war." From an article on "Propaganda and Truth" in the Yugoslav literary magazine, Telegram, 30 June.

6. "Soviet foreign aid is not meant to safeguard the national independence of the recipient countries but to control them and bind their hands. In a word ... it is an instrument of the Soviet revisionists for promoting neo-colonialism - expansion and infiltration, domination and interference - in the Afro-Asian countries. This is their aim in their 'aid' both to the Arab countries and to other Afro-Asian countries." Peking People's Daily, 15 July.

7. "The fact has become clear that a political policy aimed at an economic boycott of the Americans and the British cannot be effective, in spite of the fact that some people advised it in a hurry." - From the Bulgarian weekly review, Pogled, 26 June.

8. "The Socialist countries are not demanding anything from anyone on behalf of the Arabs that would not accord with the UN Charter ... Nor do they question the existence of the State of Israel." - Belgrade Radio, 13 July.

9. Saudi Arabia's Jiddah Radio said on 16 July that "the contradictions in inter-Arab relations unfortunately continue to present a sorry picture of disarray." The Cairo Press was quite reasonable and moderate in advocating an Arab summit meeting, but the official attitude was different. It was difficult to reconcile the advocacy of a united stand and an Arab summit with "the talks held in Cairo, from which eight Arab States were excluded, although each is responsible for every inch of the great Arab homeland."

10. The Iraqi Acting Minister of Finance states that it has been decided not to grant any authorisation for imports from Rumania, having regard to its hostile attitude towards the Arab peoples. The Ministry of Economy has prepared a memorandum, to be submitted to the Council of Ministers at their next meeting, on breaking economic relations with Rumania. A similar memorandum has been prepared to be submitted to the Arab League, asking for Rumania to be included in the boycott resolutions passed by the Arab States against America, Britain and West Germany. - Cairo Radio in Arabic, 10 July.

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
J.I.P.G.D.

NNNNN

E.R. 1/5. No. 82 ARRIVING TO Rabat

RESTRICTED

1076

Cypher/Cat. A

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 740 22 July 1967

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 740 of 22 July
Repeated for information Saving to UKMission New York, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis.

Heikals article of 21 July/continued theme of its predecessor (my telegram No. 700) but slightly more in favour of Arab Summit and much less critical of Saudi Arabia and other laggards (no (repeat no) reference to King Feisal by name). It is also explanatory and mildly apologetic about preliminary top level meetings appearing to shut out some of the brethren. Emphasis on importance of results and widening the base of the battle; and to the idea that an openly held summit would make it easier for peoples to put pressure on their Governments. Further reference to internal division in Arab world and isolation of the disloyal if summit fails.

2. Finally he reverts to theme of 30 June (my telegram No. 619) that world Press had been biased against Arabs and that "we must either isolate ourselves more from the outside world or try to open up and reconsider our relations with the others and handle our case differently. I favour the latter regardless of all the difficulties and pains it involves". The United States was living in an isolation of this kind because of her stand on Viet Nam.

F.O. pass Saving UKMis New York 10, Washington 14, Paris 19, Moscow 22 and Unnumbered to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 1015Z/22 July 1967
Recd 1400Z/22 July 1967

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Dept.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 28 JUL 1967

SSSSS

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1076

FM TEL. No. 83 SAVING TO Rabat

RESTRICTED

Cypher/Cat. A

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 741 22 July 1967

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 741 of 22 July
Repeated for information to Moscow, Kuwait
and Saving to Washington, UKMission New York, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis.

Arab-Israel.

Official Ahram today quoted Kuwait Minister of Foreign Affairs as saying here that: "an Arab Summit has become more than a necessity ... we must not (repeat not) listen to poisonous propaganda seeking to sow discord among the Arabs ... Kuwait is wholly ready to employ all its resources when the Arab situation calls for it, even to the extent of stopping oil completely".

2. Kuwait Minister of Finance and Petroleum, who left yesterday for Moscow with a Kuwaiti Petroleum Delegation, is quoted by Ahram as saying that his talks with U.S.S.R. would touch on vast cooperation in Kuwait's rich deposits, "especially as we have several big projects estimated to cost millions of pounds over the years". The battle with Israeli colonialism demanded the strengthening of collaboration with the Arab's friends, beginning with the U.S.S.R.

F.O. pass Moscow 21, Kuwait 9 and Saving to Washington 15, UKMis New York 11 and Unnumbered to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 1015Z/22 July 1967
Recd 1400Z/22 July 1967

[Repetition to Moscow referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

N.E.A.D.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 28 JUL 1967

SSSSS

RESTRICTED

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

~~Cypher~~ ~~code~~ en clair

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 336 of 24 July, 1967.

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 336 of 24 July.

My telegram No. 331.

Soviet Embassy here have issued a denial saying Novosti News Agency article is a fake distributed in certain countries including Morocco.

HOLLIDAY

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

1076.

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO Rabat.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. Tel No 402

[Date] 24 July

D M

R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

RESTRICTED.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDRESSED TO F O TELNO 401 OF 24 JUNE REPEATED

FOR INFORMATION TO ARAB POSTS WASHINGTON AND

UKMIS NEW YORK.

ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS ANNOUNCED THAT

ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING WILL BE CONVENED

IN KHARTOUM ON 1 AUGUST. OSMAN OEL HADARI.

SUDANESE EMBASSADOR IN CAIRO. WILL CONVEY

INVITATIONS PERSONALLY TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF

TUNISIA MOROCCO AND IRAQ AND IT IS BEING SAID

THAT HASSAN MAHGOUB. MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

(AN IMAM~S MAN) WILL DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO KING

FEISAL.

2. HOPEFUL STATEMENTS ARE CIRCULATING IN THE

PRESS THAT THIS MEETING WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR

A FULL DRESS SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN KHARTOUM.

F O PASS TO ARAB POSTS U/N. SOSFA,

DISTRIBUTION

A.L. Scanlon 26.VII.

d.o. [illegible] 26/7/1967

H. [illegible] 26/7/1967

H.E.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

26/VII

1076

RESTRICTED

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

25 July, 1967.

Faked Novosti News Agency Message

..... Further to our telegram Aside No. 331 of 20 July, 1967, I enclose, to complete the story, a copy of a M.A.P. item carrying the Soviet Embassy's démenti, a cutting from L'Opinion on the subject, and a summarised ..... translation of what Al Maas had to say about it.

..... 2. It is typical of the incoherency of Al Maas that in the same breath it derides other newspapers for having been taken in by the article, and then goes on to suggest that it was in fact authentic!

3. Whatever the truth of it all, there seem to be plenty of people around town who, like Al Maas are convinced that the whole thing was staged by the Russians. Once again it is a question of people believing what they want to believe, and this time we have nothing to lose by it.

(A. S. M. Marshall)

B. R. Pridham, Esq.,
Joint Information Policy & Guidance
Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

REVIEW OF THE PRESS.

British Embassy, Rabat,
July 24, 1967.

Al Massaa (Independent) No. 322 of 23 & 24/7/1967.

A. Headlines.

1. "Scandal of the Week". "Which Embassy was it which distributed the NOVOSTY communiqué?" (3 col.)

2. "Our correspondent in Berlin says, "Emigration to Israel is occupying the Germans". (4 col.)

3. "Three conditions for the convening of an Arab Summit Conference". (3 col.)

4. "Will World Intelligence help Tshombé to escape?"(1 col.)

B. Main News Items.

German

1. The only/paper which exposed Israel's brutal and atrocious crimes was the organ of the German Socialist National Party which said that Israel's crimes in Sinai were comparable to those committed by Hitler against Jews during the Second World War.

2. The paper's correspondent in Berlin tells of the tremendous activity Zionist organisations were making in Berlin to encourage Jews to emigrate to Israel to replace the ejected Arabs. The German press is making also an extensive propagenda in favour of this campaign.

3. Relates the history of the usurpation of Palestine, which started with the birth of the world Zionist movement.

C. Special News Items.

1. Three trade union leaders from Cairo, Damascus and Khartoum attended a trade union conference held in Algeria for demanding the release of Mahjoub Ben Seddik.

2. Abderrazzaq, assistant of Mahjoub Ben Seddik, was seen at the Reception given by the Polish Embassy on the occasion of the Polish National Day.

3. Egypt's new Minister for War, Amin Huwaidi, was formerly Egyptian Ambassador in Rabat.

4. Albania is following Communist China's example and is accusing the Soviet Union of deceiving Arabs by not giving them the promised help during their recent war with Israel.

5. Al Massaa's political editor has learnt that Ismail Azhari will soon arrive on an official mission in Morocco entrusted to him by the semi-Arab Conference recently held in Cairo. He has undertaken to contact Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia for the preparation of the Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting while the Iraqi President has been charged with the same mission in Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and the Gulf States. The two Heads of State will convey to the above countries the three conditions for the convening of a general Arab Summit Conference, namely (1) That the Foreign Ministers be given a full authorisation by their respective Governments to take resolutions, abide by these resolutions and execute them; (2) The break off of diplomati

relations/

relations with America and Britain on the grounds of their participation in the aggression against Arabs; (3) The boycott of America and Britain in the petrol field on condition that this be complete and done by all notwithstanding the sacrifice involved; and the withdrawal of funds deposited in Western Banks.

Failure or success of the Arab Summit will depend on agreement to the above conditions. Evidence of obstacles in its way has started to be detected in Tunis.

6. Ahmed Taiebi Benhima, Morocco's Permanent Delegate to U.N.O., arrived in Rabat during the week end, coming from New York.

D. Comment.

A

1. Says that the scandal of the week first started when Le Petit Marocain, as usual, published a communiqué conducive to the demoralisation of Arabs, and which detracts from the importance of Soviet-Arab relations. This communiqué was attributed to the Soviet NOVOSTI. Al Anbaa, in turn, was not lacking in intelligence and reproduced the same document. This gave rise to the scandal. Telegrams were exchanged and the Soviet Embassy Press Office issued a dementi which referred to the base attacks made in the above two papers against Arab and Islamic peoples and said that the purpose was to frustrate the efforts made for the promotion of peace and the termination of Israeli aggression. The Soviet Press Attaché praised the national press which was not deceived by the manoeuvre.

Wondering who might have circulated the communiqué, hints that, inasmuch as it stated an actual fact as the Soviet fleet had remained inactive during the aggression, it is not unlikely that the NOVOSTY communiqué was not a farce but was allowed to appear and, after having done its part, there was no harm in allowing the Soviet Press attaché to deny its truth so long as this is merely verbal - real falsification lying in what is being done in the Canal. Moreover, Intelligence Services seem to have studied the position well and learnt what the Soviets had said to Arab delegates, to Boumedienne, and to Aref, and circulated this knowledge in the name of NOVOSTY... after Boumedienne had returned to Algiers. Otherwise it would have been very difficult to publish such a communiqué in a capital like Algiers where the press is under State control... As for the communiqué and its contents, they will be discussed in a coming number.

B

1076

L'OPINION - SUNDAY/MONDAY 23/24 JULY

DANS LES AMBASSADES

POISSON DE JUILLET...

D'habitude, depuis la crise du Moyen-Orient, dans les réceptions diplomatiques, on ne parle que des « acrobaties » de la diplomatie internationale quant à trouver une solution aux problèmes posés par l'agression des hordes sionistes, et des « coups de ciseaux » de la diplomatie impérialiste quant à mettre les Arabes devant le fait accompli.

Donc, la tradition dans les réceptions, depuis la perpétration du crime sioniste contre l'Egypte, la Jordanie et la Syrie, veut que l'on ne parle, le plus souvent, que du Moyen-Orient.

Cependant, vendredi soir, lors de la réception donnée par Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Pologne, à La Tour Hassan, et dont nous parlons par ailleurs, dans cette même page, toutes les discussions tournaient pratiquement sur un même sujet: l'article de l'Agence de Presse Novosti relatif aux événements du Moyen-Orient.

Cet article que l'Agence Maghreb Arabe Presse dit avoir « reçu sous pli de Moscou » et qu'elle a diffusé dans la soirée du 19 juillet, a été... vite repris par le journal colonialiste « Le Petit Marocain ». L'organe « Mas » avait « sauté » sur l'occasion. Il faut le comprendre... Par contre, la presse nationale n'a pas été dupée, à l'exception du journal gouvernemental « Al-Anba »...

L'article que « Le Petit Marocain » a publié dans son édition du 20 juillet avait été annoncé dans sa page « une » sous le titre : « **Pour la première fois depuis les événements du Moyen-Orient, l'Agence soviétique Novosty prend position** ». En page « trois », sur 4 colonnes et sous le titre: « **Dans une mise au point de l'Agence soviétique Novosti, l'U.R.S.S. rappelle qu'elle avait dissuadé Nasser d'entrer en conflit avec « Israël »**, le journal pro-sioniste publie les détails.

On savait, depuis vendredi matin, que l'article en question est un faux qui n'a jamais été l'œuvre de l'Agence Novosti qui, il faut le souligner, est plutôt spécialisée dans les informations culturelles et scientifiques.

Dans une mise au point, l'Agence Novosti, en substance, « **dément catégoriquement ce matériel fabriqué par les ennemis de l'amitié soviéto-arabe. Elle est persuadée que cette manœuvre calomnieuse, comme d'ailleurs toutes les autres, échouera.** »

Il n'est pas sans intérêt de signaler qu'il y a eu des précédents précis dans le genre.

Le monde se rappelle qu'il y a quelques temps de faux numéros du journal français « L'Humanité » avaient été publiés; leur contenu, évidemment, était on ne peut plus bizarre. En peu de mots, on avait fait « écrire » à « L'Humanité » ce qu'il n'avait pas l'habitude d'écrire.

Le monde et particulièrement ceux qui suivaient de près la guerre de libération algérienne n'avaient pas manqué de tomber sur des numéros d' « Al-Moujahid » non édités par les responsables du Front de Libération-Nationale.

Ces numéros étaient également des faux.

L'affaire Novosti fera encore, sans doute, couler beaucoup d'encre.

We has letter report (by bag)
ref. our report of the original
item.

I.O.

24/VII

Draft for /3

TELEGRAPHIC SERVICE ◇ XEROX

PRODROME RABAT

2. OP [redacted]AT MOMV MERCI

[redacted]NTROFORM LDN

PRODROME RABAT

VERBATIM SERVICE 340/67 UESDAY 25TH JULY 1967

In the emotional atmosphere following defeat in the field and defeat in the U.N., Arms Embargo is not, I would say, a subject to appeal at the moment to the Arabs who, in their emotional elements at any rate, see their only hope in re-arming for a fight to the finish. 1076

Amemiaireur 27 July 1967

As regards Morocco, don't let too sure: remember King Hassan's initiative (re Algeria) on arms limitation in the Maghreb. We should put out A to B

Included in Review 27/7/67

MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL

A/

FOLLOWING TEXT OF REPLY [AND SUPPLEMENTARIES] BY PRIME MINISTER TO PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION(S) ON JULY 25

MR ERIC MOONMAN ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER, WHETHER HE WILL CONSIDER THE DESIRABILITY OF CONVENING A MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE FROM THOSE NATIONS WHO HAVE HELPED TO ARM THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL, WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT AN EMBARGO ON ALL SUCH DELIVERIES.

THE PRIME MINISTER: HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE CLEAR ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY STEPS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT AN EARLY MEETING OF THE KIND SUGGESTED BY MY HONOURABLE FRIEND WOULD BE LIKELY TO LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS. /B.

MR. MOONMAN: AS THIS COUNTRY WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO URGED A CEASE-FIRE ON ISRAEL, WOULD MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND AGREE THAT WE HAVE A UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY IN ENSURING THAT THERE IS A PROPER CHECK ON ARMS DELIVERIES PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE GIGANTIC BUILD-UP FROM RUSSIA?

TELEGRAPHIC SERVICE

HE PRIME MINISTER: YES. BUT AS MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND HAS
DE CLEAR REPEATEDLY ANY CONTROL OF ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST
MUL LATERAL AND EFFECTIVE. WE IMPOSED A TEMPORARY EMBARGO WHILE
HE FIGHTING WAS ON AND IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS IN THE HOPE THAT IT
OULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT IT WAS NOT. THAT IS WHY
MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND IS WORKING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENT AFFECTING THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE ARABS AND TO
ISRAEL.
=

SIR J. LANGFORD-HOLT: IS IT NOT CLEAR THAT WE ARE DRIFTING BACK INTO CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS WHICH WERE A DIRECT CAUSE OF TWO WARS? CANNOT THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN GIVE US ANY MORE HOPE OF STRONGER AND MORE STRENUOUS ACTION BEING TAKEN TO GET A SETTLEMENT IN THIS AREA?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I SHARE WHAT I KNOW TO BE THE HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN'S KEEN DESIRE TO GET A LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE KIND INDICATED BY MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND AND MYSELF IN THE HOUSE AND OUTSIDE AND BY OTHER RIGHT HONOURABLE MEMBERS. ONE OF THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF A TRULY LASTING PEACE, APART FROM ALL THE OTHERS, IS AN EFFEITIVE SYSTEM OF ARMS CONTROL. BUT I SEE NO HOPE IMMEDIATELY OF GETTING A SYSTEM OF ARMS CONTROL AHEAD OF A SETTLEMENT OF HE OTHER DEEPER AND EVEN MORE BITTER ISSUES.

ENDS VS 340.....LPS

PRODROME RABAT

SERVICE TELEX

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1076

RESTRICTED

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.
25 July, 1967.

Al Masaa, the independent Moroccan afternoon paper, has reported that Ismail el Azhari, the Sudanese President, would soon arrive in Morocco on an official mission entrusted to him by the recent meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo. According to the paper Azhari was to tour the capitals of Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference expected to take place in Khartoum in August. The Iraqi President is apparently to make a tour of Amman, Beirut, Kuwait and the Arab Gulf States at the same time.

2. Al Masaa has it that the two Arab Presidents will approach the Governments in the capitals they visit and explain that there will be three conditions stipulated for the convening of an Arab Summit Conference. These conditions are:-

(1) Attendance at Khartoum of Foreign Ministers fully authorised not only to make resolutions but also to adopt and execute them.

(2) The breaking off of diplomatic relations with America and Britain. This will be done by those States who have not already done so in accordance with the Arab Summit Conference decision that Arab States will determine their relationship with foreign states in the light of the latter's attitude towards the Palestine question.

(3) Complete boycott of oil exports to America and Britain by all Arab States. All these will have to bear their share of the sacrifice involved in proportion to the size of their hard currency reserves. These must be withdrawn from the Western banks where they are deposited.

3. Al Masaa states that the success of the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in agreeing on these conditions will be the only criterion for progress towards an Arab Summit Conference. They allude to Tunisia's objections to the decision for the Foreign Ministers' Conference being taken by representatives of the 5 radical Arab States alone.

/4.....

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

4. We do not know how sound Al Massa'a speculation is, but we can be quite certain that the Moroccans will refuse to have any part in a decision either to break off diplomatic relations with America and Britain or to surrender any of their meagre hard currency reserves to support an oil boycott of the two Anglo-Saxon countries. We also have doubts, in view of their embarrassment over the decisions on Rhodesia taken by the O.A.U. Foreign Ministers' Conference in Addis Ababa two years ago, that King Hassan would commit Morocco to be bound by any decisions taken by Foreign Ministers in Khartoum.

5. I am copying this letter to Chanceries at Khartoum, Tunis, Benghazi, Jedda, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait and the Residency Bahrain. I also enclose a spare copy in case Eastern Department may be interested.

.....

(J. F. Walker)

Le Roi Hussein est maintenant sûr qu'aucun avion anglais ou americain n'a participé a l'attaque israelienne contre les arabes

1076

MAP-119

LE ROI HUSSEIN EST MAINTENANT SUR QU'AUCUN AVION ANGLAIS OU AMERICAIN N'A PARTICIPE A L'ATTAQUE ISRALIENNE CONTRE LES ARABES.

AMMAN, 25 JUIL.-(MAP)- LE ROI HUSSEIN, S'ADRESSANT AUJOURD'HUI A UN GROUPE DE HAUTES PERSONNALITES JORDANIENNES, A DECLARE QU'IL ETAIT MAINTENANT ''SUR'' QU'AUCUN AVION ANGLAIS, OU AMERICAIN N'AVAIT PARTICIPE A L'ATTAQUE ISRALIENNE CONTRE LES PAYS ARABES.

LES RADARS JORDANIENS AVAIENT, DANS LES PREMIERES HEURES DE LA GUERRE, DECELE LA PRESENCE D'UN NOMBRE IMPORTANT D'AVIONS AU LARGE DE LA COTE ISRAELIENNE. IL EST MAINTENANT ETABLI, A DIT LE SOUVERAIN JORDANIEN, QU'IL S'AGISSAIT D'APPAREILS ISRALIENS REVENANT D'EGYPTE, LEUR MISSION ACCOMPLIE.

LE ROI HUSSEIN A D'AUTRE PART REAFFIRME LA NECESSITE D'UNE CONFERENCE DES CHEFS D'ETAT ARABES. IL A DECLARE QU'IL AVAIT L'INTENTION DE PRENDRE CONTACT PERSONNELLEMENT AVEC LES DIRIGEANTS DES ETATS ARABES POUR LEUR EXPLIQUER LES PROBLEMES DE LA JORDANIE.-(MAP)-

AA/BR++++++++++23205++++++++++++++++++++++++

Entier

26/7

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DAA

ALS

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CMFA

[Distribution Heading]

FROM Cairo TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 404 D M

[Date] 26 July. R M

H E/M 27/VII
O Sc Ars 27.VII
Sec 27/7.
D A 27/7.
F.S. 26/7

Repeated to

Sudan will want a summit for the purpose of guaranteeing her continued existence, and agreeing a line of policy that King Hussein can take. Nasser can hardly claim to lead the Arab world, and at the same time refuse to meet its chiefs! Walker 27/7

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECD FROM CAIRO.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 756 OF 25 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON. UKMIS NEW YORK. OTTAWA. MOSCOW. PARIS DELHI. ANKARA AND CERTAIN ARAB POSTS AS NECESSARY) .

REF MYTEL 745 (NOT RPT NOT TO ALL).

ARAB-ISRAEL

NOTHING MUCH MORE DEFINITE HAS EMERGED ABOUT WHAT THE ARAB LEADERS SAID IN CAIRO.MUCH OF THEIR DISCUSSION WAS COMPLETELY PRIVATE.THE FOLLOWING IS BASED ON PRESS REACTIONS.PRESIDENT NASSERS SPEECH OF JULY 23 AND WHAT DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS HAVE LEARNED OR SPECULATED.

2.IT SEEMS THE GENERAL VIEW THAT THE RUSSIANS DECLINED TO SUPPORT ANY EARLY RESUMPTION OF WAR AGAINST ISRAEL OR EVEN TO CONSIDER MILITARY

/Re-equipment

Not received 27/7

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

RE-EQUIPMENT ON MORE THAN A DEFENSIVE SCALE. BOUMEDIENNE IS THOUGHT TO HAVE TRIED WITHOUT SUCCESS TO PERSUADE THEM TO SEE THINGS IN TERMS OF A JOINT UAR-ALGERIA-SYRIA-IRAQ-SUDAN OFFENSIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND BOUMEDIENNE HIMSELF IS SUSPECTED OF HAVING HIS OWN WORLD ROLE MORE IN MIND THAT THE FORTUNES OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR CLAIMS TO KNOW THAT PRESIDENT AREF WAS INTERESTED IN THE ANNEXATION OF THE EAST BANK OF THE JORDAN. AND THAT THE SYRIANS ARE AS HOSTILE TO KING HUSSEIN AS EVER.

3. ONLY PRESIDENT AZHARI AND KING HUSSEIN ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT AN ARAB SUMMIT. BUT PRESIDENT NASSER AND THE UAR PRESS HAVE NOW CONFIRMED THAT THE UAR WILL ATTEND THE SUMMIT PROVIDED THAT A UNITED FRONT CAN BE ASSURED BEFOREHAND. ALTHOUGH ON JULY 23 PRESIDENT NASSER ATTACKED SAUDI ARABIA HE TALKED OF ~~QUOTE~~ "KING FEISALS PRESS AND RADIO" ~~UNQUOTE~~ RATHER THAN THE KING HIMSELF AND IN A COMPARATIVELY MILD TONE (FOR HIM). THE UAR PRESS HAS BEEN VERY QUIET RECENTLY ABOUT THE SHORT COMINGS OF THE ~~QUOTE~~ "NON-PROGRESSIVE" ~~UNQUOTE~~ ARAB GOVERNMENTS. BOTH PRESIDENT AND PRESS HAVE * CAREFUL TO EXPLAIN THAT CAIRO MEETINGS WERE NOT RPT NOT A ~~QUOTE~~ /progressive

* ? word omitted (? been)

PROGRESSIVE" ~~UNQUOTE~~ SUMMIT OR A DIVISIVE MOVE. THE ARAB LEAGUE HEADQUARTERS ARE REPORTED AS SAYING THAT IT IS AGREED TO HOLD A BOYCOTT CONFERENCE AFTER THE SUMMIT MEETING.

4. IT LOOKS THEREFORE AS THOUGH THE BEST THE LEADERS COULD DO IN CAIRO WAS TO AGREE THAT A SUMMIT SHOULD BE TRIED. THOUGH IT IS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT NEITHER BOUMEDIENNE NOR ATASSI FAVOURS IT.

5. NOTHING IN THIS SUGGESTS THAT PRESIDENT NASSER FEELS HIMSELF IN ANY STRONG POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD. OR THAT HE WAS ABLE TO PLAY THE ROLE OF LEADER IN THE CAIRO MEETINGS FOR ALL HIS VALIANT LANGUAGE.

6. MEANWHILE. THE ONLY SUGGESTION OF ANY CONCESSION THAT THE UAR WOULD BE PREPARED TOMAKE TO ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL IS FREE NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. IT IS APPARENTLY THE EASTERN BLOC MISSIONS WHO ARE SAYING THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTED. ADDING THAT THE RETURN OF UNEF WOULD BE THE OBVIOUS WAY TO ACHIEVE IT. SOSFA.

U/N Rabat 1076

OS Ats 4. VIII
FO 4/8
Edit Mw

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN

Telno. 19 Saving 28 July, 1967 (JIPGD)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
-3 AUG 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 19 Saving of 28 July.
Repeated for information Saving to: Certain Other Posts UNNUMBERED.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

27 July, 1967

From the London "Evening Standard" of 26 July (similar reports appeared in other papers), "Petrol Ration Danger Dying. The danger of petrol rationing has definitely receded and the Cabinet is confident there will be no supply difficulties in August and September. This is the situation after a final pre-holiday season review by Mr. Wilson and key Ministers. Throwing aside only a little caution they would probably extend their forecast considerably. The Arab countries are now back in business with resumption of exports which were stopped during the Arab-Israeli war. This is indirectly easing the British position although the embargo by those countries on deliveries to Britain and America is still in force. United States cooperation in re-arranging the pattern of world supplies has greatly helped the Whitehall planners."

2. "Is it not humorous to see the Communist States holding two summit conferences to discuss the Middle East problem, which is a secondary issue to them, while those most concerned with the problem are unable to hold a single summit conference to discuss their problem?" - From an article in Ad-Dustur broadcast by Amman Radio, 17 July.

3. Speaking on the Middle East conflict, the Rumanian Prime Minister, M. Maurer, said at a dinner given in his honour by the Netherlands Prime Minister on 17 July: "The Rumanian Government has stated on many occasions that these problems cannot be settled by ... arms and that attempts to resolve them by force cannot serve the interests of the peoples in that part of the world. Rational and durable solutions ... can be obtained only by peaceful means ... the elimination of foreign interference and respect for the fundamental interests of each State, based on its independent and sovereign existence".

4. The Libyan newspaper Al-Haqiqah has accused certain Arab oil-producing countries of taking over Libya's oil markets. It said that stand on the Arab question, is "encountering piracy and robbery by certain Arab and friendly States in OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). These countries are fighting over the Libyan market in West Germany to supply it with oil for a certain period; indeed, to dictate terms for a minimum of two years. Our trade is in difficulties, but working hours in Tunisian, Egyptian and Lebanese ports have been extended to receive what Libyan ports have rejected. The Arab information machinery has exploited the good-hearted citizens to benefit the trade of one Arab country at the expense of another." Libyan News Agency in Arabic, 23 July.

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5. "Oil Ministry sources say that during the Middle East crisis Libya has suffered the greatest loss in production of all the Arab oil-producing countries.... Production in June was 1,038,000 barrels a day less than in May .... No other Arab country has suffered such a loss, or anything like it." - Bayda Radio in Arabic, 23 July.

6. The official Yugoslav news agency, Tanyug, in a despatch from Cairo on 16 July, commented on the reported arms negotiations between the Sudan and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, including the supply of heavy tanks and MiG aircraft. "These deliveries could mark the end of the Western influence on the Sudan", the agency added.

7. "The Soviet MiG-21 aircraft had no chance against the Mirage III-C used by the Israelis. It is less manoeuvrable and the pilot has poor visibility. The Mirage carries 50 per cent more fire-power in the form of missiles and has a dual guidance system for firing, which the MiG lacks .... Spare parts for Soviet equipment have always been in short supply, necessitating the dismantling of some operating units. The Soviet equipment, designed largely for cold climates, overheated in desert conditions ... Soviet T-34 tanks used by the Egyptians were World War II products and proved to be no match against Israeli tanks. They overheated after two or three hours' operation, consumed fuel at a high rate and lacked armour and sufficient fire-power". From an editorial in the Nairobi Daily Nation, 8 July.

8. Five thousand Malta dockyard workers are in danger of losing their jobs because of the closure of the Suez Canal, the Chairman of the Dockyard Council of Administration said in Valletta on 20 July.

9. "It is also necessary for us to consult with each other, maintain wisdom in our attitudes and be far-sighted, for we have not the ability to face the whole world and expect the Great Powers to come to us on their knees. No one with any sense can conceive this". - President Bourgiba of Tunisia, reported by Tunis Radio, 17 July.

10. "Should the war of nerves end in a clear-cut victory for the Soviet side - and all those who are loyal to Arabism and the homeland hope that such a victory will never occur - the price the Arabs will pay at the cost of their independence, traditions and future will be so high that it will stagger the imagination .... If we bear in mind that the Soviet Union has never claimed, even during the time of its most cordial friendship with the Arabs, that wiping out Israel is its goal, we may deduce that Moscow is now preparing a dreadful trap for those deceived by its friendship". Jiddah Radio in Arabic, 19 July.

11. An Algiers Radio broadcast on 16 July said: "In connexion with the fighting which took place on Friday and Saturday (14 and 15 July) along the Suez Canal ... the participation of Algerian armed forces ... has been effective and direct. Our troops have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in lives and material on the ground, in the air and in the canal waters. Our troops fought with exemplary valour. Four of our soldiers were wounded. Algerian 'sisters' have also taken part in the fighting, particularly in anti-aircraft units".

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(1076)

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ن وكالة نوفوستي

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حول لاحداث الشرق الاوسط

الازمة

In case it is of any value, this is the Arabic text carried by MAP of the "Novosti" Article. MAP's Arabic Editor claims, from years of experience, to recognise the Arabic style as distinctly authentic "Novosti" Arabic.

[signature] 28/7/1967

BRITISH EMBASSY
PRESS SECTION AND READING ROOM,
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RABAT, MOROCCO. 329-96

مخبر المامة الحي

عن اسرائيل * كما

بسرعة * مخبر انه

صورة مجزأة بعد ان

B.L. Pridham Esq.
JIPGD
Foreign Office

X 28/7

بلاد العالم العربي [illegible] الى ان [illegible] الى الحقيقة الواقعة وهي ان

المتحدين [illegible] سماعات سرية وعلنية من قوات الاستعمار بين

العربيين [illegible] وجود مساعدة مادية من الاتحاد السوفيتي *

ان [illegible] السوفيتي يفهم ويقدر المصالح الشرعية للشعوب العربية * ولهذا فانه

يطلق [illegible] على الدول العربية في حربها العادلة الدفاعية ضد المتحدين

في [illegible] * مخبر ان الحكومة السوفيتية قد اعلنت مرارا وتكرارا انها لن

تتدخل في الحرب العربية مع اسرائيل الا اذا [illegible] ان الولايات المتحدة

تتدخل [illegible] تلك الدولة * يجمع

[illegible]

(12 pages of arabic)

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BRITISH EMBASSY
RABAT

CONFIDENTIAL

31 July 1967

I am very conscious that I owe you an indication of how Moroccan policy is moving as regards an Arab/Israeli settlement. The trouble has been that the Moroccans have been playing their cards very close to their chest so that virtually the only source of reliable information would be the Foreign Minister himself. Laraki agreed to see me before I return for U.K. leave but he has finally decided to put this off until his return from Khartoum. All I know, therefore, is what I have picked up from Arab diplomatic colleagues and other hearsay sources.

2. The principal Moroccan concern appears still to be lest Boumedienne establish some form of leadership in or acceptance of his policies by the Arab world. Better Nasser than that. An open split between the revolutionary and non-revolutionary regimes would not suit the Moroccan book but nor, on the other hand, would a form of unity which resulted in the Bloc of Four (or Five) dominating the rest. The Algerian threat would in either case be greater. So, on the one hand, the Moroccans have been careful not to reject the invitation to Khartoum while, on the other, concerting pressure with the Saudis, the Tunisians and the Kuwaitisto make the conditions of attendance acceptable. Advance commitments (e.g. on breach of relations and the oil embargo), as first demanded by the Sudanese, were not acceptable. Nor could the Moroccans agree that the Foreign Ministers could make irrevocable commitments. A common line was hammered out during the simultaneous visits of the Saudi and Kuwaiti Foreign Ministers (interesting, incidentally, as a sign of Hassan's stature, that they came here) from 18 to 23 July and from 17 to 19 July respectively, And was sold to Nasser: the Sudan is not represented here and when their Ambassador in Cairo, Othman Abdelkader, was sent here as emissary of his President he was treated with scant respect - a mere Head of Department met him at the airport.

3. What was agreed, I am told, was that:

(a) the Khartoum meeting was to be regarded as a continuation of the meetings of Arab Foreign Ministers which took place earlier at Kuwait and New York. The talks would be exploratory and without commitment.

(b) "rupture of diplomatic relations" was to be dropped from the agenda;

/(c)

D.J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East African Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) the other items on the agenda proposed by the Sudanese would be retained as subjects for discussion, but without prior commitment;

(d) Foreign Ministers attending would be free to raise other matters, not on the Sudanese agenda.

If this is confirmed, it would appear to be a considerable achievement for Hassan. Perhaps also for Nasser. One source told me that Nasser had really been very reasonable: it looked as though he quite welcomed outside support against Atassi and Boumedienne.

4. King Hassan's dislike of the Baath and Atassi appears to be a minor reflection of his attitude to Boumedienne. Despite Arab pressure on him for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria, and the visit of Farid Zernaddin, an important Syrian emissary, to the Palace a week ago, he has not followed Bourguiba's lead. At the same time he is showing little sympathy for Arif, and I understand that the visit of Fadhil Jamali, the Iraqi Royalist ex-Foreign Minister, to Morocco after an eight years wait is taking place at the King's behest.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to the British Interests sections at Cairo, Khartoum and Algiers, and to Chancery at Jedda.

(L.G.Holliday)

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PRIORITY RABAT

U/N 31

ADDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 423.
R F I PRIORITY TO RABAT, ALGIERS, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, BENGAZI,
CAIRO, JEDDAH, AMMAN BEIRUT KUWAIT, U
U/N , HCADEN 21 WASHINGTON 20 UKMIS N. Y. 21 .
DELEGATIONS ARE NOW ARRIVING FOR THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS
CONFERENCE DUE TO BEGIN ON 1 AUGUST AT 11A.M. 2 .
THE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS,
ARE AS FOLLOWS.
U.A.R. MAHMOUD RIAD,
SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN SAQQAF,
ALGERIA, PROBABLY BOUTEFLIKA,
TUNISIA, MONGI SLIM (MINISTER OF JUSTICE).
IRAQ , ISMAIL KHAIRALLA (ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER).
SYRIA, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MAKHOUS.
YEMEN, DR MOHD ABDEL AZIZ SALAM.
KUWAIT, JABIR EL AHMED , LIBYA, AHMED EL BISHTI.
LEBANON, GEORGE HAKIM.
MOROCCO, DR AHMED EL IRAQI. (The correct way of spelling LARAKI!) (AL ARAKI / RAQI)
THE SUDANESE DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY MAHGOUB WHO IS
EXPECTED TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE.
OBSERVERS WILL BE HASSOUNA FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE AND
SHUK AIRI FOR THE P.L.O. .
IT IS ALSO ANNOUNCED THE DELEGATION FROM THE SOUTH
ARABIAN LIßERATION FRONT , WILL INCLUDE BASUNDA AND
PROBABLY MAKKAWI AS WELL AS ASNAG

/S 3 . . .

TELEX ◇ SIERRA

5.

THE JORDANIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IS UNABLE SO FAR TO [redacted] WHO WILL COME FROM AMMAN.

4.

THE PRESS HERE REPORT THAT THE CONFERENCE AGENDA DEALS CHIEFLY WITH WAYS AND MEANS TO END THE U.A.R. SAUDI DISPUTE OVER THE YEMEN.

CONSIDERATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS IS ALSO OF COURSE ON THE AGENDA, TOGETHER WITH CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITIES OF MOBILISING ARAB RESERVES AND CAPABILITIES TO THE SERVICE OF THE COMMON CAUSE, BUT ACCORDING TO THE PRESS THESE ARE NOT THE PRINCIPAL ITEMS

REDDAWAY

X

WHAT IS THE FO NO TO US PSE???

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